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Abstract 
The 'sun-rise' industry of private health care, especially private 
hospitals, in Thailand throws many questions to the health policy forum. 
Will the growth of the private health sector reduce public health 
expenditure, or will it increase total expenditure on health? The focus 
of this study is on equity in health and health care: in a country where 
private expenditure dominates total health expenditure and the 
government lets the private health sector flourish, in this scenario, 
are the poor or the underprivileged the victims of this limited 
privatisation policy? 
The main research objective was to assess the equity of coverage of 
public and private health in an urban area in order to identify policies 
of promotion and regulation which would lead to an equitable and 
efficient health service system. The study used Phitsanulok municipal 
area as a model to develop policy recommendations for other urban areas. 
There were three main methods of data collection: general household 
survey, health diary plus household health interview and a one-day bed 
census of patients in public and private hospitals in the municipality. 
The first two methods employed multi-stage random sampling with clusters 
of 12 and 3 households, respectively, as smallest sampling units and 
these neighbourhood households were divided into three groups to 
represent each season in a year. 
The main findings were that inequalities in health existed among 
different household income, education and occupational groups, including 
these attributes of the education and occupational groups adjusted 
according to the household head. Unequal accessibility to health care 
seemed to affect both reported rates of illness within the past two 
weeks and hospitalisation during the past 12 months. Inequity of health 
care financing was obvious in that the underprivileged (the poor, the 
uninsured and underinsured) paid out of pocket as a percentage of their 
household income higher sums than the privileged groups. 
The private health sector (private clinics and private hospitals) was 
the major provider of health care to urban dwellers for both outpatient 
and inpatient services. Users of public facilities were the lower income 
groups and civil servants, while users of the private health sector were 
the higher income groups, the higher occupational groups and the younger 
age groups. Inpatients of private hospitals were more likely to be 
covered by health benefit schemes (civil servant benefit, private 
insurance, etc.) than inpatients of public hospitals. Information on the 
utilisation and financing pattern of private health services reconfirmed 
inequity of health care financing. 
It is obvious that the Thai health care system needs changes to reduce 
inequity in health and health care. Universal coverage ;s a way towards 
more equitable health care financing. While Thai citizens (in urban 
areas) have enjoyed a wide choice of health utilisation, a public 
competition model could be applied to the public health sector to make 
public services more competitive and more efficient. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Health is a prerequisite for economic development, and better economic 
status of the population in turn leads to better health as well (Maxwell 
1981). Though health services may have made fewer contributions to 
health as compared to broad social policies, its substantial expenditure 
in terms of money cannot be overlooked. The imbalance in economic growth 
without social development has resulted in underprivileged, underserved 
people suffering from poor health conditions, and, at the same time; has 
prevented them from being able to access health care (O'Neill 1983). 
Different political economies result in a diversity of health service 
systems, from highly competitive market systems to highly socialised 
health care. Egalitarian systems, like that of the National Health 
Service of the United Kingdom, were thought to provide for equity in 
health, but evidence from the UK, e.g. the Black Report (DHSS 1980) and 
the White Paper (HMSO 1989), have shown that the achievement of equity 
in a nationalised system has been less successful than expected. 
In the 1980s, the New Right's ideas of advocating market mechanisms has 
invaded the health care environment. A Conservative Minister of Health 
in the UK aimed at a 25% share for the private health sector rather than 
the 5% in 1980 (Bosanquet 1983). Arguments have arisen over that what 
should be the aims of a health care system. The National Audit Office 
(1989) advocated that inequality in health among different social 
classes could be overcome through collaboration between government 
bodies and the independent health sector. When the Conservative 
government moved to reform health care, there emerged three important 
principles for reforming the British National Health Service: 
efficiency, equity and choice (Ham et a1 1990). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, many other developed countries made a transition 
from health insurance to universal services so as to reduce inequity 
(Abel-Smith 1985). But in the late 1980s, when those countries realised 
the escalating costs of health care to government budgets, they thought 
of changing the methods of financing health services by creating 
competition on the demand side (amongst finanCing agents) and on the 
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supply side (competition amongst health care providers). The main 
reasons were political as well as financial pressures (Donaldson and 
Gerard 1993). 
Health care reforms in developed countries also highlight the concept of 
'public competition' which remedies restricted choice within the public 
system and is argued to increase efficiency of the system and patient 
care (Saltman and Von Otter 1992). Wider choices are also provided to 
consumers to exit to private health services. Hard efforts have to be 
put into the management process of the public health sector to be 
competitive and responsive to consumer needs (Harrison et al 1992). 
Developing countries find it difficult to finance health care totally 
out of tax revenue. Community financing and user charges have been the 
two main sources of enhanced funding (Donaldson and Gerard 1993). 
However, many countries are considering the possibility of introducing 
compulsory insurance schemes. The reasons are to find more resources for 
the health sector and to remedy dissatisfaction with the existing 
inefficient health services (Abel-Smith 1992). 
The Thai health care system is a mixed system. Westernised medicine has 
dominated both public and private health services for almost one hundred 
years. There has never been any written statement that says health 
services are covered by the government. The first government hospital to 
be built was for merit making by King Rama V for the loss of his son. 
Independent nonprofit-making (mission) hospitals were widely distributed 
long before the establishment of government provincial hospitals. And no 
more than 16 years ago, in the fourth National Health Plan (1977-1981), 
the government proposed that district hospitals should cover the whole 
country. In the meantime, the government health budget has been shifted 
to primary health care activities. The two shifts of budget, to some 
extent, have given rise to the growing economy of the private health 
sector especially in Bangkok and big cities where government hospitals 
have been underfunded. 
Seventy percent of health expenditures in Thailand come from the pocket 
of consumers. This pattern of health care financing has not been 
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drastically changed even since the Social Security Act has been in 
effect in June 1991. The high burden of health expenditure continues. 
Even the low income card scheme, which has given free care for the poor 
for 16 years, does not ensure that the right people get free treatment 
because of mismanagement and abuse in the distribution of the cards 
(Mills 1991). 
The Thai economy in the seventh National Socioeconomic Development Plan 
(1992-1996) is expected to grow at a sustainable rate of 7% per year. 
Rapid urbanisation with migration of workers, dependents included, to 5 
industrialised zones, namely: peri-metropolitan, eastern sea coast, 
southern sea coast, big cities throughout, and border towns, is 
anticipated. The corollary is how to plan for the most expensive health 
care, ie. hospital services, in those areas. Should the government 
strongly encourage the private sector to be a partner in health care 
provision, and, should more capital funds be raised from private finance 
for private hospitals? Or should the government be the major provider of 
hospital care in these urbanised areas? 
The art of balancing the growth of public and private health sectors in 
Thailand is an emerging important issue. In planning and financing the 
public health sector. complementary information from the private sector 
cannot be neglected. In Thailand, information on the private health 
sector is badly needed, otherwise the policy issues on the public and 
private mix will be weakly postulated. or biased to one or another 
extreme. 
The research objectives were to assess equity in health in terms of the 
morbidity and mortality of different socioeconomic groups. to assess the 
equity of the health services in terms of accessibility and utilisation 
and to determine factors influencing utilisation patterns for public and 
private health services. It reviews general arguments on the merits of 
public and private health care. Major issues of concern are equity, 
efficiency a~d choice of provider. The research focused on these issues 
in an urban area of one province. An in-depth study illustrates the 
pattern of financing health services in both sectors. Equity is 
extensively considered through household level data to make sure that 
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the policies to be proposed have taken into account all relevant aspects 
of health, both economic and social dimensions. 
As the family is the smallest unit with a close tie, household demand 
for health care is a fundamental concept to approach the issue of equity 
in health. There have been a number of household surveys on health and 
economic aspects, but their integration to explore issues on equity in 
health and the public and private mix has never been attempted. It is 
worthwhile to develop this untapped use of household information, so 
that a longitudinal monitoring system of equity can be set up for the 
whole country. 
This thesis contains 10 chapters. Chapter 2 reviews literature on 
equity, efficiency and choice from an international perspectives. It 
begins with theoretical debates on the theories of society, implications 
of the theories for health care and the specific characteristics of 
health care. Then, a section on the public and private mix in health 
care reflects how each country lays out its health care system. The 
chapter extensively reviews theoretical and practical definitions of 
equity but the researcher is inclined to adopt three practical 
definitions: equity in health care delivery, equity of financing health 
care and equity in health. Efficiency in health care is concerned about 
information to measure efficiency and experiences of market efficiency. 
Consumer choice and satisfaction are gaining more attention from many 
countries as an important component to reform. Finally some examples of 
health care reforms in both developed and developing countries are drawn 
to provide a basis for considering Thai health care reform. 
Chapter 3 discusses details on the Thai health care system in relation 
to the framework of chapter 2. It explains the trends of health care 
financing and health care provision in Thailand where the private sector 
has become dominant in financing and more important in provision. 
Previous studies on equity, efficiency and consumer satisfaction in 
Thailand and particularly in the study site are reviewed. Interactions 
and recent policies influencing relationships between the public and 
private sectors are discussed. The chapter ends with the provincial 
background of the study site. 
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Chapter 4 describes how this study was done. There were three main 
methods employed: a general household survey of 890 households, a health 
diary plus interview of 117 households and a one-day bed census in two 
public and three private hospitals. Reinterviews were undertake~ for the 
general household survey to ascertain the reliability of obtained data. 
There is a short discussion on the grouping of socio-economic variables 
used in this study. 
The results of this study are presented in three chapters. Chapter 5 
compares the results between the general household survey and the health 
diary plus interview. Household characteristics - household income, 
social characteristiCS, housing and overcrowding index, household 
durab1es and family wealth index - and morbidity and mortality from the 
two surveys are compared. The chapter discusses potential variations 
caused by methods, interviewers and seasons. 
Chapter 6 provides the main presentation on equity. Data from the 
general household survey are used to demonstrate three main aspects of 
equity. Equity in health is explored through differentials of mortality 
and morbidity amongst different socio-economic groups. Equity in health 
care delivery includes access as a prerequisite to health care, 
utilisation when ill, hospitalisation, and use of preventive and 
promotive services. Equity of financing health care stresses costs of 
care, payers of health services and the burden of health service costs 
in relation to household income. The scope of this chapter covers all 
public and private health services in this urban area, and the 
calculation of household health expenditures adjusted for all 
reimbursable expenditures. 
Chapter 7 is complementary to Chapter 6, especially in terms of 
hospitalisation. However, its strengths are more than complementary. It 
gives more detail on behaviours of the public and private hospitals. The 
input mixes (especially manpower and hospital facilities) and outputs 
(throughputs and patterns of diseases with average lengths of stay) of 
both types of hospitals are compared. User characteristics of and 
consumer views towards both public and private health services are also 
presented. 
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Chapter 8 is a discussion chapter drawing all findings in the previous 
three chapters together as the basis for policy recommendations. The 
chapter estimates sources of finance (including the share of total 
expenditure) of each public and private health service ;n this urban 
area. Furthermore, utilisation data of all health services and costs to 
users are worked up in terms of an estimated matrix of the public and 
private mix in health care financing and provision in an urban area. 
Clearer policies can be drawn from this matrix. The chapter further 
discusses the interface between the public and private sectors in terms 
of referrals of patients, sharing of personnel and medical technology. 
Finally three aspects of equity are discussed; the worst is inequity in 
financing heath services. 
Chapter 9 explores policy implications for long term health care reform 
in Thailand. The philosophy of the Thai health care system provides a 
fundamental ideology for reform. The chapter discusses policy 
recommendations on increasing the role of public financing to control 
total health expenditure, and how to achieve that role. Privatisation 
policies are debated, for example contracting services from competing 
public and private sectors to increase efficiency. How the public sector 
adjusts itself to be more efficient and to safeguard equity and quality 
of care is also discussed. Quality assurance and regulations are 
recommended. And finally phasing for long term health care reform is 
suggested. The thesis ends with a discussion on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research methodology and suggestions for further 
research. 
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2. EQUITY. EFFICIENCY AND CHOICE: AN INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature related to recent concepts, 
developments and reforms in health care provision in the international 
arena. The central arguments are focused on three basic concerns: 
equity, efficiency and choice. The first part will discuss the 
theoretical debate of these issues, followed by a substantial review on 
equity both in terms of definition and in practice. The chapter will 
proceed further to issues on efficiency in health care and consumer 
choice and satisfaction. Examples of health care reforms will highlight 
the arguments on balancing these three principles. 
2.1 Theoretical debate 
In the international arena of health care reform in the 1990s, the most 
prominent arguments are on equity, efficiency and choice (Ham et al 
1990). The concepts underlying these arguments are linked to theories of 
society. Barr (1987) explained that I[A) society is a co-operative 
venture for the mutual advantage of its members. It generally contains 
both an identity of interests and conflicts of interest between 
individuals and groups'. Three broad types of theories of society that 
explain these conflicts in relation to the level of state intervention 
are libertarian, liberal and collectivist. 
Apart from the discussion on the theories of society, the discussion on 
the specific characteristics of health care will give details on why 
equity, efficiency and consumer choice in health care have become very 
important in recent years. 
The theories of society 
History tells that human society has evolved from a laissez-faire 
society without state intervention to a stronger state controlled 
society. The first ideology was that of the libertarians. When society 
developed, more problems emerged, and at the same time the ideologies of 
liberals and collectivists developed to direct soc;al changes. 
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The ideology of libertarianism is laissez-faire. Libertarians respect 
individual members of society and protect individual freedom. They 
advocate free markets and private property as they will increase 
productivity and the distribution of goods. These means are considered 
to lead to maximisation of total welfare (Barr 1987). Libertarians 
regard government control as harmful (reduces welfare) and regard 
taxation as a form of theft (Nozick 1974). However, they accept some 
form of taxation, ego taxes for poverty relief as a means of government 
intervention (Hayek 1960). 
The liberal philosophy goes beyond that of libertarians as it embraces 
economic security or need (Gilson 1985). It accepts a greater state 
distributional role as the free market is not the best mechanism for 
production and distribution of all goods. The variants of this 
philosophy are utilitarianism and Raw1sianism. 
The utilitarian aim is a good example of the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity. '[Its] aim is to distribute goods (including 
rights, freedoms and political power) so as to maximise the total 
utility (welfare) of the members of society' (Gilson 1988). 
Utilitarians welcome the role of the state to redistribute goods to 
ensure maximum utility to the point where no one can be made better off 
without anyone becoming worse off (Paretian allocation). Rawlsianism is 
also concerned with the distribution of liberty but has a second 
principle in favour of the least well-off. An allocation that makes the 
rich better off even without jeopardising the poor is unacceptable. 
The three main aims of collectivists are equality, freedom and 
fraternity. Collectivists analyse society as groups of social classes 
and conflicts between social classes lead to exploitation. Co-operation 
rather than competition is the goal of society to achieve fraternity. 
Free markets will never work well unless there is equality in terms of 
power and wealth. Government control is a means to redistribute rights 
and wealth to achieve social justice. 
The welfare state came to prominence when the ideologies of the liberals 
were dominant, ie. around the Second World War (Barr 1987). Social 
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security and social services became state concerns so as to achieve 
social justice. However. collectivists argue that the welfare state is a 
strategy to support inequalities rather than to remedy them (Barr 1987). 
Deep recession in the West with declining productivity in nationalised 
industries encouraged a new ideology of the New Right. The Chicago 
Neoclassical School and the Austrian School are examples (Bennett 1991). 
They advocate the libertarians' ideology. the role of free markets to 
achieve efficient distribution of goods and retain public choice. 
Implications of the theories of society for health care 
The health care system is by no means outside the framework of society. 
The logic of the government to provide health care is the same as the 
government's \political economy. As politics changes over time. so the 
health care s~tem keeps on changing accordingly. ie. the government 
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attitude to the health care system reflects the prevailing ideology. 
De Jong and Rutten (1983) discussed four distribution principles in 
relation to promoting health and removing inequalities in general and in 
health. Each of their distribution principles is derived from a broader 
theory. The four principles are: utilitarianism (derived from 
utilitarian theory). egalitarianism (from egalitarian theory). 
libertarianism (from entitlement theory) and equal access (from theory 
of the welfare state). These distribution principles operate at 
different levels; structural (how society functions). process (method of 
distribution) and outcome levels (effectiveness. health status). The 
collectivist philosophy (egalitarianism) requires structural re-
arrangements as a prerequisite condition. The equal access principle has 
an advantage of being practical.ie. no social reform is necessary. but 
it neglects the effectiveness (outcome) of the system. Utilitarianism 
makes the most efficient use of scarce resources (it is process-
oriented) but egalitarianism aims to equalise health status output. 
The authors further discussed policy options relating to the four 
distribution principles in relation to the health care system. 
Libertarians do not believe in the right to health care but worship 
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freedom. Then there will be a wide range of services for the rich but 
limited acute services for the poor. Public health activities are 
strictly limited to necessary measures. Utilitarians give high priority 
to public health and health education activities; considerable priority 
to screening, curative and rehabilitative services; but low priority to 
care. The equal access principle is very expensive because it guarantees 
an equal access right, so health services are under pressures from both 
professionals and consumers. The egalitarian principle is advocated by 
the authors as the best choice for achieving Health for All. Individuals 
are guaranteed the right to a minimum health level and minimum health 
care. It goes further than the utilitarian policies in that care for the 
chronically ill and handicapped is also given a priority. To cope with 
high demand for health and health care in a welfare state, recent health 
policy developments have focused on competition, cost-sharing, cost-
effectiveness and individual responsibility. The implications of these 
policies for the welfare state are to increase the role of the market, 
increase individual responsibility, improve budgeting and evaluation 
techniques, and reduce the guaranteed service levels. In sum, an equal 
access principle should be replaced by libertarian, utilitarian and 
egalitarian principles, the authors concluded. 
The British health care system is an example of governments' changing 
attitudes. In 1948, the Labour government applied the collectivist's 
view (egalitarian) to nationalise the health services. The National 
Health Service has been financed through taxation and redistributed for 
equal access. The strength of the system is the equity principle. The 
system has been criticised for inefficiency and limited choices 
(Enthoven 1985). In the 1980s, the Conservative governments have applied 
the libertarian principle to reform the National Health Service. In the 
White Paper 'Working for Patients', separation of purchaser and 
provider, self-governing hospital trusts and internal markets are 
created to increase system efficiency; and contracting for clinical 
services is considered to increase patient choice. But the equity 
principle is still influential. as can be seen from the fact that the 
NHS is mainly financed by general taxation (HMSO 1989). 
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Despite egalitarian and libertarian principles. the NHS has tried to 
deploy the utilitarian principle in prioritising health programmes so 
as to maximise the utility of limited resources. The quality-adjusted 
life year (OALY) is a utility unit developed by combining number of 
years gained from an intervention and quality of life during that time 
gained. Costs per CALY of different treatments are compared for various 
disease conditions. For example it was suggested that high priority 
should be given to the insertion of pacemakers for heart block 
(condition with irregular heart beats) because the cost per CALY was 
less than that for other treatments (Williams 1985). 
"The utilitarian basis of this approach to rationing has 
great appeal. 00 we want to obtain the most health care 
possible from our given resources? Is it not fairer to spend 
£100 000 on treatments yielding benefit to more people than 
wasting it on one fancy technological treatment? Plausible 
enough sentiments. even having an appealing distributional 
equity perhaps in a closed collectively-oriented society. 
But in a society such as that of the United Kingdom may they 
not have the effect of precipitating a two-tier system of 
care with the rich going elsewhere for care and the poor 
relying on charity?" (Roberts 1989) 
The transition of the British NHS reflects a mix of distribution 
principles. However. a strong commitment to equity has been given a top 
priority ~ince its foundation. 
" ... fundamental rationale from a free-at-the point-of-
service national health service is that the type and quality 
of service offered shall not be related to willingness-and-
ability to pay. and that it shall be provided according to 
nationally determined criteria of eligibility as uniformly 
as possible over the country at large. and financed 
according to ability to pay. not according to benefit 
received. out of centrally administered taxes. To the extent 
that the system departs from these principles, it is because 
of concessions to human frailty: either to reduce abuse or 
because of inability to control the system financially or 
managerially without decentralisation, which in turn has 
generated unwanted variations in provision. In other words, 
the basic principle is a centralising, egalitarian one, and 
all departures from it are to be regarded as blemishes or 
imperfections, to be minimised if they cannot be expunged." 
(Williams 1980) 
The implications of theories of society for Thai health care have not 
been dramatic. The Thai culture favours freedom while the political 
system has been under military power since the institution of a 
democratic monarchy in 1932. The collectivist philosophy has been 
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regarded as against the monarchy system. Health policies have been based 
on libertarianism. An obvious example is that fees have been charged for 
a long time at government hospitals. 
The development of Thai governments' health policies can be grouped into 
three periods. The earliest period (from 1942 to 1946) emphasised the 
prevention and control of communicable diseases. The second period (from 
1946 to 1976) saw the expansion of health infrastructure at the 
provincial level. The third period (from 1976 till now) is concerned 
more with accessibility and equity in health care. Physical access is 
ensured by complete coverage of district hospitals. It was in 1976 that 
the government issued a policy on free medical care for those on low 
incomes to remove economic barriers to health care. Even though these 
health policies were addressed to Parliament by the Cabinet, they were 
meant for the Ministry of Public Health rather than for other 
ministries. 
At the end of the second period, in 1974, the Board of Investment (BOI) 
of the Prime Minister's Office gave incentives to investors of private 
health care as one area of the country's industrial development. This 
policy has triggered the expansion of private for profit hospitals. The 
share of private hospital beds to total beds in Bangkok has increased 
rapidly. Ten years later, incentives for private hospitals in Bangkok 
were upheld. Details of the Thai health care system will be discussed in 
chapter 3. 
The specific characteristics of health care 
Having discussed the theories of society in relation to distribution 
principles, this section will discuss the specific characteristics of 
health care to consider in more detail whether health care is the same 
as or different from other commodities. Two main arguments are 
considered: the marketability of health care and the moral issue of 
health care. 
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Libertarians regard the market as the best mechanism to distribute 
goods. However, only when the standard assumptions hold, will the market 
mechanism be perfect. The standard assumptions include (Barr 1987): 
Perfect informationj 
Perfect competition; 
- Absence of market failure. 
On the contrary, if these assumptions do not hold, the market will not 
work as efficiently as expected. This warrants some form of state 
intervention to redistribute resources efficiently and equitably (the 
aims of most governments). The state can intervene either directly: 
through methods of finance, public production and regulation; or 
indirectly through cash transfers (Barr 1987). Strong state intervention 
reflects the views of collectivists. 
However, in the 19805, the emergence of the New Right loosened the 
conditions in standard assumptions as preconditions for marketability. 
Friedman and Friedman (1980) of the Chicago Neoclassical School argued 
against state intervention: 
"Perfection is not of this world. There will always be 
shoddy products, quacks and con artists. But on the whole, 
market competition, when it is permitted to work, protects 
the consumer better than do the alternative government 
mechanisms that have increasingly been superimposed on the 
market." 
The Austrian School is more specific on imperfect information. Existing 
information is far from perfect, it tends to be localised and 
inaccessible to the government. Market mechanisms will create more 
information that is useful for consumers and providers. 
In discussing the marketability of health care in relation to the 
standard assumptions, the following arguments prevail. Information in 
the health care environment tends to be asymmetrical (imperfect). The 
major cause is the uncertainty characteristic of health care. Doctors, 
to a certain extent, know the consequences of the diseases more than 
their patients. The standard theory of demand and supply in determining 
the quantity and quality of care needed is not applicable. Supplier-
induced demand is the phenomenon observed. The second argument is that 
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competition in health care tends to be imperfect. There are limitations 
to entry as well as exit from the market. Professional bodies regulate 
the number of providers and control the standards of practice. This 
monopolistic characteristic limits competition. The third argument is 
that of market failures because health care possesses externalities. 
moreover it can be a public good and a merit want (Barr 1987. Cullis and 
West 1979). 
Externalities of health services are the external effects to people 
other than consumers. ego immunisation against infectious diseases 
provides protection to those not immunised as well. However. it is 
difficult to exclude them from having this benefit (non-excludability). 
though it is undesirable to exclude. To some extent. certain health 
services are non-rival. ie. one consumer does not inhibit others from 
using them. as in the case of vector control through environmental 
management. Non-rivalness and non-excludability properties make some 
health services public goods. which are difficult to market because 
there will be a lot of free riders (who can benefit without paying). 
Again the argument arises. not all health services are public goods. 
Curative and rehabilitative services are the target for transferring to 
markets. They are patient-related. For example. only victims of cancer 
get the benefits from chemotherapy. Drug supplies may be used up by 
cancer cases and nothing is left for other diseases (eg. communicable 
diseases). Then there has to be a rationing system to allocate limited 
resources to other needy cases. User charges may be collected from 
treatments of cancer cases. It would be unethical if the needy did not 
receive appropriate treatment. In other words. it would be ethical for 
those who benefit to bear some costs. 
The argument on merit wants is broad and vague; examples are treatments 
for the unconscious and the mentally-ill. In this case. they are merit 
goods because the unconscious and the mentally-ill cannot themselves 
decide what is· good for them; hence the state should make these 
decisions. The merit goods label can be attached to the treatments given 
to children. the aged. and the poor. etc. These merit wants need some 
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form of state intervention to ensure that the needy get appropriate 
health services, ego cash transfer in a voucher, public provision. 
Marketability and ethical issues of health care are interrelated. The 
debate on these issues has been on the agenda since the 1960s. Some 
authors said that because of the specific characteristics of health 
care, the market in health care tends to fail. But many authors argue 
that the market has an important role in the allocation of health care. 
The main concern of these arguments is the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. 
The market is believed to be a good mechanism for determining the 
quantity and quality of commodities needed in society. Price is a 
valuable signal, ensuring equilibrium between demand and supply and 
resulting in efficiency in production and consumption. In the health 
care environment, user charges and copayments are suggested as a market 
mechanism to allocate limited resources to achieve maximum efficiency. 
This triggers debates on equity issues if demand is price-elastic for 
the poor (Gilson 1988, Yoder 1989). 
Arrow (1963) pointed out that uncertainties of medical care: the 
uncertainty of contracting diseases and the uncertainty of effects of 
treatment, were the most common cause of market failure. "Uncertainty as 
to the quality of the product is perhaps more intense here than in any 
other important commodity". This imperfect or asymmetrical information 
warranted state intervention, ego state funding of services through 
compulsory health insurance. licensing of the occupation. etc. 
Lindsay (1973) discussed the theory of sharing the uncertainty and 
government intervention. Tax-supported subsidies to the poor would 
reduce inequality of health care consumption between the rich and the 
poor. The egalitarian attitude holds that health care should be made 
available to anyone in medical need, not determined by economic status. 
Government intervention is justified because the administrative cost is 
cheap. 
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Lees (1976) argued against the concern with imperfect information. Lack 
of knowledge in health care does not prevent the market from working 
properly. The substitution of socialised medicine for private medicine 
has not led to more medical care, to better medical care, or to a more 
equal distribution of medical care. Free markets are remarkably useful 
institutions but are not applicable for environmental health, infectious 
diseases, chronically sick and mentally ill. 
The ideas of the New Right have influenced the reform of the British 
National Health Services which has involved introducing an 'internal 
market' within the public sector and between public and private sectors 
by contracting out supporting services or even sophisticated clinical 
services (HMSO 1989). 'Managed competition' is the means used to 
increase market efficiency while maintaining the equity principle by 
financing through general taxation. 
The concerns of health care characteristics, market efficiency and state 
interventions have formed the frontier of the 'public and private mix' 
in health care (McLachlan and Maynard 1982). The frontier moves along 
the public or private axis within two dimensions: financing and 
provision of health care. This is relevant to both developed and 
developing countries. The next section will discuss these issues in 
detail. 
2.2 The public and private mix in health care 
Because of the special characteristics of health care and the different 
views of theorists on society, a prototype of state intervention in 
health services has never been agreed upon. There are three major 
aspects to consider in terms of the degree of state intervention: 
financing, provision and regulation. The higher the proportion belonging 
to the public, the stronger is state intervention. 
Health care financing 
Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health 
expenditures. The public sources of finance are mainly from taxation and 
30 
partly from government revenues raised from assets. Government taxes are 
redistributed in the form of budgets to various ministries. Private 
health expenditure makes up for the inadequacy of public expenditure and 
responds to a high demand for private health care. Examples of private 
financing are user charges at the point of service delivery, premiums 
for private health insurance, payments by private employers for their 
employees, and donations, etc. 
In countries with an egalitarian philosophy, public health expenditure 
accounts for the majority of total health expenditure. In 1987, public 
expenditure was 90% of total expenditure in Sweden, 87% in the UK, 78% 
in Holland, 77% in West Germany and 75% in Canada. But in the countries 
with a libertarian orientation, private expenditure is the major part of 
total expenditure, ego in the US, private expenditure was about 59% of 
total expenditure in 1987 (Ham et a1 1990). Nonetheless, public 
expenditure was still high. 
In developing countries, in an egalitarian country like Malaysia in 
1987, public expenditure was 77% of total expenditure. A collectivist 
country like China spent nearly 70% of total expenditure from public 
sources (taxes and social security) (Griffin 1990). In libertarian 
countries, ego South Korea, Indonesia, government expenditures were 33% 
and 35% of total health expenditure respectively (Ron et al 1990). 
Health care provision 
Having controlled the finanCing of health care, the state may intervene 
further by direct provision. Collectivist states usually playa major 
role in both financing and provision, ego in China before the recent 
economic reforms. Libertarian states, on the other hand, take less 
responsibility for direct provision as well as a smaller share in 
financing. However, it is not always the case that a high share in 
public financing goes together with a high proportion in public 
provision. Many governments finance private health services which 
compete with public health services, ego private health services 
predominate and are reimbursed ~rom public finance in Holland. 
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The share of public expenditure and share of public provision have 
significant effects on total health expenditure. It is likely that the 
countries with high shares of public finance and provision can control 
the growth of total health expenditure. And in the countries that let 
private sectors playa major role, total health expenditure is difficult 
to control. 
Regulation 
In countries where the majority of health care is provided by the 
private sector, the state can intervene by controlling quality, quantity 
and distribution, and prices of the services. Apart from direct control 
from the state, other agencies, ego professional bodies, financial 
agencies etc., including the public at large, ie. consumers, can in many 
ways control quality, quantity and prices of the services (WHO 1991a). 
However, this framework of control is also applicable to countries with 
a prominent state role in health care provision. 
Quality assurance has become a mechanism to control quality of care in 
Europe because traditional professional self-regulation has proved 
ineffective for removing incompetents from the medical professions (Jost 
1992). In the UK, internal markets and self-governing hospital trusts 
are the mechanisms for increasing efficiency and liberalising 
bureaucratic management. It is foreseen that the government's role of 
protecting the competitive process would be extensive and would involve 
some top-down control (Hughes and McGuire 1992). Complaints by consumers 
are another source of information on quality of care and should be 
encouraged (Mulcahy and Lloyd-Bostock 1992). Law suits are prevalent and 
costly in the US (Fenn and Dingwall 1992). 
In developing countries, it is foreseen that greater emphasis is given 
to private health sector. It is the government's role to strengthen 
state regulation to ensure quality of services given in private sector 
(at the same time, public services need to emphasise on quality 
assurance). 
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Though equity is frequently claimed as an objective of every society, 
the definition has never been simple. This section reviews different 
definitions of equity relating to health and health care with arguments 
for and against each definition. Examples of inequities in health and 
health care are demonstrated. 
" ... equity, like beauty, is in the mind of the beholder." 
McLachlan and Maynard (1982). 
The above quote reflects the difficulties in defining equity. However, 
it is necessary to convert qualitative data into quantitatively 
measurable figures to evaluate how well an equity objective is met. A 
good working definition is therefore sought. 
Equity implies that economic and social goods should be distributed 
fairly across individuals (Pereira 1989). This is still far from being a 
good working definition. The word 'fairly' needs further clarification. 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that equity is not the same as equality. 
Mooney (1986) gave a good set of seven working definitions of equity in 
relation to health. They are: 
1. Equality of expenditure per capita; 
2. Equality of inputs per capita; 
3. Equali ty of inputs for equal need; 
4. Equality of access for equal need; 
5. Equality of utilisation for equal need; 
6. Equality of marginal met need; 
7. Equality of health. 
The first two definitions are simple arithmetic. The distinction between 
them is that expenditures are estimated in monetary terms inclusive of 
public and private spending (but mostly considered only public 
spending); whereas inputs can be described in terms of manpower and 
other health resources, ego number of hospitals, beds, etc. The former 
allows for standardising for the different prices of the same health 
resources at different places. The third definition links inputs to 
need, so this is better than the second definition. The problem is how 
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to define and judge equal need. The fourth and fifth definitions both 
have 'need' as a base of comparison, but utilisation is better than 
access because utilisation is the interaction of demand and supply. 
Equality of marginal met need, ego by regions, is defined as the 
"marginal impact on health status per pound be equalised for all. 
regions" (Culyer 1976). It is advocated by economists because it 
concentrates on an extra unit of need at the margin which is more 
relevant to decisions than the total need of each group. Priorities are 
given to marginal unmet needs of different groups under different 
resource requirements. Decisions are made to allocate resources to the 
highest priority of each group. So far, few studies employ this 
definition (eg. Steele 1982). The final definition (equality of health) 
is frequently used as an outcome variable of the health system. The most 
authoritative study is the Black report (DHSS 1980). 
Mooney advocated the complementary use of the third and the fourth 
definitions (equality of inputs and equality of access for equal need) 
as the second best definitions: 
" ..• in practice it appears that faced with the choice 
between the seven definitions presented above, most opt for 
a mix of equal inputs for equal need and equal access for 
equal need, the mix to be determined empirically by 
examining the trade-off between access and health. I would 
support that view, if equating marginal met need cannot be 
made a practical alternative." (Mooney 1986) 
Three definitions above, the third to the fifth definition, require 
further clarification for the term 'equal need'. Need can be defined as 
private or social need. Private need is an individual's concern while 
social need concerns the public at large. It is difficult when private 
needs of comparison groups differ, and also differ from social need. 
Culyer (1991a) took account only of need that would yield benefit after 
treatment, even if it is to the benefit of only one individual: 
" ... the need for health care embodies an opinion of the 
difference that medicine can make. It is not a before and 
after comparison but a with and without comparison. It may 
be described as capacity to benefit and is a kind of 
differential prognosis. If there is no effective care it 
cannot be held to be needed. But if there is, and it can 
benefit a particular individual, then that individual is in 
need (of health care)". (emphasis original) (Culyer 1991a) 
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Recent contributions to equity definitions are the 'equity as choice', 
the 'health maximisation account' and the 'basic capability approach' 
(Pereira 1989). Most of them are at the development stage. 
Le Grand's approach of 'equity as choice' is libertarian: "if an 
individual's ill health results from factors beyond his or her control 
then the situation is inequitable; if it results from factors within his 
or her control then it is equitable" (Le Grand 1987). The health status 
of individuals is a function of health harming activities. The advantage 
of this approach is to provide information on how the distribution of 
health comes about. Its implicit application is at the process of making 
choices in health care consumption rather than its output. 
The equity as choice approach is different from Mooney's definitions. It 
resembles the Grossman model on human capital. Individuals invest or 
disinvest in their health stock by trading off between competitive 
commodities. Much more groundwork is needed to define 'choices' and 
'constraints' in making choices. The policy implication for state 
intervention from this approach is to equalise the constraints people 
face so that they can make equitable choices. 
The maximisation of health approach has been developed at York 
University based on the quality-adjusted-life-year (OALY) measure of 
health. It is believed to be equitable if the overall health of the 
community is maximised. This utilitarian approach can be compared with 
the equality of marginal met need criterion of Mooney. But it is not 
clear whether the OALY gained is equitably distributed among 
individuals, as pointed out by Sen (1973): 
"maximising the sum of individual utilities is supremely 
unconcerned with the interpersonal distribution of the sum." 
(Sen 1973) 
So far, this approach has been criticised by health professionals, 
social scientists and economists. The strongest objection is "that a 
unit of health is treated as being of equal value no matter who gets it" 
(Pereira 1989), or, 100 units of health gained to one person are equal 
to each unit gained to 100 people. Adjustment to give different 
weighting to different groups of people is needed to achieve an equity 
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element, though in practice this is very difficult and depends on 
different value judgements. Policies to reduce inequity based on this 
approach require great information. 
Sen's basic capability approach takes account of Le Grand's equity as 
choice, that people make choices relating to their health. The 
distinction is that Sen's approach emphasises the capabilities of 
individuals to produce good health. The focus on capabilities ensures 
that individuals have capabilities to function well, ego they are 
continuously able to use medical services when they choose to do so, not 
just having accessibility. Health status is the end product of 
capabilities to functioning. in turn capabilities are influenced by 
goods (eg. health care) or the characteristics of goods (eg. clinical 
efficacy). In summary. equality of capabilities gives a better prospect 
than equal access for good health (Pereira 1989). 
Philosophical arguments on equity date back to Aristotle's horizontal 
and vertical equity. The distinctions between horizontal and vertical 
equity have never been agreed. However, they can be applied to health as 
illustrated by Culyer's (1991b) definitions. He clearly outlined the 
definitions of horizontal and vertical equity as follows: 
Horizontal equity 
H1 Equal treatment of those with equal initial health 
H2 Equal treatment for equal need 
H3 Equal treatment for those with equal expected final health. 
Vertical equity 
V1 More favourable treatment for those with worse initial health 
V2 More favourable treatment for those with greater need 
V3 More favourable treatment for those with worse expected final 
health. 
Culyer's first two steps of horizontal equity are similar to some of 
Mooney's definitions, but further interpretation of 'treatment' has to 
be made. It could be expenditure, input. access or utilisation, 
depending on the provider's or consumer's framework. The third step that 
emphasises outcome is the most crucial. 
Pereira (1989) summarised that a good definition of equity should meet 
these requirements: easily comprehensible, specific and rigorous, in the 
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standard language of normative economics, not requiring excessive 
information and widely acceptable as policy statements on health-equity. 
Different policy implications result from using alternative equity 
definitions. Equality of input and equality of expenditure per capita 
assume that the initial state of health and commodities' prices are the 
same. They have gained some popularity in spite of limited policy 
implications because of ease of use. Equity as choice has become more 
popular for libertarians. It is because people want more freedom and 
have more information on the trade-off between risk and benefit. 
Marginal met need, and CAlY maximisation, are of use for egalitarian 
allocation of resources. Inequity in health status indicates that 
problems exist but does not guide the process of achieving equity. 
Inequity in practice 
The topic of inequity in health has been researched in the UK since the 
1920s (Stevenson 1928). It is only recently after the Black report (DHSS 
1980) that the issue has been recapitulated allover the world. This 
section will review some of the studies to highlight inequalities in 
many respects; inequity in health ~tatus (inequity by social classes, 
geographical inequities, inter-generational inequities), inequity in 
health care delivery (eg. inequity of access, geographical inequities) 
and inequity in the financing of health care. 
Inequity in health status 
The concept of social class has been dated back to the 1910s, when the 
Registrar General tried to summarise meaningful vital statistics 
(Mascie-Taylor 1990). Social classes have been developed to be a 
composite indicator of occupation, economic activity status, status in 
employment and type of industry (OpeS 1990). Therefore, they are a good 
proxy for income level, education level and lifestyle. 
In 1980, the Black Report proved that there was unequal distribution of 
deaths across the social classes. The gradient was regressive, ie. the 
lower social classes experienced higher deaths than the higher classes 
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when standardised for age and sex (DHSS 1980). The gap had widened when 
the same methods were used to follow up the changes 10 years later 
(Davey Smith et a1 1990). 
Il1sley and Le Grand (1987) argued that social class is an imperfect 
tool for measuring changes over long periods, due to changes in the 
size, composition and status of classes. 
"There are other factors which make us distrust occupational 
class except as a simple descriptive label. Its inevitable 
past neglect of women's occupations- although over time 
their greater inclusion in the labour market has radically 
altered male occupations. In the 1950s the skilled non-
manual class was full of male clerical workers- they barely 
exist nowadays .... There are many other examples. The 
exclusion of the unemployed, those in full-time education, 
person over 65, distort trends substantially. In the 1971 
Census of England and Wales the number of persons with not-
stated occupations was greater than that of class V and its 
mortality was greater than that of class V. This implies 
enormous margins of errors." (Illsley and Baker 1991) 
An alternative method of measuring inequality in health was suggested, 
based on differences in the age-at-death for every member of the 
population. The results suggest that since 1921, all individuals have 
lived longer. A preliminary analysis of changes in specific diseases 
shows that there may have been a decline in health inequality between 
the poor and the rich (Illsley and Le Grand 1987). 
However, social class is still a good, simple indicator that has been 
little used in other countries. The best parameters for comparison in 
other countries are either socio-economic groups (SEGs as used in OPCS), 
income groups (decile or quintile groups) or occupational groups. But 
they do not show as strong a gradient as social class disparities in the 
UK. 
Studying the trends of inequities in health by social class has an 
implication for policy formulation that the problems have not yet been 
solved or even need greater attention. Trends in the distribution of 
income may be helpful in predicting changes in health inequalities. 
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Inequities in health status by geographical area have been established 
in the North-South divide in England (Townsend et al 1988). The dividing 
line ;s drawn from the Wash to the Bristol channel. Standardised 
mortality ratios (SMRs) of the people above the line were higher than 
those in the South. 
Geographical inequities can be studied in the UK down to the level of an 
electoral ward. Many scoring systems of deprivation have been developed 
to establish statistical correlation with health outcomes to try to 
explain health differences and guide resource allocation. Jarman's 
underprivileged score is derived from e components, ego composition of 
social classes IV and V, composition of the aged in the community, 
housing, etc (Jarman 1984). Townsend's deprivation index is another 
composite indicator of social deprivation: unemployment, car ownership, 
non-owner-occupiers, and overcrowded households, which correlates with a 
final health index (Townsend et a1 1988). This index has implications 
for prioritising community action, targeting resources, monitoring the 
impact of changes and providing a framework to evaluate the models 
towards healthy cities (Flynn 1992). 
Age is a strong confounder of mortality and morbidity of populations. It 
is not possible to correct many inequalities of health among different 
age groups. But the unfairness between different age groups, inter-
generational inequities, has become an important issue in the US because 
there are limited resources for health care. The child programmes are 
vulnerable to cutbacks in financing. Benjamin et a1 (1991) showed that 
the growing number of the ageing population and faster growth in budget 
are at the expense of resources for children. 
Minkler and Robertson (1991) made the statement that inter-generational 
inequity in the US is an "age/race war". The aged populations are 
composed of White people more than the younger age group. Po1;t;c;ans 
who are White rather than Black would prefer to finance health 
programmes for the aged than programmes for children. Th;s may be called 
;nequ;t;es among racial groups or the underpr;vi1eged, ;n a broader 
context. 
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Identifying this type of inequity has a complex implication for 
financing policy. It should not be so simple that those who benefit are 
those who pay. Because of caring externalities for health care, equity 
in financing health programmes for specific groups is an important 
issue. 
Inequity in health care delivery 
American health care commentators identify inequity of access as one of 
the most urgent problems. Between 30 and 40 million Americans lack any 
health insurance and another 50 million are inadequately covered 
(Greenberger et a1 1991). For those who are inadequately, or not 
insured, they delay their care seeking resulting in longer hospital 
stays (Weissman et a1 1991). It is the general consensus that the US 
health care needs reform. 
"The challenge for proponents of equity in the health arena 
is to avoid the eternal temptation to seize the high ground 
of "rights" to health care (or whatever), thereby entrusting 
the debate to philosophers, theologians, lawyers, 
constitutional scholars, and ideologues, who are rarely much 
concerned with the construction of political coalitions. 
What is needed is not a learned exegesis or spirited defense 
of rights but rather convincing arguments that new policies 
for the uninsured are the right thing for society to do." 
(Brown 1991) 
In developing countries, physical distance and economic barriers may be 
the main causes of inequity of access. Gilson (1988) identified 
additional costs of poor physical access: transport costs, time costs 
including opportunity costs from a loss of income when seeking health 
care. Seasonality of disease patterns may increase need at a time of 
lowest mobility. These cause problems to the least advantaged groups of 
people. 
After the colonial period, most government health services in developing 
countries were provided free of charge at the point of service. Faced 
with the problem of financing government services, the World Bank (1987) 
recommended that countries impose user charges to reduce wastage and 
increase equity. This recommendation has been criticised as it will 
create problems of access. 
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"The demand-diversionary effect of charges, thus appears to 
be having important effects: it is not simply 'frivolous' 
utilisation that is being diverted. Although the evidence on 
health status is difficult to document with precision, and 
will remain so for some time, it seems clear that a trade-
off between health status and revenue-generation is being 
implemented, often unwittingly. Equity in health care is 
thus deteriorating - already measurably, in terms of access 
to care, and probably also in health status differentials 
between socio-economic groups." (Creese 1991) 
Policy implications for achieving equality of access in developed and 
developing countries may be different. In the US, the policy is to 
increase elegibility to health care via insurance schemes or other 
means. In developing countries, other social and economic developments 
together with health policy are needed. 
Urban-rural inequalities have been shown everywhere in the world, 
particularly unequal inputs of health resources. Even in a country with 
strong state control like China, the distribution of doctors could not 
be corrected: 
"Economic factors are crucial determinants of the unequal 
distribution of physicians between rural and urban areas. 
Few physicians really want to stay in rural areas because of 
the relatively poor working and living conditions. Even the 
strong policies pursued during the Cultural Revolution could 
not eliminate inequality, when economic inequalities 
remained largely unchanged" (Lampton 1977, quoted by Song et 
al 1991). 
Inequity in health care delivery in terms of distribution of health 
resources is not difficult to demonstrate. In the UK where primary care 
is well developed, regional variations in numbers of general 
practitioners in England in 1987 were low, but if all doctors in 
hospital and community health services were taken into account, regional 
variations were higher (Isaacs 1990). Similarly, numbers of available 
beds per 1,000 resident population in inner deprived areas of London in 
1989/90 were higher than in other areas of London, but when only primary 
care providers (GPs and district nurses) were compared, the providers to 
population ratios in inner deprived areas were no better, or even worse 
than in other areas of London (King's Fund 1992). 
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Inequity in the financing of health ca~e 
Establishing inequalities in health and health care delivery by various 
parameters is not sufficient for corrective action. Studies on 
inequities in financing indicate the direction and level of resource 
allocation. 
Basic arguments in the financing of health care are who pays for and who 
benefits from the health care system. Further questions asked are 
whether payments should be made before or at the time of service, and 
how much consumers should pay, at a flat rate or according to actual 
use. In a country where health services are made available to all, ie 
most of health expenditures are financed by general taxation, an 
important question to ask is whether the taxes are progressive or 
regressive. If regressive, ie taxes make up a higher proportion of the 
income of the poor than the rich, the health system is said to be 
inequitable. 
Out-of-pocket expenditure is another source of health financing which 
puts a heavy burden on consumers. Percentage of out-of-pocket expense to 
household income is one indicator of equality of health expenditure. In 
Canada where access to health care is total, inequity of health 
expenditure still exists, though the gap has diminished: 
"In terms of the share of total family income spent directly 
on out-of-pocket expenses, while the gap between income 
groups narrowed during this period, the relative burden 
remain consistently higher for the poor than for the rich. 
These proportions were, respectively, 6.0 and 3.1 percent in 
1964, 2.8 and 2.3 percent in 1972, and 2.5 and 2.1 percent 
in 1982." (Badgley 1991) 
Health care financing policy can have a great impact on achieving equity 
of household health expenditure as in the case of Canada, where after 
the reform of health care financing in the 1970s, inequity of health 
expenditure diminished. 
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2.4 Efficiency in health care 
Efficiency is of high concern because in any society there are limited 
resources. Maximisation of the welfare function is constrained by 
limited resources but it is also a function of technology and taste 
(Barr 1987). When health care technology evolves and consumer tastes 
vary, the state is faced with problems of underfunding. Increasing 
efficiency will reduce wastage and leave more resources for further use. 
Efficiency is maximised when three conditions hold simultaneously: 
efficiency in production (technical efficiency), efficiency in 
production mix (mix of inputs) and efficiency in consumption (meet 
consumer desires) (Barr 1987). 
Applying these conditions to the health care environment, the production 
of health care must reach its highest outputs by using a good mix of 
inputs: doctors, nurses, other personnel, technology. At the same time, 
health care products must be well balanced to provide an appropriate 
level of utilisation without wastage. However, the production and 
consumption of health care are complex. Some products are more cost-
effective than others. Culyer (1991a) gave four definitions of 
efficiency in health care: 
"Efficiency can be defined into four kinds. The first is 
providing only services that are effective in the sense that 
there is believable evidence that patients will enjoy better 
health with the interventions than without them .•• The 
second kind of efficiency is providing whatever effective 
services are provided at least resource cost. • . The third 
kind of efficiency is concentrating resources on those 
effective services, provided at least cost, that offer the 
biggest payoff in terms of health ... The fourth kind of 
efficiency is providing such a mix of effective services at 
the least resource cost, and on such a scale, that the 
benefit from having more resources is no larger than their 
cost." (Culyer 1991a) 
A framework for evaluating the 'efficiency' of the British NHS reform 
has been put forward by Brazier et al (1990). There are three levels of 
efficiency: technical efficiency, cost-effectiveness and social 
efficiency. The technical efficiency is concerned with the physical 
relationships between outputs and inputs. Cost-effectiveness here covers 
all kinds of economic evaluation of health programmes. Social 
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efficiency, in other words, global or high level or allocative 
efficiency, may involve social judgements about the benefits and costs 
of health programmes as compared to others; e.g. education, leisure, 
transport, housing, etc. 
What are the barriers to health care becoming more efficient? Some 
argue, as discussed earlier, that it is because the specific 
characteristics of health care are not compatible with market 
mechanisms. Imperfect information puts the providers in a superior 
position and governs the agency relationship with consumers. In 
insurance and NHS models, both providers and consumers are not conscious 
of the costs of health care and may exhibit 'moral hazard' that 
increases total cost. The following part will discuss more on the 
experiences of market efficiency. 
Culyer (1980) believed that health care services are public goods and 
should be provided collectively by the state. The market, though 
responsive to individuals' decision making, makes the price higher and 
is a less efficient way to respond to social preferences. But in 1989, 
when the NHS introduced market mechanisms in health care to increase 
efficiency, he and his colleagues supported the view that a competitive 
market in the form of an 'internal market' is better than a regulated 
system. A competitive market creates more information for monitoring and 
evaluation than a centralised system (Culyer et al 1990). 
"Collective interests of a whole country-such as law and 
order, the health and education of the nation-are plausibly 
most efficiently implemented by a national collectivity (ie. 
the central government). Clearly, depending on the nature 
and scope of the public good in Question, there is a large 
variety of collective institutions that will be appropriate 
for different decisions. In every case, the delegation of 
decision making can be seen as a rational response of 
private individuals to the high costs of reaching agreements 
on every single issue involving public goods. In short, they 
are 'market type' reactions." (Culyer 1980) 
"Given an appropriate environment that rewards and punishes 
as it should, ••• there is every reason to expect that the 
provider market in the NHS will contribute much to improved 
performance, choice and value for money. The need, we 
suggest, is less for regulation than for ensuring an 
environment that ;s as competitive (or contestable) and open 
as it can be made and for the provision of central and 
regional support services that require and enable purchasers 
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to seek out and scrutinise bids in the most searching way 
possible." (Cu1yer et a1 1990) 
Le Grand and Robinson (1984) also stressed bureaucratic inefficiency. 
Subsidies that arise when the government intervenes in the market to 
make a zero price to users are a cause of inefficiency. Price has merit 
in setting how many extra services are demanded. 
"The inefficiency associated with state "subsidies" arises 
because their existence encourages users to demand more of 
the services concerned than they would if they were charged 
the true cost. The value of the extra services demanded (as 
measured by the amount that people are willing to pay for 
them) must be less than their social cost. Hence, if the 
extra services are actually provided, there will be 
inefficiency, with services being provided that cost more 
than they benefit. If the extra services are not provided, 
then some arbitrary rationing method must be used to cope 
with excess demand (such as queues or waiting lists). This 
will inevitably result in some people with high valuations 
of the service not receiving it, while others with much 
lower valuations do; hence again there will be 
inefficiency." (Le Grand and Robinson 1984) 
Viewed from the provider'S side, Green (1985) argued that the market is 
more efficient than the centrally planned National Health Service. 
Doctors as providers of health care will choose the most cost-effective 
treatments for their patients. However, this is under the assumption 
that the majority of doctors are not under economic pressure. 
" ... the factual evidence supports the conclusion that the 
market can supply more cost-effective health care than the 
NHS. Efforts to put NHS doctors under particular 
constraints, or to offer incentives intended to channel 
their efforts in a planned direction, will often be 
ineffective (if they are not counter- productive) because 
the decision-maker who devises the incentive (or penalty) 
does not, and 'cannot', possess the knowledge of all doctors 
who will be affected." (Green 1985) 
As discussed before, the market is more or less appropriate for 
different health services. Pharmaceuticals are close in nature to goods 
for private consumption, hence some would argue that the private market 
can run efficiently. The market does not only operate at lower cost but 
guarantees distribution of drugs (availability) in the time of use. 
"Private enterprise functions most efficiently if market 
forces are allowed to operate independently and completely 
unfettered. Nonetheless, some government involvement is 
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necessary to ensure the availability and proper use of 
affordable pharmaceuticals." (Vogel and Stephens 1989) 
Encouraging efficiency through pricing is increasingly advocated in 
developing countries. However excessive concern about cost to achieve 
high cost recovery will create a problem of equity. A trade-off between 
efficiency and equity is often observed. 
"There may be a conflict between the goal of economic 
efficiency and social equity. A project that meets a 
cost-benefit criterion may also make the poor worse off." 
(Mishan 1977) 
However, Giraldes (1990) argued that efficiency and equity need not 
contradict each other. In Portugal, financing hospital services was 
previously based on a technical efficiency principle, and later was 
combined with an equity principle which was already applied to primary 
health care. Three criteria were introduced: demand/utilisation, health 
situation and coverage by health services, to give different weights to 
achieve more equitable resource allocation. There was a great shift of 
resources to needy areas. Consequences of the transfers have yet to be 
evaluated. 
2.5 Consumer choice and satisfaction 
Libertarians respect individual 'freedom'; even egalitarians also count 
'freedom' as one of their aims. When health care was regarded as a merit 
good. there were few complaints. In countries where health care is 
financed and provided by governments, complaints are also few. This does 
not imply that the services are good, but rather that people have 
limited choice. 
"There is a variety of ways in which the welfare state is 
said to be illiberal or coercive. Individual preferences for 
diverse services are overruled; the taxation necessary to 
fund the welfare state's activities is coercive; recipients 
of welfare benefits have to conform to specific regulations 
and conditions; the welfare state creates a psychological 
condition of 'dependence', thus reducing people's ability to 
make their own choices; producers' interests predominate at 
the expense of consumers' liberties." (Le Grand and Robinson 
1984) 
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In the US, freedom is a basic philosophy in every walk of life. Health 
care also provides freedom for consumer and provider alike. 
"Many Americans instinctively reject any system they think 
would be bureaucratic, inconvenient, impersonal, or 
unresponsive to patients' needs and preferences ... 
American physicians fear a system in which their 
professional judgements about patients' needs would be 
subordinated to political considerations." (Enthoven and 
Kronick 1989) 
It is not clear whether freedom does good or bad to health care systems. 
Does consumer choice contribute to cost escalation in the US health 
care, or is it just a coincidence? The culprit may be the financing or 
delivery system. However, the world trend is for increased consumer 
choice. 
"The patient is to be better informed, probably via 
commercial marketing techniques, about factors affecting 
health and the relative merits of alternative providers of 
services and so better able to judge whether the services 
are worth the fee and which provider to seek out." (Roberts 
1989) 
When health care has become commercia1ised, consumers are more concerned 
about its quality and quantity. Dissatisfaction towards the health care 
system has been observed. The opinions varied from mildly dissatisfied 
to strongly dissatisfied with an expressed need for radical changes in 
the US (B1endon et a1 1990). The issue has been at or close to the top 
of the political agenda in many countries. 
In Britain, there have been a lot of surveys on attitudes towards the 
NHS. The level of dissatisfaction accumulated from 25% to 47% from 1983 
to 1990 as measured by the British social attitudes surveys. Somehow, 
the proportion had dropped significantly from August 1991 to November 
1991 as found by another set of surveys. It is believed that mass media 
communication played a role in 'floating' attitudinal changes (Judge et 
al 1992). The pre-election period provided the opportunity to discuss 
the immediate evaluation of the reforms rather than the issue of lengthy 
waiting lists. 
Many health systems are now concerned to increase consumer choice. One 
aim is that when consumers gain more information about health care, the 
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health care system will be more accountable to the community. In the UK, 
where consumer choice in health care is limited, the NHS has issued the 
'Patient's Charter' to make public health services more accountable to 
the consumer. It is assumed that consumers are in a better position to 
bargain for good health care. 
'IOn this point the Welsh charter is more innovative: "Try to 
be well informed about your health or condition. Ask 
questions so you can make decisions based on a better 
knowledge and understanding." That begins to sound much more 
like a partnership between patients and professionals and 
acknowledges that people have responsibilities for their 
health care too. At present the charter concentrates on what 
the NHS should be doing for the patient, but this is only 
one side of the bargain." (Stocking 1991) 
When consumer choice cannot operate properly, there is another mechanism 
for making their voice heard by the provider. A collective voice of 
consumers will be louder and will be a powerful mechanism of control in 
health care: 
" the increase in the numbers and type of providing 
agencies will make the monitoring and regulation of services 
more difficult. More than ever, health service users will 
have to rely on active pressure groups to campaign on their 
behalf and to keep health issues on the agenda." (Allsop 
1992) 
Consumer choice has an important implication for health care reform. It 
is easier for a country with limited choice to increase freedom, while 
it is harder for the US to change to a system that interferes with 
choice. This may be a reason why the US health system reform to contain 
high costs has not yet been consolidated. 
"Our strategy would be to encourage the spread of HMOs and 
other efficient delivery arrangements by giving all 
consumers a choice of plans that requires a consideration of 
costs. Those who prefer to keep traditional "free choice of 
provider" arrangements and are willing to pay the extra 
costs associated with them would be free to do so." 
(Enthoven and Kronick 1989) 
2.6 Reforms of health care systems 
Having reviewed three basic arguments of health care reforms separately 
in an earlier part, this section will discuss some examples of health 
care reforms in developed and developing countries to highlight how they 
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come together. It starts with examples in European countries which are 
far ahead in making reform a coordinated task (Schneider et al 1992). 
The section ends with examples from developing countries. 
Health care reforms in European nations 
There has been concern about the inequities of access for certain groups 
of populations and distribution of services by geographical areas across 
European countries in the last decade (Smith 1991). Health care costs in 
many countries have increased faster than the growth in GOP (the 
elasticities of health spending to GOP in the UK is 1.1, in Belgium it 
is 1.3, the same as in the US). There were clear signs of inefficiency 
in over-consultations, overuse of high technology equipment, etc. 
Associations between financing systems, health delivery systems, equity 
and efficiency in these countries have been established. Public payment 
by a contract model has been argued to be both equitable and efficient 
(Hurst 1991). 
The share of public expenditure as a percentage of total health spending 
in Europe ranged from 62% in Portugal to 95% in Norway in 1989. Total 
health expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product varied from 
5.1% in Greece to B.8% in Sweden. It has been shown that per capita 
health expenditure is positively correlated with per capita gross 
domestic product (Schieber et al 1991). Provision of health services 
shows greater variations from publicly dominated systems in Scandinavian 
countries (Sweden, Norway. etc.) to privately dominated in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, etc. It has been observed that countries with 
compulsory health insurance schemes and applying cost containment 
measures (Germany and the Netherlands) successfully controlled growth in 
expenditure in the 1980s (Hurst 1991). 
The objectives for reforms in the 1990s are as follow: equity in access, 
income protection, macroeconomic efficiency. microeconomic efficiency, 
freedom of choice for consumers. and appropriate autonomy for providers. 
All people should have access to a basic minimum of care, and have equal 
treatment for equal need. People should be protected from catastrophic 
threats of paying a high proportion of their income or wealth on health 
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care. Health expenditure should consume an appropriate fraction of gross 
domestic product. Health outcomes should be maximised while costs 
minimised for an appropriate mix of health care activities. Consumers 
should be able to exercise some choice over their treatment. And, 
lastly, doctors and other providers should have freedom to give 
treatment according to all of the above objectives (Hurst 1991). 
The similarities in reforms are the equity, efficiency and choice 
issues. All countries were successful in increasing health care coverage 
especially through compulsory health insurance schemes. Detailed 
differences are observed from country to country. Many methods of cost 
containment, the most popular being global budgets, were implemented. 
Competition is being applied either to the side of third party payers 
(competition between public and private insurance companies as in the 
Netherlands) or the supply side (competition among public and private 
providers as in Germany, Britain). Purchasers of health care can be 
individuals (as in Sweden) or general practitioner fund holders and 
health authorities as agents (in the UK). 
The WHO Task Force on Health Development for Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (WHO 1991b) supported the arguments of Hurst (1991) that 
public payment by a contract model is equitable and efficient. The 
reforms in Western European countries have spilt over to Eastern Europe. 
The "managed market" is seen to be a mechanism to revitalise public 
services to be competitive with the private sector and to be accountable 
to the public at large. 
"The new paradigm of intervention is not simply that of 
market-based liberalism nor one based on a model of 
technocratic control. Its principles centre on a 
decentralisation of responsibility, a new accountability for 
health outcomes, and a reconsidered role for the medical 
professions." (WHO 1991b) 
"Convergence of western Europe health systems upon a public 
contract or "managed market" model of financing and 
organisation reflects a recognition that privatising the 
provision of health care services will not, in itself, 
create a flexible and responsive environment. The public 
sector is being revitalised by creating a competitive 
internal environment, or through encouraging competition 
between public and private providers and insurers." (WHO 
1991b) 
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Health care reforms in North America 
The health care system in the United States provides a high degree of 
choice between alternative insurance schemes and health care providers. 
It has a plentiful supply of hospital beds, medical staff and the most 
up-to-date medical technology. The system is flexible and open to 
innovative experiments (Ham et al 1990). Health care financing is 
dominated by the private health insurance industry - large employer 
group plans and small individual group plans (Bodenheimer 1992). The 
government provides public assistance in the form of Medicaid and 
Medicare schemes for the disabled, the poor and the elderly. Government 
sources of health expenditure amounted to only 42% of total health 
expenditure in 1989, with the highest total per capita health spending 
among the DECO countries (Schieber et al 1991). The major providers are 
in the private sector. eg. 58% of short stay hospitals in 1987 were 
private not-for-profit. 27% for-profit and only 25% public hospitals 
(Ham et al 1990). 
The American health system is now facing many problems as viewed by 
different authors. Aaron (1991) addressed three major problems: the 
rising cost of health care; lack of and inadequate insurance and 
increasing use of advanced technology without rigorous evaluation. The 
American College of Physicians (1990) focused on four problems faced by 
patients and physicians: inadequate access to health care; inadequate 
health insurance protection; costs continuing to rise. and a burdensome 
system for patients, their families and physicians. However, there is 
general consensus between these different viewpoints. 
'The uninsured and underinsured' is the term used as a target group to 
campaign for health care reform. The uninsured are the group that lacks 
any insurance scheme and is estimated to be about one in eight to one 
out of four Americans depending on the period of the study (Aaron 1991). 
The underinsured are those who have inadequate insurance protection for 
major hospital and medical expenses and are estimated at about 50 
million Americans (American College of Physician 1990). Altogether, both 
groups are currently as many as 70 million people (Brown 1992). 
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In brief, the dissatisfaction level of the Americans, especially those 
who are uninsured and underinsured, towards their health care system is 
remarkably high for it is inequitable, very expensive, and with less 
achievement in terms of health status. Many authors have proposed 
universal coverage of the system to reduce inequity (American College of 
Physician 1990, Bodenheimer 1992, Fein 1992). Previous reforms of the 
public reimbursement model (Medicaid, Medicare) have failed to contain 
the cost. Radical changes are needed. But above all, leadership in the 
reform is urgently needed (Thier 1991). 
In 1945, about the same period as the foundation of the British NHS, 
President Truman first proposed a universal health plan for all 
Americans. Two more Republican presidents. Nixon and Ford supported 
universal, employer-based health insurance in the 1970s. With a massive 
lobbying effort by the American Medical Association and insurers. the 
plan has never passed through the Congress (Dukakis 1992). In the 1992 
presidential election. health care was at the top of the election 
campaign (Cotton 1992). President Clinton's policies were strong in the 
areas of access, cost control and physician autonomy while the former 
president Bush's were strong on quality, liability and patient autonomy 
(Lundberg 1992a). However, a good proposal requires more than 5 years to 
see the impact of cost control (Fein 1992). The proposal should last 
longer than 5, 10 or 20 years before the system melt-down or collapse 
because no impact has occurred (Lundberg 1992b). 
In contrast, the Canadian health care system ;s claimed to be the best 
in the world (Lalonde 1988, Badgley 1991). It provides comprehensive 
services to the whole population on the basis of need with a wide choice 
between doctors and hospitals (Ham et al 1990). Health expenditure was 
8.7% of GOP and public spending was 75% of total health expenditure in 
1989 (Schieber et al 1991). The introduction of universal. comprehensive 
and public financing in the 1970s and control of health expenditure in 
Canada has been contrasted with US health expenditure (Evans 1986). 
Moving in the opposite direction to the US. the Canadian system prefers 
paying doctors by salary rather than paying by fee-far-service. A survey 
in 1989 revealed that 41% of Saskatchewan residents voted for salaried 
52 
doctors even though a few had experienced a salary system. Despite 
saving 15-20% of the costs of fee-for-service doctors. there was longer 
consultation time and more advice and counselling for patients (York 
1992). 
Nonetheless. Canada is faced with the problem of costs escalating faster 
than the growth of GOP (Deber et al 1991). and the gap of life 
expectancy between the rich and the poor is widening (Badgley 1991). 
Options for reforms are 1) Laissez faire. leave market mechanisms to 
resolve the problem; 2) Business as usual. intervene only as forced to; 
3) Managed care, put controls on consumers and providers within the 
current system; 4) Manpower regulation, reduce physician numbers, switch 
reimbursement further away from fee-for-service; 5) System change, 
encourage fundamental changes in the system (Deber et al 1991). But the 
country cannot afford to go for a laissez-faire system. Other social 
change is needed to alleviate inequity in health. 
Health care reforms in developing countries 
In 1987, the World Bank recommended developing countries should increase 
the efficiency of the public health sector by imposing user charges. 
This in turn would increase the equity of access to people in rural 
areas as resources would be channelled from urban to rural areas (World 
Bank 1987). However. developing countries are at different stages of 
health system development. A few countries have for a long time imposed 
user charges as a normal means of financing service delivery while 
others provide total health coverage free at the point of use to their 
populations. This section reviews health care reforms in developing 
countries that have well developed private health sectors and that are, 
like Thailand, in South East Asia (or nearby). 
China is a communist country moving towards a free market economy. The 
government views the private sector as a complement in providing health 
care in economic zones. South Korea and Singapore are the earlier newly 
industrialised countries (NICs). Their economic developments are of 
interest to Thailand as well as their health care systems, because 
Thailand is aiming to be an industrialised country. Malaysia ;s a 
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competitor to Thailand's economic growth, with a UK prototype health 
care system. 
In the People's Republic of China, the Communist Party's resolutions in 
1978 provided guidelines for private economic activities. In 1981, the 
Guangdong Provincial Government in the new economic zone issued a set of 
regulations for private practitioners (Yeun 1992). However, the latest 
figures in Griffin (1990) show that 100% of hospital beds were 
government owned. Health financing was dominated by insurance (50% of 
total expenditure), followed by private payment (31%) and public 
expenditure (19%). Total health expenditure was 4.0% of GOP. 
The main objective of reform in China is to reduce inefficient 
management. After the Cultural revolution, hospital care and modern 
technology became the topic of reform at the same time that primary 
health care activities had to be maintained. By the early 1990s the 
private sector had grown substantially. This reform was initiated by 
bold local hospital administrators and was later approved by the Chinese 
State Council. The key features of the reform were (Yang et al 1991): 
1. Decentralizing management responsibilities and local 
development; 
2. Expanding existing facilities while introducing a range 
of financial incentives to medical staff to improve 
productivity and pay level; 
3. Encouraging development of private practitioners and 
family hospital beds (a family hospital bed is a bed in a 
domestic residence serviced by health professionals); military 
hospitals to be made available to the public. 
4. City hospitals to support rural and smaller hospitals by 
exchanges of staff, and to accept responsibility for patient 
care; contracts and programme funding have been developed to 
facilitate these arrangements; 
5. Developing a system of health legislation; 
6. Reforming the health insurance system. 
The Chinese government now recognises the role of the private health 
sector in filling the gaps left by the public sector. A survey of 
consumers and providers of private health care in 1990 in Guangzhou 
Metropolitan, a pioneer in China's economic reforms, revealed that 
private medicine was too small as compared to its counterparts in 
commerce and industries. Even though the doctor to population and the 
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hospital beds to population ratios in this urban area were not low. the 
demand gaps left by the public sector seemed to be high. A set of 
policies encouraging greater competitiveness of the private health 
sector was recommended by Vuen (1992) to improve the quality and 
quantity of health services available and to minimise the side-effects 
of private medicine. However. Vu (1992) addressed that the reform in 
favour of economic zones would bring back high inequality in health care 
delivery and health status. 
South Korea is remarkable for its economic development. The private 
sector dominates the country's economy. In 1987. government health 
expenditure was only 12% of total health expenditure. private health 
expenditure accounted for 67% and the rest 21% from insurance. 
Government hospital beds were 18% of total beds and total health 
expenditure accounted for 5.1% of GOP (Griffin 1990). 
The health care system in Korea has achieved universal health insurance 
coverage within a short period. But the administrative cost of the 
system is higher as a percentage of total expenditure than in the US. It 
absorbed over 10% ranging up to 22% of operating expenses due to the 
verticalisation of the programmes (De Geyndt 1991). A great deal of 
effort was put into collecting premiums from farmers (15% of the 
population). reaching 90-94% collection rates in most villages. 
resulting in high administrative costs (Vu and Anderson 1992). 
Furthermore, extending coverage to the uninsured urban population (29% 
of the total population) aroused a very hot political debate because it 
is difficult to explain why other people should pay for the uninsured 
urban population (Abel-Smith 1992). The movements towards universal 
coverage are to ensure economic growth within a limited democratic 
system. 
"Unilateral government policies toward economic growth 
during the period of 1960-76. resulted in an unequal 
distribution of wealth among classes. and raised the issue 
of social equity. To avoid class conflict. the government 
had to introduce the concept of social welfare onto its 
policy agenda. The first result of such change was the 
introduction of a health insurance scheme. The government 
and the ruling political party encouraged the idea with the 
hope that it could somehow solve the inequities. injustices 
and ill-health inherent in the process of rapid 
industrialization." (Yang 1991) 
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Total expenditure on health is growing rapidly. The fragmente~ health 
insurance system and health provision which are in many respects similar 
to the US system caused a more rapid increase in cost than the US 
system. The elasticity of health spending to GOP of Korea was 1.6 
whereas of the US it was 1.3 during the same period. The Korean health 
care system needs reform to increase efficiency. 
"Korea is now heir to the waste, costs, and maldistribution 
of free-market medical provision. Ironically, she has also 
inherited the least desirable features of administrative 
decentralisation in the face of limited democratic 
traditions." (Flynn and Chung 1990) 
Decentralised health insurance management and private health providers 
are the causes of high costs in health care and inequities among 
different insurance schemes. To correct structural sector deficiencies, 
the following policy decisions are called for: 1) equity of access to 
services for all citizens, 2) cost containment to ensure reimbursement 
for most services provided to an insured population, 3) Quality 
assurance of medical care in a financial environment where incentives 
are usually provided for more services (De Geyndt 1991). 
Singapore is another country of the newly industrialised countries 
(NICs) with a growing private health sector. The government subsidised 
curative services for the poor treated in government hospitals but 
charged a high rate to the rich. The poor have less freedom of choice of 
doctor while the rich can choose their doctors when treated in 
government hospitals. This has caused an escalation of health care 
expenditure that the government did not wish to bear. 
Based on the experience of the Central Provident Fund, which removes 
from the government the burden of providing housing, the Medisave 
programme was introduced to make employees able to pay copayments when 
they were ill. However, payments from Medisave went to public hospitals 
rather than the private sector because the public sector ;s still 
predominant in providing health care. 
In effect, the pre-plan hope of the Ministry of Health to 
transfer more of the health care cost burden from the 
Ministry budget to the patients by favouring the creation of 
additional proprietary institutions as providers of health 
care was not realised, but Medisave provided a means to 
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shift expenditure away from the Ministry of Health budget to 
employers and workers as consumers by a form of prepayment 
without putting a strain on consumer income at the time of 
service. (Ruderman 1988) 
Results from the 1987/88 Household Expenditure survey in Singapore show 
that monthly health expenditures were more or less progressive to 
household monthly income. Households in the lowest category of income 
(less than 5$500 a month) paid 1.8% of their monthly income on health, 
and the second lowest (5$500-999 a month) paid 2.3%. Households in the 
band of S$2,OOO-3,999 a month paid the highest. 3.0% of monthly income. 
The second highest group (5$4,000-5,999 a month) paid 2.8% of monthly 
income on health, but the highest group (5$6,000 and over) paid only 
1.9% of monthly income (Department of Statistic. Singapore 1990). 
In Malaysia, the government health sector has been a major provider 
since British colonisation. Public expenditure is the major source of 
total health expenditure. Information in 1987 showed that 86% of 
hospital beds were owned by the government, 77% of total health 
expenditure was from taxation, and total health expenditure was 3.5% of 
GOP (Griffin 1990). In the 1980s. the government adopted strongly pro-
private sector economic policies and the government also had to consider 
a policy on the public and private mix in health care delivery. 
"The government currently takes a flexible approach 
concerning the private sector in health care provision in 
the country guided by its policy of a free market system. 
The government views the private sector as playing a 
complementary role. However, since the private sector is 
mainly curative concentrated in urban areas and accessible 
to those who can afford it, the government's role is to: 
- provide care for all strata of society, both urban and 
rural, and free to those who cannot afford it. 
- be completely responsible for preventive health." 
(Ministry of Health, Malaysia 1991) 
Several measures of promoting private sectors have been implemented in 
Malaysia. Private health insurance is encouraged to reach rural people 
by a tax relief policy. Contracting out has been implemented for non-
clinical (eg. laundry, catering, security) and clinical services (eg. 
radiotherapy, computerised tomography). At the same time, the government 
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is considering legislation to control distribution of equipment and 
buildings (WHO 1991a). 
2.7 Conclusions 
Though health care reforms in many countries claim that the ultimate 
goals are equity. efficiency and choice, the most important motive seems 
to be efficiency. Market mechanisms are being extensively used to 
achieve efficiency and choice. Increasing efficiency through market 
mechanisms may jeopardise an equity principle. This research stresses 
three definitions of equity: equity in health. equity of utilisation and 
equity of financing. 
Practical examples of health care reforms in developed and developing 
countries provide a good framework for this study. The public and 
private mix in financing and provision of health care plays a 
fundamental role in determining overall health expenditure. Payment 
mechanisms: out of pocket, third party payers, means of paying hospitals 
and doctorsj are related to the cost of health care and equity of 
financing. 
The British reform sheds light on how to increase public sector 
efficiency through competition, internal markets and maintaining equity 
through a tax-financed health system. The German system of global budget 
control effectively contains health care cost. The Canadian system is an 
example of a total public insurance model (without private health 
insurance), while the US has not yet developed a good proposal for 
reform. 
In developing countries. China is an example of a communist country with 
privatisation policies both in the general economy and in health. South 
Korea has achieved total coverage for all groups but with very high 
costs. Singapore's Medisave programme is a good example of achieving 
equity of health financing. And Malaysia spells out strong policies on 
private health care and the government's responsibility. 
58 
2.8 Summary remarks of the chapter 
The theories of society imply different distributional principles. The 
state through its political framework applies the principles to achieve 
social justice (equity). Strong state controlled countries with a 
collectivist's view may achieve equity to some extent but often are 
inefficient in production. Libertarians in laissez-faire countries use 
markets as a mechanism for increasing efficiency and consumer choice but 
at the expense of social fairness. 
Equity, efficiency and choice have been the central issues of recent 
health care reform in many countries. They are basic aims of every 
society. The libertarian is concerned more about freedom or choice, the 
utilitarian maximises efficiency, and the egalitarian protects equity. 
The theories of society influence health care system variations. The 
specific characteristics of health care, to some extent, limit the role 
of the market in achieving efficiency. 
Health care is a commodity that can be marketed. However the specific 
characteristics of health care make it difficult to go to entirely free 
markets. Most countries apply some form of state intervention to health 
care so as to guarantee social equity. However, the emergence of the New 
Right has revitalised ideas of the usefulness of the market so as to 
increase efficiency and choice. The internal market and managed 
competition are some of the new ideas. 
Equity, the objective of state intervention, has many interpretations. 
The commonly used definition is Mooney's definition. Equity in health ;s 
the ultimate goal of health care in every country, even though health is 
influenced by many other socio-economic policies. Equity of input, 
equity of access, equity of expenditure are the intermediate steps for 
achieving equity in health. 
Equity is defined as the fair distribution of economic and social goods 
across individuals. By Mooney's definition of equity, inputs, processes, 
outputs and outcomes of health care and health are treated as social 
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goods to be distributed fairly. The most powerful parameters for 
comparing this distribution are social class and geographical area. 
Inequities in health and health care are demonstrable in all countries 
regardless of political economy. An egalitarian approach alone cannot 
either safeguard equity or completely remedy inequity. Improving 
efficiency can increase the resources available for redistribution and 
therefore increase equity. It is not always the case that efficiency is 
increased at the expense of equity. 
Health care resources are limited in spite of increasing demand and 
escalating health expenditures in almost all countries. The government 
cannot cope with the demand for budget increases. The market approach is 
seen as one mechanism for distribution of health care to achieve 
efficiency, choice and equity in the end. Private sectors are given a 
role in most recent health care reforms. 
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3. THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MIX OF HEALTH SERVICES IN THAILAND 
This chapter reviews the Thai health care system which has its own 
particular characteristics. The absence of overt colonisation has 
encouraged a mix of public and private health services. The chapter 
begins with descriptions on health care financing and provision. It then 
explores the issues of equity, efficiency and choice in relation to the 
present public and private mix. It further reviews some remedies in 
terms of regulations that have been introduced into the system. 
3.1 Health care financing 
Westernised health care entered into Thailand (formerly called Siam) in 
the 18605 (Singkaew 1991). Previously, traditional medicine was provided 
to clients free of charge at the point of service, but clients paid the 
doctors when treatments had been successful. The culture of paying a 
hospital and paying a doctor has continued for modern health care: 
clients have to pay for treatments even in public hospitals. This 
history has influenced the pattern of health care financing. Household 
expenditure has been a major source of finance (see table 3.1). 
Myers et al (1985) were the first group to present the distribution of 
health expenditure by sources of finance. They found that household 
expenditure was consistently high at about two thirds of total health 
expenditure (data of 1978 and 1981). Public sources of finance were the 
next major payer, at about 30% of total expenditure. The striking rise 
of foreign aid in 1981 compared to 1978 was probably due to the capital 
costs of expanding the coverage of community hospitals to rural areas 
according to primary health care policy (Tangcharoensathien 1990). 
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) applied the 
same method as Myers et al to study the health care financing patterns 
of 1984 and 1987 (see table 3.1) (Thai Government 1988). A longitudinal 
trend can be seen, with the public share of finance decreasing and that 
of household expenditure rising. A big warning in the interpretation of 
table 3.1 is that household expenditure was overestimated because no 
allowance was made for reimbursable expenses (Tangcharoensathien 1990). 
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Table 3.1 Percentage distribution of health expenditure by sources of 
finance 
Sources of finance 1978 1981 1984 1987 
------------------------------------------------------------
1. Public 
Ministry of Public Health 
Other ministries 
Government employees 
2. Workmen Compensation Fund 
3. State enterprises 
4. Private insurance 
5. Foreign aid 
6. Household expenditure 
20.0 
8.5 
2.0 
0.4 
0.4 
1.3 
1.0 
66.5 
17 .9 
8.1 
3.2 
0.5 
0.3 
0.9 
2.6 
66.6 
17.4 
6.9 
3.6 
0.5 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
69.3 
14.1 
6.0 
4.1 
0.4 
0.8 
0.7 
0.7 
73.2 
=====================================:================::::::: 
Source: Myers et al (1985) for 1978. 1981 data 
The Thai Government (1988) for 1984, 1987 data 
Though the overall share of public sources of finance has been 
decreasing, the expenditure for government employees has been 
increasing, ie. from 2% in 1978 to 4% of total health expenditure in 
1987 (table 3.1). Table 3.2 shows a clearer picture of this rise. The 
public expenditure for government employees is a kind of fringe benefit 
given to government employees (civil servants, comprising permanent 
employees and their dependents and temporary employees) to cover 
hospital care in public and private hospitals and ambulatory care in 
public hospitals only. The health benefits have increased more rapidly 
than total fringe benefits and the government payroll. Finally, the 
share of health benefits for government employees in the total 
government budget has increased from 0.4% in 1978 to 1.5% in 1990. 
Table 3.2 Trends of public expenditure for government employees 
1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Health benefits (mil. baht) 
% of total fringe benefits 
% of government payroll 
% of government budget 
595.2 
nat 
3.1 
0.4 
988.0 
8.4 
2.9 
O.B 
1,774.9 
9.9 
3.1 
1.1 
2,801.1 
12.9 
4.1 
1.4 
4.315.5 
17 .5 
4.2 
1.5 
===================================================================== 
Note: nat = not available 
Source: Central Comptroller Department 
Total government expenditure on health has been consistently at about 7-
8% of the total government budget (Thai Government 1988). Table 3.3 
shows the changing patterns of government revenue which make up the 
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government budget. The major sources of government revenue in 1977 were 
import and export taxes (27.8%). By 1987, the specific sales taxes 
(29.6%) provided the largest share. However, the share of direct 
taxation from income has changed only slightly (from 15.7\ in 1977 to 
18.7\ in 1987). 
Table 3.3 Percentage distribution of government income by sources of 
revenue 
Sources of revenue 
Direct taxes 
General sales taxes 
Specific sales taxes 
Import/export taxes 
Fees and permits 
Other duties 
Sales of goods and services 
State enterprises 
Others 
1977 
15.7 
21.5 
21.5 
27.8 
0.8 
5.4 
2.1 
3.1 
3.8 
1987 
18.7 
17.6 
29.6 
19.7 
2.7 
0.3 
3.0 
5.0 
3.5 
--------------------------------------------------------
Total income (million Bahts) 52,104 191,621 
========================================================= 
Source: National Statistical Office 1988 
Table 3.4 shows the trend of total health expenditure since 1978. During 
the past decade, health expenditure, including both public and private 
spending, has increased from 3.4% of GNP in 1978 to 5.7% of GNP in 1987. 
From 1981, the increases in health expenditure have been faster than the 
increases in GOP. This rapid increase is due to the growth in private 
expenditure rather than public expenditure. The projection to the year 
2000 by the NESDB shows the spiralling rise in health expenditure. Total 
health expenditure is projected to reach 8.1\ of GNP which is the level 
of spending in developed countries. 
As household expenditure is the major source of health care financing, 
further details are given here. In 1988, about 3.4% of total household 
expenditure was allocated to medical care. Of this, 22% was for drugs, 
36% for medical services in public hospitals, another 36% for medical 
services in private clinics and hospitals and 6% for other medical 
services (NSO 1990). The share of expenditure on drugs in monthly 
household health expenses has been decreasing (from 32% in 1981 to 22% 
in 1988) while the share of expenditure on institutional medical 
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services has been increasing. Moreover, the share of expenditure on 
medical services for public hospitals has been decreasing (from 50% of 
monthly expenses on institutional medical care in 1986 to 46% in 1988) 
while the share of expenditure on medical services for private clinics 
and hospitals has been increasing (from 40% of institutional medical 
care in 1986 to 46% in 1988) (Tangcharoensathien 1990). This corresponds 
with the studies on income elasticities of demand for drugs and medical 
services by Myers et al (1985) and Tangcharoensathien (1990). Table 3.5 
shows that a 1% increase in household income (national average household 
income), decreases expenditure on drugs by 0.69%, but increases 
expenditure on medical services by 1.62%. However, the overall 
expenditure on medical care increases as household income increases: 
this corresponds with the projection in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Trend of total per capita health expenditure (public and 
private spending) in the past decade and the projection to 
the year 2000 (1987 prices) 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Proiected 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
2000 
% of GNP Per capita 
on health expenditure 
(Baht) 
3.4 680 
3.6 710 
3.9 738 
4.2 798 
4.6 864 
4.8 939 
5.2 1,052 
5.6 1,132 
5.6 1,192 
5.7 1,282 
5.8 1,389 
6.0 1,506 
6.1 1,634 
6.3 1,774 
8.1 3,718 
% increase 
health 
expenditure 
4.4 
3.9 
8.1 
8.3 
8.7 
12.0 
7.6 
5.3 
7.6 
8.4 
8.4 
8.5 
8.6 
% growth 
of GOP 
5.05 
4.57 
5.96 
3.90 
6.76 
6.65 
3.40 
4.30 
7.74 
5.5 
5.5 
5.6 
5.6 
============================================================ 
Source: Social Development Project Division, NESDB 1990 
Note: The projected growth of GOP in 1988 to 1990 was under-estimated. 
It was actually 12.0% in 1988 and 10.8% in 1989 (The Bank of Thailand 
1990 quoted by Tangcharoensathien 1990). 
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Table 3.5 Income elasticity of demand for medical care, 1981 and 
1986/88 
Income elasticity 
of demand for 
Drugs 
Medical services 
Medical care 
1981 
(1) 
-0.69 
1. 62 
0.25 
1986/88 
(2) 
-2.6 
1.7 
0.57 
===============================================:=== 
Note: (1) Myers et al 1985 
(2) Tangcharoensathien 1990 
Thus Thai health care financing is dominated by private household 
expenditure, though the public hospitals claim that they cater for poor 
patients. The pluralistic characteristics of the Thai health care -
public and private, formal and informal sectors - absorb a large portion 
of private expenditure, especially expenses for drugs. Hospital care was 
a cause of escalation in health expenditure. The share of public 
spending of total health expenditure in the 1980s was decreasing (from 
18% of total health expenditure in 1981 to 14% in 1987), but expenses 
for the privileged group 'civil servants' were increasing. Private 
health insurance's share of total health expenditure was minimal and 
decreasing. It is expected that some changes in the financing pattern 
will become obvious in the 1990s, because of the implementation of the 
Social Security Act from 1991 onwards. 
Health insurance and health benefit schemes 
Table 3.6 shows the different schemes of health benefits and health 
insurance in 1991. Sources of finance and beneficiaries for different 
schemes are discussed briefly. 
Civil servants and employees, their spouses, children and parents are 
entitled to use free care at public health facilities and limited 
services, ego inpatient care and special investigations, at private 
health facilities. Funds for these fringe benefits come from general 
taxation without any contributions from civil servants or employees and 
are controlled by the Central Comptroller Department, Ministry of 
Finance. It was estimated that in 1991, 5.6 million people (9.8% of 
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total population) were covered and used up 4,315.5 million Baht. Health 
expenditure from this scheme was about 770 Baht per person per year. 
State enterprise employees acquire health benefits very similar to the 
civil servant health benefits. Deductions from their incomes are not 
made for these benefits. The benefits are financed by corporate revenue. 
There are great variations among state enterprises in whether they 
provide coverage to their employees only or extend coverage to their 
dependents. Big and financially secure state enterprises tend to 
reimburse health expenditures for both outpatient and inpatient care at 
public and private hospitals. In 1991, O.B million people (1.5% of total 
population) were covered by state employee benefit. Expenditure per 
person per year was 733 Baht, very similar to expenditure for civil 
servant health benefits. 
Table 3.6 Health benefit and health insurance scheme in Thailand 1991 
Schemes Target population Expenditure Source of 
million % of total million per finance 
population baht capita 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil servant and employee 5.6 9.B 4,315.5 770 General tax 
State enterprise employee 0.8 1.5 564.1 733 Corporate finance 
Free medical care 10.7 19.0 2,500.0 233 General tax 
Workmen Compensation Fund 1.7 3.3 396.9 233 Employer liability 
Social Security Scheme 2.2 3.B 1,540.0 700 Tripartite 
contributions 
Health card project 2.7 5.1 183.0 68 Community finance 
Free medical care for 3.5 6.2 267.5 81 General tax 
the elderly 
School health insurance 6.7 12.2 180.9 27 General tax 
Private insurance 0.2 0.5 445.2 1,855 Private payment 
======================================================================== 
Source: Health Planning Division 1992 
In 1975, the Parliament granted a specific budget for the low income 
group to entitle them to free medical care at public health facilities. 
It was intended to create equity in receiving medical care among the 
people. Families with income less than 2,000 Baht a month or individuals 
with income less than 1,500 Baht a month apply for a low income card in 
order to get access to free medical care at public health facilities. 
Because the cards are issued and renewed once every three years, many 
poor families are not given low income cards. However, public health 
facilities have provided more free medical care to the poor without a 
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low income card than to the poor with low income cards. In 1991, 10.7 
million people (19.0% of the total population) were low income card 
holders and a budget of 2.500 million Baht was allocated to the free 
medical care to the poor scheme. It is estimated that 233 Baht was 
allocated for one person per year. 
Because Thai politics is very averse to socialism and communism, the 
schemes for social security have been introduced slowly. In 1974. the 
Workmen Compensation Fund was founded by order of the Military 
Government. Employers of establishments with more than 19 employees are 
liable to pay contributions to the fund. The Fund provides benefits to 
employees to cover the cost of treatment and to compensate for income 
loss from injuries and illnesses related to work. The Workmen 
Compensation Fund reimburses expenses at both public and private health 
facilities with an upper limit of 30.000 Baht per episode of illness. In 
1991 there were 1.7 million workers (3.3% of total population) under 
this scheme and the Fund reimbursed 396.9 million Baht to health 
facilities. Expenditure for work related illnesses was estimated to be 
233 Baht per worker per year. 
The Social Security Scheme is the result of the Social Security Act 
passed by Parliament in 1990 after efforts lasting 26 years. During the 
first three years of implementation. working establishments with more 
than 19 employees are covered by this scheme. Employees are obliged to 
contribute 1.5% of their salary to the fund, while employers and the 
government both contribute the same amount to the fund. Target groups of 
the Social Security Scheme include workers (at that period the same 
group as covered by the Workmen Compensation Fund) and also their 
dependents. The scheme allows them to use public and private health 
facilities which sign a contract with the Social Security Fund. The Fund 
allocated 700 Baht per capita per year to the main contractor according 
to the number of registered workers and dependents. In 1991. 2.2 million 
workers and their dependents (or 3.8% of the total population) were 
covered by the Social Security Fund and a budget of 1.540 million Baht 
was allocated. 
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The health card project was initiated by the Ministry of Public Health 
in 1984 as a form of community financing. The idea was to develop 
voluntary health insurance in rural and urban areas at a time when there 
was little hope of compulsory health insurance. Clients bought health 
cards (fami1y/ individual cards, mother and child cards) through village 
health volunteers to cover expenses at health facilities of the Ministry 
of Public Health. Health card funds or multipurpose community 
development funds were established at village level to pay health 
facilities a fixed percentage of the card price according to the level 
of health facilities. The government allocated a minimal budget for 
operating this project. However. cost recovery of the health card scheme 
at district and provincial hospitals was lower than 50%, that means 
another government budget was used to subsidise the health card scheme. 
In 1991. 2.7 million people (5.1% of total population) were covered by 
the health card project and 1B3 million Baht was raised through the 
community financing mechanism. 
In 1989, the Ministry of Public Health proposed a new budget line shared 
with the Ministry of Education for a school health insurance scheme. It 
was intended to provide all primary school students with free medical 
care at public health facilities as these students are in school and the 
teachers were responsible for care. In 1991. there were 6.7 million 
students, making up 12.2% of total population. A capitation rate of 27 
Baht per student was calculated for this programme. 
The issue of the inadequate health budget for low income groups was 
raised in the Parliament in 1989. and many Members of Parliament (MPs) 
expressed their sympathy with free medical care for the poor. A new 
budget line for free medical care for the elderly was explicitly 
specified. despite the fact that a policy of giving free care to the 
elderly had been publicised since 19B1. It was estimated that there were 
3.5 million elderly people (6.2% of the total population) in 1991 and 
the Parliament managed to allocate 267.5 million Baht under this budget 
line. 
The private health insurance market is still limited in Thailand. It was 
estimated by Kolakul (1989) that there were 236.100 people covered by 
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various policies of private health insurance. The most common policies 
were life insurance with health benefits and group health insurance 
purchased by private firms or state enterprises. The minority was 
individual health insurance. There are great variations in the premium 
rates and health benefits provided by different policies. In 1991, 
private health insurance paid 445.2 million Baht for health expenditure, 
which was about 1,855 Baht per person per year, the highest expenditure 
per capita among all health benefit schemes. 
The health benefits and health insurance as shown in table 3.6 are not 
mutually exclusive, ego those who are covered by civil servant benefit 
may buy a private health insurance policy or buy a health card. There is 
no information on the extent of multiple health benefits so it is not 
possible to estimate clearly how many were left uncovered. However, in a 
study of a rural area, Hongvivatana and Manopimoke (1991) estimated that 
1.6% of rural people were covered by multiple health benefit schemes and 
56% of rural people were left uncovered. In urban slum areas of 
Chiangmai, where the health project was implemented, Tangcharoensathien 
(1990) estimated that 15% of urban slum people were covered by family 
health cards, 20% by low income cards, 10% by civil servant benefit, 6% 
by other schemes, another 6% were covered by multiple schemes and 43% 
were uncovered. 
3.2 Health care provision 
At the time of feudalism, Thai health care was provided by the private 
traditional health sector. The earliest western medicine entered with 
the French imperialists during King Narai of Ayudhya reign (around 
1460). It was reinstated again in the reign of King Rama III (1844) by 
Dr Bradley, an American missionary doctor. In the period of King Rama V, 
the first government hospital was built in 1888 to commemorate the loss 
of his son. But actually the first private hospital was founded in 
Petchaburi province by a group of missionary doctors in 1883, five years 
earlier (Singkaew 1991). 
Not until the reign of King Rama V did western medicine gain its 
popularity. Western medicine has become indigenous because the first 
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medical school was established with royal permission in 1890. King Rama 
V foresaw that Thai traditional medicine would become obsolete. 
"(The plan of setting up a medical school is) approved. But 
I warn that. foreign doctors are good. should they disappear 
or not? Thai doctors will not exist in the future. will 
they? I, myself. still prefer Thai medicine, and feel safe 
with Thai doctors. If Thai doctors behave like foreign 
doctors. every thing will be cold. No regards are given to 
monks and the respectable. However, I am too old to live to 
the time that all Thai doctors do not exist. Younger 
generations will be pleased with foreign medicine. No one 
would be worried as I do. This is just a warning from a 
conservative man" (quoted in Siriraj Medical School 1990) 
The earliest household survey of health seeking behaviour was carried 
out by the Health Planning Division in 1970. Later surveys by the Health 
Planning Division and the Institute of Population and Social Research 
(IPSR) in 1979 and 1985 show that self-care as a means of acute illness 
alleviation (including self-prescribed drugs) has decreased from 54.1% 
of total acute illness to 46.5% and 28.6% respectively (Thai Government 
1988). Table 3.7 compares the changing patterns of health seeking 
behaviour in 1979 and 1985 between urban and rural populations. 
Traditional medicine was the least consulted means of care in both urban 
and rural populations. and it decreased in popularity. Self-
prescription. which included self care. was more prominent in rural 
areas than in urban areas. It has given way to formal health care; 
government hospitals and the private health sector. The private sector 
slightly increased its share in rural areas but had a decreased share in 
urban area. During the 6 years (1979 to 1985). government hospitals 
became very popular in both rural and urban populations. 
Table 3.7 Percent distribution of health seeking behaviours of urban 
and rural people in 1979 and 1985 
Pattern of 
behaviours 
Urban 
1979 1985 
% 
change 
Rural 
1979 1985 
% 
change 
____________________ a _________________________________________________ _ 
Self-prescribed 36.4 13.6 -62.6 44.0 24.6 -78.9 
Health centre 4.9 0.7 -85.7 20.0 16.6 -17.0 
Government hospital 14.1 41.2 +192.2 8.8 29.5 +235.2 
Private health sector 41.6 38.3 -7.9 14.5 16.3 +12.4 
Traditional medicine 3.0 1.0 -66.7 7.1 2.8 -60.6 
Others 0 5.3 5.5 10.2 
======================================================================= 
Source: Thai Government 1988 
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The changing patterns in table 3.7 can be partly explained by an 
increase in supply apart from the implications of income elasticity of 
demand for medical care as shown in table 3.5. Furthermore, it is not 
clear that the methodology of the two surveys by the Health Planning 
Division and the IPSR were the same (Thai Government 1985). The history 
of Thai westernised health services is dominated by the state-owned 
hospitals. The first group of private hospitals were not-for-profit 
hospitals in urban areas. During the fourth and the fifth National 
Health Development Plans (1977 to 1981 and 1982 to 1986), there were 
policies to expand regional and general hospitals in provincial 
districts and to build new community hospitals to cover all districts. 
The growth of government hospital beds is shown in table 3.8. The share 
in total utilisation of public hospitals then rose. 
Table 3.8 The trends of growth of public hospitals outside Bangkok 
Hospital beds 1977 1982 1987 1990 1996* 
---------------------------------------------_ .. 
Regional 8,216 10,286 11,190 11,339 14,625 
%increase/yr 5.0 1.8 0.4 4.B 
General 14,991 18,615 20,261 20,063 25,575 
% increase/yr 4.8 1.8 0.6 4.0 
Community 3,412 6,765 11,430 na 20,800 
% increase/yr 19.8 13.8 9.1 
================================================ 
* Expected from the seventh National Health Plan (1992-1996) 
Source: Pannarunothai et al 1992 
Besides the growth of public hospita1s, the private for-profit health 
sector has grown rapidly from 1970 onwards: it has tripled in the number 
of hospitals and quadrupled in the number of beds (Thai Government 
1988). By 1989, private one-man-so10 clinics and polyclinics were the 
major provider of out-patient care (though bear in mind that hospitals 
provide out-patient care as well) and private hospitals have expanded to 
31% in number and 14% in bed capacity of total facilities (see table 
3.9). 
The growth of private hospitals was faster than that of public 
hospitals. Table 3.10 shows that the growth rate of private hospitals 
was nearly ten times that of public hospitals during 1967 to 1978 
(bearing in mind the denominator of private hospital beds was far 
smaller than that of public hospitals), and it was about twice the rate 
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during 1978 to 1990. This made the share of private hospital beds to 
total beds rise from 2% in 1967 to 10% in 1978 and 14% in 1990. 
Table 3.9 Percent distribution of health infrastructures between public 
and private sectors, 1989 
Health 
Infrastructures 
Public 
MOPH Other 
ministries 
Private Total (Number) 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hospitals 
Beds 
OP clinics 
Health centres 
61.4 
63.2 
0.5 
100 
6.2 
23.1 
3.1 
o 
31. 4 
13.7 
96.4 
a 
100 (1,127) 
100 (93,154) 
99 (7,716) 
100 (7,880) 
=============================================================== 
Source: Health resource survey, Health Statistics Division, MOPH 
Table 3.10 The growth of private hospital beds compared to public 
hospital beds 
Private hospitals Public hospital~ %private beds 
beds %increase* beds %increase of total beds 
----------------------------------------------------------
1967 
1978 
1990 
1,017 
5,528 
13,316 
40.3 
11.7 
44,227 
52,014 4.4 
80,377 4.5 
2.2 
9.6 
14.2 
=·==A========~============================================= 
verage 1ncrease per year 
Source: Health Statistic Division and Medical licensing Division 
The growth of private hospitals was widespread. Table 3.11 shows that 
the growth of private hospitals outside Bangkok has been more dramatic 
than in Bangkok. In 1988, 1990 (and in the projection for 1994). This 
causes the share of total private hospital beds outside Bangkok to 
exceed that of Bangkok by 1994. The slow-down in Bangkok may be a sign 
of saturation, whereas the hectic booms outside Bangkok were the result 
of the promotion by the Board of Investment which stimulated capital 
investment in health care, and by the banks in giving loans for 
investment outside Bangkok (Ngarmwuthiporn 1992). Moreover an increase 
in consumer demand was met by a good supply of doctors who joined 
private hospitals as doctors' income was four to eight times higher than 
in the public sector (Chunharas et al 1992). 
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Table 3.11 The growth of private hospitals in and outside Bangkok 
In Bangkok Other t~an Bangkok 
beds %increaset beds %increase % of total private beds 
------------------------------------------------------------1978 3.041 2.487 44.9 
1987 5.935 10.6 4,390 8.5 42.5 
1988 6,322 6.5 5,166 17.7 45.0 
1989 6,726 6.4 5,224 1 • 1 43.7 
1990 6.994 4.0 6,322 21.0 47.5 
1994 10,959 14.2 11.082 18.8 50.3** 
=.==;::::;:~=;;:::::=;::=;:::=============================== 
** Expected figure from Board of Investment 
Source: Medical Licensing Division and Board of Investment 
The private hospitals provide almost the same hospital care as 
government hospitals do, ie. ambulatory, accident and emergency, 
inpatient care and also preventive and promotive services. Both of them 
target the same group of people with health benefit coverage. The 
government employees are one group. Table 3.12 shows the trend of 
government expenditure to cover the health benefits of its employees 
together with the percentages of these benefits that were given to 
private hospitals. In 1988, about 8% of the government budget for health 
benefits went to private hospitals. It increased to 12.8% in 1990; if 
the increasing trend of the total budget were taken into account (rates 
increased by 12% in 1989 and 23% in 1990), the rate of increase would be 
even higher. 
Table 3.12 The trends of government employee health benefit and 
reimbursement to private hospitals 
Total 
(mn baht) 
% Reimbursed to private hospitals 
increase mil baht % of total 
------------------------------------------------------
1981 988 na na 
1982 1,213 22.8 na na 
1983 1,482 22.2 na na 
1984 1,775 19.8 na na 
1985 2,128 19.9 na na 
1986 2,589 21.6 na na 
1987 2,801 8.2 na na 
1988 3,156 11.7 248.7 7.9 
1989 3,521 11.6 400.6 11.4 
1990 4,316 22.6 551.6 12.8 
======================================================= 
na not available 
Source: Central Comptroller Department 
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3.3 Equity in health 
In a limited information environment as in Thailand, few studies can 
prove inequity by the definitions in chapter 2. Evidence produced by the 
Thai Government (1988) shows differences in health expenditures per 
capita by occupational groups and health benefit groups. Distribution of 
hospital beds in relation to population shows the lowest ratios in the 
Northeast region, the poorest part of the country (Provincial Hospital 
Division 1987). Furthermore, the government health budget allocated to 
the health infrastructure, when calculated in terms of inputs per 
capita, shows disparities among regions. However, this evidence is 
subject to the error of not including private health expenditures or 
inputs from other sectors. 
In highlighting the health needs of the population, it is unfortunate 
that no comprehensive summary indicators, such as standardised mortality 
ratios (SMRs) by social class, are available. Apart from SMR, social 
class which has long been developed in the UK has yet to be studied in 
Thailand. The study of Mortality and Morbidity Differentials (MMD) in 
Thailand in 1986 (IPSR 1988) attempted to present inequities in health. 
Urban-rural. regional. occupational (according to the National 
Statistical Office's classification) and educational differentials were 
used as the characteristics for comparison. 
The first indicator used was infant mortality rate (IMR). The data from 
the 1980 census and 1984-86 Survey of Population Change (SPC) at the mid 
census period established prominent differences in infant deaths in 
different occupational groups. Furthermore. urban/rural differentials 
were marked especially in administrative and service worker groups (see 
table 3.13). 
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Table 3.13 Indirect estimate of IMR from 1980 census and SPC 1984-1986 
by occupation of mother 
1980 1984-1986 
--------------------
Occupation Total Urban Rural Total 
-----------------------------------.----------------------------------
Administrative, executive, 
managerial and government official 
Sales 
Agricultural/farmer 
Service worker 
22.4 
34.7 
47.8 
33.9 
12.7 
33.5 
49.4 
33.4 
27.8 
34.8 
45.6 
41.6 
16.7 
27.8 
38.9 
27.3 
====================================================================== 
Source: adapted from IPSR 1988 
Table 3.14 Major causes of death between urban and rural population, 
1985 (Rate per 100 000) 
Urban population Rural population 
Causes of death Rate Causes of deaths Rate 
--~--------------------------------------------------------------------Accident, suicide, homicide 
Senility without psychosis 
Heart diseases 
Malignancy 
CVA 
Pneumonia, bronchitis 
58.4 
42.1 
40.7 
36.0 
27.8 
17.7 
Senility without psychosis 
Accident, suicide, homicide 
Malignancy 
Pneumonia, bronchitis 
Heart diseases 
Conditions originating during 
perinatal period 
98.0 
78.6 
54.2 
42.1 
37.3 
35.2 
======================================================================== 
Source: IPSR 1988 
Mortality data from the Survey of Population Change further established 
differential mortality experiences for children and adult groups. Oeaths 
in most age groups were more prevalent amongst rural people (crude death 
rate 5.7/1,000) than urban dwellers (3.3/1,000) and Bangkok dwellers 
(3.0/1,000). The Central region, the most affluent, had a crude death 
rate of 4.3/1,000 while the Northeast, the poorest, had a crude death 
rate of 5.9/1,000. Almost all disease categories hit harder on rural 
than urban populations, except for heart diseases (see table 3.14). When 
limited information on occupation is analysed, farmers were more prone 
to premature death than labourers and clerical/sales workers (see table 
3.15), and the uneducated had the worst rural and urban death rate (see 
table 3.16). The major weakness in these rates is that they are not 
standardised for either age or sex. These important confounding factors 
would be distributed differently between the rural and urban dwellers, 
and among different occupational groups. Rural-urban migration of the 
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working population tends to leave their children and parents in rural 
areas. And the large group of 'did not work' should be reallocated to 
the same occupational group as the head of household. 
Table 3.15 Death rate per 100 000 population aged 11 years and over by 
occupation, 1985/86 
Occupation Rate 
-------------------------------------
Administrative, executive, 
managerial and government 
official 
Sales 
Agricultural/farmer 
Service worker 
Transport worker 
Labourer 
Did not work 
170.8 
262.1 
399.9 
184.2 
629.5 
318.1 
855.9 
==================================== 
Source: IPSR 1988 
It is interesting when data on attendant at death or before death are 
presented. If a death event attended by a medical doctor is used as an 
indicator of access to medical care, then the urban population had 
greater access to medical care than the rural population (60% as opposed 
to 40%, IPSR 1988). 
Table 3.16 Death rate per 100 000 population age 6 and over by 
education level, 1985 
Education level Rate 
----------------------~----None 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
1,533.6 
338.5 
167.6 
168.9 
=========================== 
Source: IPSR 1988 
Morbidity and utilisation of health services are better illustrated by 
data from the quinquennial National Health and Welfare Survey (HWS). In 
1986 (NSO 1986), the prevalence rate of acute illness in the past 2 
weeks for the rural population was 7.3% while for the urban population 
it was 5.0%. In contrast, the admission rate of maternity during the 
past 12 months for the rural population was 33% of total deliveries and 
urban population 49%. The results of the 1985 survey by the Morbidity 
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and Mortality Differentials (MMD) (IPSR 1988) were twice as high as the 
rates of 1986 HWS (because the MMD asked for acute illness during the 
past 30 days), but urban-rural differentials persisted. Use of drug 
stores and self prescribed treatments were higher in rural than urban 
areas (32% of total illness and 17% respectively). The prevalence rate 
of illness in urban slum areas was even worse when compared with the 
rate of urban areas found by HWS. Tangcharoensathien (1990) found a rate 
for acute illness and injury in last two weeks of 22.6% of the total 
population in Chiangmai urban slums. Drug store use including self-
prescribed treatment was as high as 28% of total illness episodes 
(Tangcharoensathien employed both participant-observation and 
quantitative techniques in data collection). 
From table 3.6 describing the financing of different health benefit 
schemes, it was apparent that there were inequities of expenditure per 
capita among different schemes of health benefits. In interpreting the 
expenditure figures, it has to be clarified that the figures for the 
Workmen Compensation Fund, private insurance, government employee and 
state enterprise employee were the actual amounts spent, while the 
figures for the rest were allocated budgets. The per capita expenditures 
that were calculated from actual expenditure were higher than those 
estimated from allocated budgets. It is more often the case than not 
that allocated budgets are used up and the beneficiaries of that scheme 
have to be transferred (in terms of the account books) to other schemes 
(finally the general budget of the health institution covers the deficit 
of allocated budgets for special programmes). This underestimation 
therefore explains to some extent the inequalities of expenditure per 
capita. Nonetheless. the inequities amongst schemes that are financed by 
general tax revenues show clearly that government and state enterprise 
employees were the most privileged groups. Private insurance schemes 
gave the highest benefits of all groups. 
The scarce data presented here are not strictly comparable. However. 
they reflect inequities of health in Thailand, regarding urban-rural, 
regional, occupational and education differentials with respect to 
expenditures, inputs, health needs and utilisation. 
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3.4 Efficiency in the Thai health system 
The available data presenting the efficiency of the Thai health system 
can be classified into three aspects of efficiency. Firstly, efficiency 
in production is reflected by studies on hospital costs. Secondly, 
efficiency in terms of income generation is reflected by information on 
cost recovery. And thirdly, efficiency in terms of productivity of 
health resources is reflected by workload studies. 
The first study on hospital costs in Thailand was done by Vasuprasart 
(1979). He constructed costing models to identify significant variables 
that explained cost variations in 11 hospitals in Bangkok. All of them 
were public hospitals belonging to medical schools, Ministry of Public 
Health. Ministry of Defence. local government and state enterprises. He 
found that inpatient cost per case was lowest in a hospital of 542 beds 
with around 29-33 cases per bed per year, though the sample was small. 
In 1980. the Ministry of Public Health studied the unit costs of 
provincial hospitals compared to community hospitals and health centres. 
Using cost accounting techniques, it was found that the cost of 
treatment for both outpatient visits and inpatients in provincial 
hospitals were the highest, whereas the costs ;n health centres were the 
lowest (Kanjanakul et al 1984a and b). There was no information 
explaining the quality of treatments in those health institutions. 
In 1988. there were at least four published papers on unit cost studies 
in public hospitals (Tangcharoensathien et al 1988, Rungthanapirom et al 
1988, Supachutikul 1988 and Pongprasert 1988). All of them employed cost 
accounting techniques to analyse each individual hospital. The results 
of these studies, especially on the allocation of labour and operating 
costs to patient service departments, were used as a basis for resource 
allocation criteria in a hospital cost function study. The Health 
Planning Division (1991) analysed routinely reported data from 17 
regional hospitals and 72 general hospitals from 1988 to 1990 to 
construct models to explain hospital costs. It was found that low unit 
costs were associated with high throughput, low staff to bed ratios, 
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shorter lengths of stay, fewer beds, not acting as a regional hospital, 
low surgical rates and absence of teaching activities in the hospital. 
The published studies on hospital costs in Thailand have studied public 
hospitals only, not private hospitals. Indirect studies on the hospital 
charges of private hospitals were done by 5iripanich (1979) and 
Phijaisanit et al (1984a). Seventy one percent of users at private 
hospitals in Siripanich's study commented that the charges were too 
expensive. Phijaisanit et al documented that doctor fees in private 
hospitals were the major cause of high charges. 
Higher prices for private hospital care cannot be interpreted as low 
efficiency in economic terms. Further analysis of Phijaisanit et al 
(1984a) showed that lengths of stay of patients in private hospitals 
were usually a day shorter than in public hospitals. Quality assessment 
by independent groups of medical experts admitted that the outcomes of 
both for-profit and not-for-profit private hospitals were kept within 
good standards. 
The second efficiency indicator, cost recovery, is also available for 
public hospitals. The Health Planning Division (1989) estimated that 
cost recovery rates in community hospital and provincial hospital were 
36% and 40% of total costs (capital and recurrent costs) respectively. 
In 1991, Tangcharoensathien and Supachutikul (1991) recalculated the 
cost recovery of community and provincial hospitals. This time, real 
cost recovery of both types of hospitals was about 50% of recurrent 
costs; and accrual cost recovery1 was about 72% of recurrent costs for 
community hospitals and 64% for provincial hospitals. 
A study on the cost recovery of a municipal health centre was done in 
Phitsanulok (Pannarunothai and Ajyutpokin 1991). Though the centre is 
intended to be the first level of medical treatment for low income card 
holders, the centre could raise revenue from other clients. In 1990, the 
cost recovery of the centre was about 73% of non-labour recurrent costs. 
1 Accrual cost recovery is calculated from hospital revenue plul revenue which would 
have been paid by low income patientl, divided by operating costs (including labour costs 
but eKcluding capital cost.). 
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There have been no published studies on the cost recovery of private 
hospitals, but the 'debt-equity ratio' is an indicator used by 
commercial banks in giving loans to private hospitals. The debt-equity 
ratio should be equal to one to reach a break-even point, ie. debt from 
capital investments equates -with profit given back to investors. Debt-
equity ratio of a large private hospital is usually larger than one 
because capital investment is high. One way of reaching the break even 
point is to increase the bed occupancy rate to at least 50-60% 
(Ngarmwuthiporn 1990a). This is not a problem in private hospitals in 
Bangkok where the occupancy rates were already 70-80% in 1990. There are 
good opportunities for investing in private hospitals both in Bangkok 
and upcountry. Private hospitals are viewed as a sunrise industry 
(Ngarmwuthiporn 1990a and b). 
The last efficiency indicator is workload data. Wibulpolprasert (1991) 
analysed the responses to the Health Resource Survey 1989 from 913 
hospitals. Table 3.17 summarises the results. The hospitals of the 
Ministry of Public Health had 62.6% of beds, and 42.4% of doctors 
working, but provided ambulatory treatments to 71.7% of all outpatient 
visits and inpatient care to 71.1% of total inpatient days. It seems 
that MOPH doctors were more productive than others in providing both 
outpatient and inpatient care. The second most productive doctors were 
private hospital doctors. This interpretation is subject to the errors 
that the severity of cases was not taken into account and the number of 
private hospital doctors included full-time staff only. 
Productivity in terms of workload may be influenced by the number of 
working hours: the longer the hours, the more patients can be seen. 
However, the number of working hours may be influenced by the desired 
target income as earned in public and private sectors. A survey of 
members of the Thai Medical Council in 1990 (Chunharas et al 1992) 
revealed that doctors working in the private sector only worked shorter 
hours than doctors working in the public sector. Table 3.18 shows the 
number of hours doctors worked at their full-time workplace and the 
extra hours they worked other than at their full-time workplace to make 
up their expected income level. It is very common that doctors working 
full-time in the public sector also work after office hours at private 
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clinics or private hospitals. In spite of working shorter hours, doctors 
in the private sector reached a monthly income of around 50,000 baht 
while doctors in the public sector doing extra work could earn around 
30,000 baht. This was because the payment per hour in the private sector 
was ten times higher than in the public sector. 
Table 3.17 Health services provided by public and private hospitals, 
1989 
Institutions Beds Doctors Outpatient Inpatient %Bed OP/Dr* IP/Dr* 
% % visits % days % occupied /yr /yr 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public 85.5 82.2 87.1 88.3 77.7 5,425 1 .711 
MOPH 62.6 42.4 71.7 71.1 85.4 8.692 2.670 
Other ministries 19.3 34.6 12.3 9.8 34.5-81.2 1.819 650 
State enterprise 0.8 1.4 0.5 4.8 47.0 2.039 554 
local government 2.8 3.8 2.6 2.6 69.7 3.560 1.084 
Private 14.5 17 .8 12.9 11.8 60.8 3.720 1.054 
For-profit 12.1 14.1 10.0 9.9 61.2 3.683 1.114 
Not-for-profit 2.4 3.6 2.9 1.9 59.3 4.079 820 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total (thousand) 73.836 12.713 65,393 20.271 5.144 1.595 
======================================================================== 
* Assuming that all doctors see both outpatients and inpatients 
Source: Health Resource Survey 1989, Division of Health Statistics 
From Wibulpolprasert (1991) 
Table 3.18 Average working hours per week of doctor by full-time 
workplace 
Medical Public Government State Private Private 
school hospital institution enterprise hospital clinic 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Full-time 
extra-time 
Total hours* 
51.7 
18.0 
62.5 
58.6 
25.6 
76.8 
43.7 
22.1 
56.4 
38.2 
20.3 
48.8 
47.4 
17 .0 
54.3 
41.5 
15.0 
43.9 
======================================================================= 
* Total hours are the average hours. and not necessary the addition of 
extra-time to full-time because some doctors do not work extra-time 
Source: Chunharas et al 1992 
3.5 Consumer satisfaction 
It is only recently that public services have become interested in the 
consumers' viewpoint. long queues and lengthy waiting times at public 
hospitals imply that services provided are not satisfactory. 
Kunaratanapruk and Boonpadung (1989) asked people in urban and rural 
areas of 30 provinces about their satisfaction toward curative services 
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in general hospitals. Only 0.2% of them were perfectly satisfied with 
the services and 65% were not satisfied at all. They criticised long 
waiting times, unaesthetic hospital environments, unfriendly reception, 
unconcerned doctors and out-of-date equipment. The authors further 
analysed whether the choice of services between public and private 
hospitals was determined by household income. The poorer groups in 
provincial districts (household income less than 2,000 baht a month) 
were more likely to use government hospitals than the richer. Moreover, 
low satisfaction with public hospitals was found amongst the poorer and 
the less educated groups, and those who were employees and self-
employed, despite being frequent users of public hospitals. 
Further studies have been done on the characteristics of consumers of 
private health services. The Department of Medical Services (1979) 
carried out a postal questionnaire survey using the telephone directory 
as the sampling frame. The result was biased since the sample was of the 
better-off. The users' average monthly income was 12,000 Baht (about US$ 
600), and educational levels secondary and vocational education. Most 
were traders and employees. Though they commented that the prices at 
private hospitals were expensive, 63% of them accepted the trade-off 
between high price and good service. Phijaisanit et 81 (1984b) surveyed 
the clientele at 8 private hospitals (both for-profit and not-for-
profit) in Bangkok during 1981 and highlighted that less than 1% of 
clients had a monthly income higher than 10,000 Baht (US$ 500, a monthly 
salary of a government doctor 10 years after graduationl). Education 
levels were mostly under university level with 16% no schooling. 
Occupation was dominated by those not employed (students 25\ and 
housewives 20%) and traders (19%). 
Recent policy changes on consumer choice of workers covered by the 
Social Security Scheme have proved that when the choice was given, 
people tended to choose private rather than public health services. In 
1991, the first year of implementing the 700 Baht capitation payment to 
health facilities that contracted with the Social Security Fund, not 
many private hospitals joined the programme. In 1992, when it was 
realised that the insured were under-utilising the services, more 
private hospitals joined in, hence, more choice was given to insured 
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workers. The share of public hospitals as main contractors at 84% of all 
employees in 1991 reduced to 58% in 1992 (Health Planning Division 
1992). 
3.6 Interactions between the public and private health sectors 
Interaction between the public and private health sectors can be 
described as relationships between public and private sectors and 
regulation. 
Relationships between public and private sectors 
Thai modern health care started with a private not-for-profit hospital 
in 1883 and since then has been dominated by public services. In the 
19705, the for-profit private health sector started to grow. The 
government viewed private hospitals as a complementary health service 
that took a heavy burden away from the government sector: both budgetary 
and service burdens. The Board of Investment has been one mechanism used 
to stimulate the growth of private hospitals since 1972. 
Private health services have never been independent from the public 
health sector in terms of manpower, though some private not-for-profit 
hospitals have trained nurses primarily to serve their own manpower 
needs and a few others have trained pharmacists, medical scientists and 
physical therapists. A proposal for the first private medical school has 
been opposed by the Thai Medical Council on the grounds that it will 
lower medical ethics. High health manpower needs in the private health 
sector have attracted doctors, nurses, dentists and others, to work 
full-time in the private sector. However, the majority of them work in 
both sectors. Health Ministers repeatedly say that doctors are allowed 
to work in the private sector provided that they spend their office 
hours in the public sector. 
Unfortunately~ there are no data on the flow of patients between public 
and private health services. Referrals seem to be a practice not widely 
performed. Informal referrals, without referral letters, may be higher 
than formal referrals. It seems that the most common cause of referrals 
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is financial problems after being hospitalised in private hospitals for 
the first few days. Referral rates within the public sector varied from 
4% to 25% depending on level and department of services (Pannarunothai 
et al 1988). 
Collaboration between the public and private health sectors was not 
proposed until the sixth National Health Plan (1987-1991). The aim was 
to maximise the benefits of existing resources through the sharing of 
medical equipment, ambulances, medical personnel, and information. But 
the success of the collaboration seems to depend on personal 
relationships rather than formal structures because there were no 
financial incentives for the collaboration (Medical Licensing Division 
1988). 
Regulation 
A positive framework for looking at regulatory mechanisms includes 
price, quantity and quality elements (WHO 1991a). In Thailand, there are 
no regulations to control prices in private hospital services but there 
is a price list guideline in MOPH hospitals. Indirect price control has 
been applied through the reimbursement rate for civil servants and their 
dependents using services in private hospitals. Under the reimbursement 
scheme, inpatient care at private hospitals is reimbursable up to 3,000 
Baht within a month or not more than 100 Baht a day if staying longer 
than 30 days, plus many other items on the reimbursement schedule. The 
civil servant health benefit decree has been amended many times, for 
example in 1980, it was amended to reduce fraud in the reimbursement of 
private hospital care, and the forthcoming amendment will increase the 
benefit to cover outpatient care at private health facilities with a 
ceiling for reimbursement of 500 Baht per episode of illness. 
Regulating the quantity of private services has been an important issue 
in controlling the number of drug stores in urban areas. In 1991, the 
government lifted controls by allowing pharmacists to set up their own 
drug stores provided that they advertised time schedules when consumers 
could obtain advice on appropriate drug use. There are no regulations to 
control the distribution of higher level private health facilities, ego 
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high technology diagnostic machines, private hospitals. Setting up a new 
private hospital has more to do with the Board of Investment than the 
Ministry of Public Health. 
Increasing remuneration in the public sector is being used as a 
mechanism for influencing the distribution of health manpower between 
urban and rural areas, primary physicians and specialists, and the 
public and private sectors. The Civil Servants Office is implementing 3 
new payroll schemes for administrators, academics and the general 
workforce. Doctors, nurses, dentists and pharmacists are classified as 
academics. Furthermore, within the Ministry of Public Health, there is a 
subsidy of 10,000 Baht a month for clinicians who do not work in 
addition in the private health sector, in the expectation that they will 
devote their time to providing better quality of care in public 
hospitals. There is another extra payment system for clinicians which is 
based on workload and will be implemented very soon. 
Medical practice in Thailand is controlled by the Thai Medical Council. 
The council has the right to suspend medical licensure to doctors who 
practise unacceptably. During the growth period of the private health 
sector, there have been many complaints filed to the Council for the 
investigation of individual doctors for professional misconduct, 
negligence of patients in the public sector and over-prescription of 
diagnostic tests in order to get financial incentives from laboratory 
centres. 
The roles of the Thai Medical Council and the Medical Licensing Division 
are not clear cut. Many complaints on unacceptable practice in private 
hospitals and clinics are made to the Council instead of the Division 
because the Council is responsible for physician's misconduct not the 
behaviour of the institution as a whole. This is because the Hospital 
Act of 1961 which is still used for the control of private hospitals is 
somewhat outdated. There have been some efforts in the Ministry of 
Public Health"either to amend the Hospital Act or to set up a new 
division to take responsibility for the private health sector. But those 
efforts have been unfruitful. 
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The Social Security Act has brought the issue of regulating quality of 
care in public and private hospitals into focus. The accreditation 
process for hospitals applying to be main contractors to the Social 
Security Fund is one positive approach to control the standards of 
hospital care. It is unclear whether private hospitals in general are 
better than public hospitals or vice versa. Quality assurance will be an 
important aspect of regulating private health care in the future. 
3.7 Provincial background 
The research on the public and private mix in health care in this thesis 
was designed for a confined urban area in Phitsanulok province. 
Information on this area is therefore given here. Phitsanulok is a big 
province in the north of Thailand (see map in Annex 3). The city has an 
ancient past and attracts inflows of people and cash including health 
service users from nearby provinces. In 1987, the net flow ratio for the 
regional hospital (situated in municipal area of Muang district of 
Phitsanulok province) was 0.06 (Pannarunothai et al 1988). This implies 
that for every 100 outpatients that crossed the district administrative 
boundary to utilise services at the regional hospital, there were 6 
patients from Muang district seeking services elsewhere in that region. 
A study of the health seeking behaviour of municipal dwellers (Muangman 
et al 1988) revealed that within the previous 12 months, about two-
thirds of total households had ever used drug stores, 48% had ever used 
private clinics, at least 43% had ever used public hospitals and at 
least 18% had ever used private hospitals. Estimation of the share of 
total visits within a year was as follows: 41% to drug stores, 16% self-
care and traditional medicine, 14% private clinics, 19% public 
hospitals, 6% private hospitals and the rest others. At the time of 
Muangman et al's study, there were only two private hospitals, 57 
clinics and 58 drug stores. 
In 1991, three years later, the growth of the private health sector has 
been considerable while population growth in the municipality (according 
to official statistics) has been low. Two new private hospitals have 
been established, making 6 hospitals in the municipal district (two 
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public and four private hospitals). There are 79 private clinics and 78 
drug stores distributed throughout the municipality (see also map in 
Annex 3). So it is a good site to carry out this study. 
In genera1ising the results of the study. cautious interpretation is 
necessary. Table 3.19 shows public and private hospital beds to 
population ratios by selected provinces. In 1989 Phitsanulok was ninth 
in terms of number of private hospital beds by province. The share of 
private hospital beds was 17\ of total beds while the country average 
was 16.5\. But when looking by province. wide variations in the share of 
private hospital beds are apparent. Total private hospital beds in these 
15 provinces accounted for 82\ of the country's private hospital beds 
(this implies that these provinces were the better off in terms of 
private health services). Nine provinces were better than the country 
average in ratios of public and total hospital beds to population. Four 
provinces had lower than average public hospital beds to population 
ratios J and a high compensation of private hospital beds (as in 
Samutprakan, Nakornsawan and Trang), but had not yet achieved average 
total bed to population ratios. Phitsanulok had a slightly higher than 
average private hospital bed to population ratio. 
Table 3.19 Ranking of private hospital beds by selected province, 1989 
Province Population Private hospital beds Beds/l0,OOO pop 
in 1990 Beds % of total Private Public Total 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bangkok 5.546,937 6,994 33.6 1.3 2.5 3.8 
Chiangmai 1,376,120 795 15.0 0.6 3.2 3.8 
Nakornrajsima 2,384,252 435 18.0 0.2 0.8 1.0 
Samutprakarn 854,883 411 54.9 0.5 0.4 0.9 
Raj buri 720,157 345 16.8 0.5 2.3 2.8 
Nakornsawan 1,088,213 333 23.8 0.3 1.0 1.3 
Songkla 1,090,083 285 12.1 0.3 1.9 2.2 
Trang 519,155 255 40.2 0.5 0.7 1.2 
*Phitsanu1ok 786,509 206 17 .0 0.3 1.2 1.5* 
Suratthani 738,350 201 18.0 0.3 1.2 1.5 
Singhburi 230,913 158 22.6 0.7 2.3 3.0 
Phuket 168,429 149 41.0 0.9 1.3 2.2 
Lampang 772,635 132 11.4 0.2 1.3 1.5 
Saraburi 535,160 128 9.0 0.2 2.4 2.6 
Chantabur; 439,273 119 13.3 0.3 1.7 2.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total (country) 56,303,273 13,316 16.5 0.2 1.2 1.4 
====================================================================== 
Source: Health Resource Survey, Health Statistic Division 
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3.8 Summary remarks of the chapter 
During its history as an independent nation, the Thai political system 
has evolved from an absolute monarchy to a democratic monarchy. The 
ruling classes have been sensitive to collectivist ideas of socialism. 
so the Thai modern health system has developed incrementally from 
traditional private care. 
The Thai health system is notable for its public and private mix. 
Private expenditure forms a major part of total health expenditure. In 
contrast. government health services are the major providers of modern 
health care. However, recent data show that the growth of private 
hospitals has been faster than the growth of the public health sector. 
Scanty data indicate that inequalities in health exist between rural and 
urban populations, and among different occupational groups. About half 
of the population is not covered by any health benefit scheme. The 
public schemes for poor or needy groups receive lower per capita 
budgets. There are inequities among different benefit schemes. 
There is no solid evidence that the public health sector is less 
efficient than the private health sector. The public sector is 
overcrowded and there is evidence that consumer satisfaction towards 
public services is poor. Little attention has been given to the quality 
of services of the private sector as compared to the public sector. 
Trends toward an increasing share of private expenditure and increasing 
share of private providers are foreseeable. These trends will inevitably 
widen the inequity gap. Research on the appropriate mix of public and 
private health sectors in Thailand is urgently needed. 
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4. MEASURING NEED AND USE: OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
This chapter describes the research methodology of how to measure the 
need for and use of health services in the study area. The chapter 
begins with objectives and conceptual framework of the study. A 
substantial part of this chapter describes the methods for measuring 
need and use. The chapter ends with information on how the socio-
economic grouping was applied for data analysis. 
4.1 Objectives of the study 
The general objective of the study is to assess the equity of coverage 
of public and private health services in Phitsanulok municipal area in 
order to identify policies of promotion and regulation which would lead 
to an equitable and efficient health service system. 
The specific objectives are focused under the following headings: 
1. To assess equity in health in terms of the morbidity and mortality 
of different socioeconomic groups in the municipality. 
2. To assess the equity of the health services in terms of 
accessibility and utilisation of both public and private health 
services for equal need, and the cost to users. 
3. To determine factors influencing utilisation patterns for public and 
private health services by different socioeconomic groups. 
4.2 Conceptual framework for analysis 
The logic of privatisation and state intervention in health care plays 
around important factors as summarised in figure 4.1 (adapted from 
Hollingsworth et al 1990). Financing and revenue raising patterns affect 
the availability of health personnel, medical facilities and medical 
technology including the way these resources are distributed. Equality 
of distribution affects equality of access. Further, cost control 
mechanisms can reduce wastage and make available more resources for more 
people (i.e. increase accessibility). Full privatisation may hamper the 
geographical distribution of resources, and produce less concern about 
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cost containment of care, so fewer people can get access. Both sides of 
the logic, privatisation and state intervention, aim at high quality 
medical care and high efficiency. A full state logic describes 
efficiency in terms of social efficiency (to the population at large) 
rather than the technical efficiency of the privatisation logic. 
However, the state has a mix of objectives- efficiency and equity. Under 
certain conditions, a private market can achieve social efficiency- but 
in practice will satisfy its own objectives- which may not be the same 
as those of the state. 
Equal social/spatial 
distribution 
Financing/ 
revenue system 
-> 
--+-----> 
Social 
---------) efficiency 
Cost/quality 
control 
v 
~-~------> Equal ity 
of access 
----+-) Quality of 
outcome 
v 
Personne1/ 
facility 
L> 
-----------> 
Medical 
technology 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of the study (adapted from 
Hollingsworth et a1 1990) 
4.3 Methods 
There are four methods employed in this study. The general household 
survey is the main source of information to analyse equity in health 
status including vertical equity in utilisation. The health diary and 
interview technique are used to compare the sensitivity of information 
gathering, especially on the past two weeks' morbidity. A bed census 
survey is another method used to supplement information on 
hospitalisation. Finally, a health resource survey addressed to the 
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hospital administrator is used to collect information on hospital inputs 
and outputs to describe better providers' behaviour. 
The general household survey 
In most cases, a general household survey is the best technique to study 
the morbidity and mortality of populations. In a single interview, many 
variables can be collected such as socioeconomic characteristics, 
illness experiences and health service use, and also consumer attitudes 
towards different health institutions. 
Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire for the general household survey is based on the 
questionnaire for the Health and Welfare Survey of the National 
Statistical Office. Details on health expenditure, consumer satisfaction 
and mortality were added. Table 4.1 summarises key questions that were 
asked to a household respondent. 
Table 4.1 Summary questions of the general household survey 
SECTION TYPE TOPICS AND QUESTIONS TECHNICAL REMARKS 
•...............................................•......•........••.••.........•....••.....•.... -..... -.... 
2 
3 
4 
INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD ROSTER 
Nalle, age, sex, larital status, 
relationship to head of household, 
education. 
INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE OF HEALTH BENEFITS 
Specify any schele(s) of health benefits 
covered, 
INDIVIDUAL ACUTE ILLNESS AND INJURY 
Acute illness and injury within two 
week recall period, severity and 
days absent frol norlal activity, 
who~ and where consulted, costs of 
care and transport, travel tile, 
waiting tile, reilbursement. 
INDIVIDUAL CHRONIC ILLNESS 
Describe chronic illness with onset, 
severity. days absent frot activity. 
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Age in years. head of household as the first 
.ember of the family. falily lelbers include 
all persons living under the sale roof lore 
than 3 lonths in the last 12 lonths. 
Different scheles are: governlent elployee. 
state enterprise employee, veteran, village 
head.an, health volunteer, free medical card 
for low incole, social security schele, 
private employee. private insurance. 
Self reporting of illness, key respondent is 
a proxy for all lelbers in the household. 
Severity of illness is probed by four 
grades. 
Probe chronic illness and severity by tracer 
cards. 
SECTION TYPE TOPICS AND QUESTIONS TECHNICAL REMARKS 
••................•.....•.•...........•...........................................•................... 
5 INDIVIDUAL DISABILITY 
Describe disability with onset, 
severity and days absent frol activity. 
Probe disability and severity by tracer 
cards. 
6 INDIVIDUAL HEALTH PROMOTION AND PREVENTION Recall period is one year. 
1 
Antenatal care, delivery, postnatal 
care, family planning, immunisation, 
other services attended, where attended, 
costs and reilburselent. 
INDIVIDUAL HOSPITALISATION 
NUlber of adlissions, days, diseases, 
where adlitted, costs of care and 
reimbursement. 
Recall period is one year. 
8 INDIVIDUAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME FROM MAIN SOURCE Assess each lember's incole to lake up 
9 
10 
11 
12 
AND SECONDARY SOURCE household income. 
Type of work, work status, paYlent basis, 
last month earnings, bonus, overtile and 
other allowances e.g. food, clothing, 
house rent, travel. 
Type of second job and pay. 
HOUSEHOLD HOUSEHOLD AGGREGATE ANNUAL INCOME 
FROM OTHER SOURCES 
Other sources of inco.e e.g. pension, 
insurance clail, interest, dividend, 
scholarship, gift, inheritance, lottery, 
property sale and leasing and transfer 
of income. 
HOUSEHOLD HOUSING AND OWNERSHIP OF DURABLES 
Housing condition, number of rOOIS, 
ownership of house and other durables 
e.g. gas stove, lierowave/oven, 
refrigerator, electric fan, radio, 
television, videotape, washing lachine, 
lotorcycle, car, bicycle, tricycle. 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMER SATISFACTION 
Level of satisfaction concerning 
quality of care, cost and inter-
relationship with doctor and other 
health personnel. 
Attitude towards existing health 
system: public and private. 
INDIVIDUAL eEATH'S) IN FAMILY 
Number of falily members who died 
during the past 5 years, age at death, 
sex, cause of death, ledical treatlent 
and place of death. 
Assess the sources of income and amount. 
Interview and observation. 
Respondent's attitude towards each 
health institutions. 
Recall period is 5 years. 
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
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Definitions used 
Since a large number of interviewers were recruited for this study, 
definitions of technical terms are important for the validity of data 
collection. Table 4.2 summarises the definitions of the terms. 
Table 4.2 Definitions of terms used in general household questionnaire. 
Terms Definitions 
-- -------- - - - -- - ----- - -- -- ------ - - - -------- -- --------- -- -- -- - - -- -- ------- -- ----------- - --
Household member This includes everyone who has slept and taken .eal s at least 
three months in the previous year. 
Household head He or she who is the leader of the household either in 
social matters or economic contribution . 
Health benefit The coverage of payment for health services for each member of 
the family. The benefit may be full cost coverage or partial, 
or may be retrospectively by reimbursement or prospectively 
without any cash payment at the point of service. 
Government employee Government employee with his/her dependent s , i e . s pou se , 
parents, and the first three children are covered by thi s 
benefit . 
State enterprise employee Employee of state enterprise with his/her dependents are 
covered by the organisation's fund. 
Veteran The veteran and his dependents are covered by a fund with a 
limited number of visits or hospitalisation. 
Village headman The village headman and his/her dependents are entitled to 
health services at government outlets at half price . 
Health volunteer A health volunteer is entitled to free medical service s at 
government outlets. 
Free medical card Card holders of the free medical card are entitled to free 
medical care at government health facilities. The card is 
issued to a person or a family with low income . 
Social security scheme Workers at establishments with more than 19 workers are 
required by the Social Security Act to contribute a monthly 
income to the Social Security Fund to cover free medical 
services at contracted health institutions. 
Private employee An employee in a small business .ay be covered by his/her 
employer when he/she gets ill. 
Private insurance One who pays a premium from one's own pocket to cover 
unexpected accident or illness. 
Acute illness Self reported illness or illness reported by proxy. 
Conditions that prevent normal daily activities for at least 
24 hours. 
Injury Any accident that injures any parts of the body. 
Chronic illness Any condition of chronic medically defined illness as listed in 
the tracer card for chronic illness. 
Recall period The recall period for acute illness and consultation is within 
two weeks prior to the date of interview. The recall period for 
hospitalisation and health promotive and preventive services is 
the previous twelve ~onths. And the recall period for a death 
is the previous five years. 
Occupation Details of the work performed by each ~ember are asked. It is 
then coded to the classification of the Health Statistics 
Division. 
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Questionnaire testing 
The questionnaire was tested for wording and content. The first test was 
scheduled about two weeks before fieldwork. Four field-supervisors 
conducted household interviews and suggested better ways of questioning. 
The second test was performed a week later. This time four junior 
sanitarian students conducted interviews. A few changes were made to 
improve precoding and record entry for interviewers. 
Sampling technique 
Previous studies on morbidity using household survey techniques reveal 
that the morbidity rates over the past two weeks varied between 7% to 
22% of the total population (National Statistical Office 1988. 
Tangcharoensathien 1990). Five percent of households targeted for this 
study would give an ample number of cases (acute illness) for 
comparison. The general household survey was split into 3 periods to 
cover 3 seasons in Thailand. The first round was in the rainy season 
(September). The second round was in winter (December) and the third 
round was in summer (March). Three hundred and twenty households were 
the maximum number to interview at each round. 
I . 
Round 1 
4 houses 
160 
enumeration 
blocks 
1 
Systematic 
80 bocks 
random sampling 
Simple random sampling 
Index houses 
Cluster assignment 
12 houses 
for a cluster 
I Round 2 
4 houses 
I Round 3 
4 houses 
Figure 4.2 Schematic summary of sampling techniques for the 
general household survey 
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The sampling frame was derived from the 1990 National Census done by the 
National Statistical Office. There are 160 enumeration blocks in 
Phitsanulok municipal area. Each block contains approximately 100 
houses. A systematic random sampling method was applied at the first 
stage to select 80 blocks for the survey. The second stage of sampling 
was simple random sampling to find out an index house for interview. The 
last stage was to select another eleven neighbouring houses from the 
map. All these procedures were performed by a statistician. Figure 4.2 
summarises the sampling technique. 
Fieldwork 
Forty junior sanitarian students were recruited as interviewers for the 
first round. A training session was held a week before the actual 
survey. There were eight field-supervisors so that the ratio of 
interviewer to supervisor was about 5 to 1. Four neighbouring households 
were interviewed by one interviewer in a day. The interviews took place 
only on Saturday and Sunday. 
The second and the third rounds were assigned to pick up the next 8 
households in the same clusters as the first round. Interviewers of the 
second round were nurse students and field supervisors were nurse 
teachers. The third round was carried out by non-health students- i.e. 
students in mathematics and statistics from a teacher training college. 
The field supervisors were the same group as the first round. 
Reinterviews 
A week after the third round of the household survey, a 5% sample of 
households (from the third round only) was reinterviewed to test the 
reliability of data collection. The samples were drawn by a simple 
random technique. Four interviewers were teachers of the Nursing College 
who had been field supervisors. 
Sixteen households were targeted for repeat interviews but only fourteen 
were used for comparison. The other two households were different from 
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those that had been interviewed a week earlier. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
present the results from the two sets of interviews. 
Reinterviews skipped the questions on acute illnesses in the family, 
because the time reference for acute illness questions had changed, 
hence no use for comparison. It was also anticipated that respondents of 
reinterviews might not be the same persons as the first interviews, so 
questions on attitudes towards the health care system were not asked. 
However, reinterviews found almost the same respondents as the first 
(93%). The most repeatable responses were found in the question on the 
number of deaths in the family. The least repeatable responses were the 
number of years lived in the municipality. Less reliable responses 
(about 74% repeatability) were found in the questions on age and last 
month earnings. If the acceptable variation for age was a year lower or 
higher, the reliability for age would increase to 93% (see table 4.3). 
Level of income is more complicated than age. Frequently used income 
indicators are annual household income and per capita income. Though 
some responses from the questions on income were more reliable than 
others (as shown in table 4.3), annual household income was the most 
unrepeatable (see table 4.4). If a 5% cut of point is applied for an 
acceptable variation, only 4 out of 14 families (28.6%) would give 
reliable responses on annual household income. If the cut of point is 
increased to 10%, the reliability would be only 50%. 
Table 4.3 Reliability test by reinterview as compared against the 
second interviewers 
Contents Degree of agreement 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondents 
fa.ily roster 
Number of family members 
Age of each member 
Education level 
Health benefits 
Type of coverage 
Chronic illness 
Items of illness 
Hospitalisation 
Number of admission 
The same respondents 93' (13 out of 1.) 
The same 93~ 
under enumerated 7' (1 member fewer, not a relative) 
Exactly agree 7.~ 
younger 19' (most members a year younger, only 1 member 7 
years younger) 
older 7~ of cases (a year older) 
Exactly agree 95' 
lower education 5% of cases 
Exactly agree 96~ 
fewer benefit schemes .~ (for state enterprise benefit) 
Exactly agree 91~ 
higher morbidith 2% (heart diseases) 
lower morbidity 5% (asthma. peptic ulcer, diabetes, heart 
diseases) 
Exactly agree 95% 
more hospitalisation 2% (2 admissions) 
less hospitalisation 3~ (for diarrhoeal diseases) 
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Contents 
Individual inco.e 
Occupation title 
Last month earnings 
Other income (in cash) 
Other income (in kind) 
Secondary occupation 
Household aggregate annual 
Sources of income 
Leve 1 of income 
Death in flUli 1 Y 
Number of years lived 
in the municipality 
Number of death(s) 
Degree of agreement 
Exactly agree 89% 
mismatch 11% (7% within the same civil servant heading, 
4% in major grouping, ie labourers instead of traders) 
Exactly agree 74% 
higher earnings 12% 
lower earnings 14% 
Fewer positive items: bonus 2%. overtime payments 5% . others 
4 ... 
Fewer positive items: food 4%, clothing 4~. accommodation 2 .... 
trave l 5% 
Fewer job titles 2% 
i ncotaC 
Exactly agree 93% 
more sources 2% (bank interest . insurance claim, present) 
fewer s ources 5% (bank interest. insurance claim, dividend. 
Higher income 4% 
scholarship. lottery and money transfer 
from relatives) 
lower income 8% ( see also table 4.5 for details on household 
income) 
Exactly agree SO ... 
1 i ve longer 21'1. 
live shorter 29% 
Exactly agree 100% 
Table 4.4 Differences in annual household incomes estimated by two 
interviewers 
Household First 
interviewer 
Second 
interviewer 
Difference % difference 
from the second 
interviewer 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16,200 
190,840 
162,000 
47,480 
196,800 
38,000 
99,000 
42,000 
147,400 
38,000 
198,000 
624,000 
21,600 
116,300 
43,000 
204,840 
230,000 
61,600 
196,800 
41,500 
116,040 
100,800 
151,700 
39,360 
238,000 
830,100 
24,000 
116,800 
26,800 
14,000 
68,000 
14,120 
o 
3,500 
17,040 
58,800 
4,300 
1,360 
40,000 
206,100 
2,400 
500 
62.3 
6.8 
29.6 
22.9 
0.0 
8.4 
14.7 
58.3 
2.8 
3.5 
16.8 
24.8 
10.0 
0.4 
================================================================ 
paired t-test = 2.24, p<0.025 
Data processing 
Data from the general household survey were coded for education levels, 
diseases and occupation by coders of the regional hospital. They were 
then organised into 5 files. An individual file contained 
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characteristics of each family member. A family file contained household 
characteristics and respondent's attitudes. A consultation file and an 
admission file were designed to capture information on previous 
consultations and hospitalisation. Lastly, a deaths file was for the 
family experiencing a death(s) in the previous five years. 
The above files were handled by the dBase programme. Linkages between 
each file were made with the help of the statistician. Data formats were 
converted and exported or imported through various programmes, e.g. 
FoxPro, EPIINFO. Statistical analyses were mainly derived from SPSSPC+ 
and EPIINFO programmes. 
Problems encountered 
The general household survey is subject to biases and errors. Sampling 
techniques were a compromise between practicality and randomness. On 
some occasions the targeted households were not willing to respond, or 
they were not present during the daytime or weekends or even houses had 
been pulled down to build new houses. Hence, replacements were 
inevitable. Replacements will bias the study results to the 
characteristics of high participative families. Table 4.5 shows 
replacements made up 26.6% of the total sample, the rate was highest 
(30.9%) in the city centre. There were no data to show the differences 
between the drop-outs and the replacements. However, interviewers noted 
that they were likely to select poorer houses instead of the richer 
because the poorer are more willing to participate than the rich. Having 
forty interviewers and eight field supervisors for each round can be 
another cause of error in data collection. 
Table 4.5 Response and replacement rates of the sampled households 
Area 
Households 
within boundary 
No of 
replacements % Replacement 
----------------------------------------------------------
West 142 
North & east. 211 
City centre 199 
South 145 
47 
69 
89 
47 
24.9 
24.6 
30.9 
24.5 
----------------------------------------------------------
Total 697 252 26.6 
======================================================:::: 
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Health diary and interview 
The questionnaire of the general household survey was applied again to a 
sub-sample of households in the municipality. This time, the interview 
took place after two weeks of diary keeping. The household respondent 
was instructed to record the illness of all family members and the 
action taken. An appointment in two weeks' time was made to collect the 
diary and to interview the respondent. This method was designed to 
increase the reliability of collected data. 
Diary design and testing 
A health diary was designed to provide information on illness over a two 
week period in the family and actions undertaken. The first draft was 
tested with a family who participated in a trial of the general 
household questionnaire. This family was selected purposively because 
one family member was undergoing active treatment for her chronic 
illness. The format of the diary was changed to increase simplicity in 
writing each family member's information. 
Recruitment of interviewer 
A girl with a certificate in accountancy was recruited as an 
interviewer. She was trained at the same time as the first batch of 
interviewers (in September 1991). Her job was spread over three seasons 
as was the major survey. She made a first visit to selected households, 
instructed a family member (preferably head of household) on filling in 
the health diary. Two weeks later, she made a second visit and 
interviewed the household respondent. 
Sampling technique 
The health diary plus interview technique is aimed to be comparable with 
the general household survey. Due to the time consuming process, a 
sample size of 10% of the general household survey was targeted. The 
unse1ected blocks from the general household survey were the sampling 
frame for this method. Because each round of the survey required only 
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forty sampled households, one in two of the unselected blocks were 
picked up by systematic random sampling. The second stage was to select 
an index house in each block, so a simple random sampling technique was 
applied. The third step was to select a cluster of three houses, 
including the index house. One house was used for each round of the 
survey (see figure 4.3). 
Data processing 
Data from the health diary and general household interview were compared 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Information from the general household 
questionnaire was handled in the same way as for the main survey. 
160 
enumeration 
blocks I Systematic random sampling 
I I 80 blocks Un-used 
of the general 80 
household survey blocks 
I Round 1 
1 house 
Systematic random sampling 
40 blocks 
Simple random sampling 
Index houses 
3 
for 
Cluster assignment 
houses 
a cluster 
I Round 2 
1 house 
I Round 3 
1 house 
Figure 4.3 Schematic summary of sampling techniques in the health 
diary plus interview 
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Problems encountered 
A temporal bias was very prominent in health diaries. About 10% of 
diaries provided more information on the first few days and less or no 
information during the later period. Again, selection bias was 
encountered as the interviewer noted that she was more likely to choose 
the poor families for replacements even though diary keeping required 
writing ability. 
Bed census survey 
The third method used in this study was a bed census survey. This method 
increased the number of hospitalised cases for analysis. A one day 
census was designed to reduce the burden on private hospitals, so that 
high cooperation would be obtained. The data were collected by direct 
interview with the patient and some more data, especially the service 
charges, were provided by hospital accountants. 
Objectives of bed census survey 
A bed census survey complements the information on who needs 
hospitalisation, what conditions lead to hospitalisation and how much is 
charged for hospitalisation. Furthermore, it provides indirect 
information on how accessible or how popular a hospital is when the 
place of residence of the patients is examined. 
Questionnaire design 
The content of this questionnaire was similar to the part on previous 
hospitalisation in the general household questionnaire. A patient 
identification number was added to retrieve information on service 
charges after the patient had been discharged. 
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Questionnaire testing 
The questionnaire was tried out on patients admitted in the regional 
hospital. The identification number was suggested for linkage of useful 
information, ie. charges and length of hospital stay. 
Recruitment of interviewers and training 
In a day there are about a thousand patients staying in hospitals in the 
municipal area. The ratio of one interviewer to inpatients was around 1 
to 20. The private hospitals were concerned about the waiting time for 
interviewing discharged cases, so the ratio was reduced to 1 to 10. 
There were 32 interviewers for the regional hospital, 5 interviewers for 
the military hospital, 10 interviewers for one private hospital and 
another 5 interviewers for another private hospital. 
Interviewers for the two public hospitals were student nurses at the 
third and fourth year levels. Interviewers for private hospitals were 
recruited from nurses and non-health personnel within the hospital. 
Training sessions were provided for small groups of interviewers for the 
convenience of private hospitals. 
Problems encountered 
Despite the design of the one day bed census, one private hospital was 
reluctant to participate at first and eventually dropped out. About 80% 
of inpatients were interviewed in the remaining hospitals: the movements 
of the discharged cases on the interview date made 100% coverage 
impossible. 
Health resource survey 
The health resource survey was designed to collect data on hospital 
inputs and outputs. This is to give a complete picture of what a 
hospital had done in a year. The household survey provides information 
on household health seeking behaviour. A one day bed census survey gives 
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a snap shot of inpatients' characteristics. The health resource survey 
reflects more providers' behaviour and achievements. 
Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire used in the health resource survey was adapted from 
the questionnaire of the same survey done nationally by the Health 
Statistics Division. A major revision was the addition of entries for 
the number of part-time personnel working in private hospitals. This was 
originally designed to record the number of working hours by part-time 
staff in order to calculate the number of full time equivalents, but 
this gave great difficulty to private hospitals because different 
doctors were employed on different bases. 
Data collection 
The questionnaire was sent to the hospital administrators at the end of 
calendar year to collect the data as of the 31st of December 1991. The 
researcher himself followed and collected the completed questionnaires. 
Problems encountered 
Though private hospitals have to report to the Ministry of Public Health 
in the annual health resource survey, the hospital administrators were 
reluctant to cooperate with this survey. But finally, the survey forms 
were returned by all hospitals. Some hospital administrators disclosed 
that the reported figures may not be real, in particular the total 
number of outpatients and inpatients. 
4.4 Definition of socio-economic variables 
The four important socio-economic variables used in the analysis 
presented in chapters 5 to 7 are occupation, income quintile. education 
level and family wealth. Responses from the surveys were coded by 
hospital coders and keyed in to database files. These responses were 
recoded again for analysis and clearer presentation. This section 
describes how these socio-economic characteristics were grouped. 
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Occupational group 
From occupation titles that enumerators recorded in interview forms, the 
coders allocated numbers for each occupational title using the coding of 
the Health Statistics Division. These numeric codes were recoded again 
when analysed by SPSSPC+ and EPIINFO programmes. Table 4.6 shows a short 
list of occupation groups. 
All individuals were given two types of occupational group. The first is 
their own occupation and the second is their household heads' 
occupation. The second occupational group is very useful when the health 
seeking behaviour of the 'no-job' group, especially children, is 
compared. The age and sex structures of sampled populations by their own 
occupation and their household heads' occupation are presented in Annex 
2. 
Table 4.6 Occupation grouping 
Occupation group Occupation titles 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil servant 
Professionals and 
administrators 
Traders 
Semi-skilled workers 
Service workers 
No job 
Civil servant, soldier 
Engineer, scientist, doctor, nurse, 
health-related professional, teacher, 
lawyer, director, manager 
Accountant, cashier, broker, shop-owner, 
shop assistant 
Tailor, dress-maker, jeweller, plumber, 
electrician, carpenter, painter, 
brick-layer, rice mill 
Singer, farmer, driver, labourer, guard, 
policeman, household worker, waiter, 
housekeeper, hair-dresser 
Unemployed, child, student, housewife, 
the aged 
====================================================================== 
The drawbacks of using occupational grouping as discussed above were 
anticipated. The grouping in table 4.6 is arbitrary in the absence of 
Thai social research evidence. The philosophy behind this grouping is 
the British Registrar General's classification of occupation. The broad 
groups in table 4.6 obscure endless disputes on the occupations included 
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in each. Furthermore, the use of the household head's occupation may not 
be appropriate for those family members who have their own occupation. 
Income guintiles 
Household income is calculated by summing individuals' incomes and 
household aggregate income. Table 4.7 summarises the sources of 
household income. Nearly 90% of household income originated from 
individuals' earnings. Household incomes were ranked into five groups 
(quintiles), or ten groups (deciles). The lower the rank, the lower the 
income. Every member in the same household has the same quintile or the 
same decile regardless of the relationship to the household head. 
The ranking of households by household income regardless of household 
size is debatable. Large families were more likely to be given high rank 
as they have more earning members (see table 4.8). Moreover, every 
member in the same household may not share the same household income. 
Housekeepers who were counted as family members of high rank households 
were treated as if they belonged to that economic class. 
Table 4.7 Sources of household income 
Ouintile % individual 
earning 
% aggregate 
income 
--------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Average 
80.0 
92.9 
91.9 
92.8 
87.0 
88.9 
20.0 
7.1 
8.1 
7.2 
13.0 
11.1 
============================================ 
Table 4.8 Household size and earning family members by household income 
Ouintile No of households Household size % earning members 
---------------------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
199 
200 
200 
201 
197 
3.5 
4.0 
4.2 
4.3 
4.7 
33.4 
39.4 
45.9 
50.4 
53.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 997 4.2 45.2 
================================================================ 
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The other ranking of household income is to take account of the numbers 
of family members. The annual household income was divided by the number 
of family members to give per capita income. This was further ranked 
into five Quintiles. The denominators employed were straight forward 
family members (ie. giving equal weight for each family member) rather 
than proportional weighting for each family member, because, in many 
families, there were family members with an unclear relationship to 
household heads. 
Education level 
Two different educational variables were assigned to all individuals; 
their own education level and their household head's education level. 
The advantages and disadvantages of doing so were the same as discussed 
for occupation variables. 
4.5 Summary remarks of the chapter 
To assess equity in health in an urban area, four surveys were designed 
to collect data at community and health service levels. Two household 
surveys were compared: the general household survey and a heath diary 
plus interview survey. The other two surveys of hospitals were a one-day 
bed census and a health resource survey. 
The household surveys were the main source of information to assess the 
need for and the use of health services. Need was classified as acute, 
chronic illness and disability of each family member. And information on 
use was asked about for each illness episode. A health diary was applied 
to 10% of sampled households to compare between the two household survey 
techniques. These households were asked to record every illness episode 
of family members and their actions for those illnesses for two weeks 
prior to the interview. 
A one-day bed census was designed to complement hospitalisation data in 
the household surveys. Patients' characteristics including 
hospitalisation details were studied. The patients were followed up till 
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they were discharged to complete hospitalisation details. This one-day 
information was supplemented by an annual hospital resource survey. 
Important socio-economic variables to explore equality between groups 
are occupation, income and educational levels. A new grouping of 
occupations was employed. The household head's occupation and education 
were used as proxies for the whole family in addition to similar data 
for each family member in the analysis of data. 
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5. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 1: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT METHODS 
This chapter presents socioeconomic characteristics, morbidity and 
mortality levels of the sampled populations from both the general 
household survey and the health diary plus interview technique. Its aim 
is to highlight the variations in the results obtained from different 
methods. Furthermore. a seasonal effect is explored to see whether it is 
a potential source of variation because both techniques were employed 
over three periods of the year. The first part of this chapter describes 
household socioeconomic characteristics. The second and third parts are 
concerned with mortality and morbidity variations by each household 
survey technique. The fourth part discusses the effects of different 
methods on the results. 
5.1 Household characteristics 
The following results are presented by two broad groups: general 
household survey and diary plus interview. Each group is further broken 
down to present seasonal variations. The general household survey took 
sampled households from 80 clusters scattered over the municipality with 
12 neighbouring households in each cluster. The diary plus interview 
took another set of 40 clusters with 3 households in each cluster. 
Details of sampling techniques were shown in chapter 4. 
The household socioeconomic characteristics cover household income, 
occupation and education of head of household. type of housing and 
ownership and household wealth. 
Household income 
As presented in chapter 4, reinterviews to test the reliability of data 
indicated that annual household income is the most unreliable parameter. 
The data presented throughout this thesis are in their original values 
without any correction. therefore cautious interpretation of income data 
is necessary. 
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Table 5.1 shows the distribution of annual household income by general 
household survey and diary plus interview technique, and also by 
seasons. In the general household survey, the means and medians of 
household income were higher than the means and median by diary, plus 
interview technique. However. there were no significant differences 
between these parameters of both techniques by season. It was noted that 
coefficients of variation (the ratios of standard deviation to the mean) 
in the general household survey were larger than those of the diary plus 
interview technique. This may be due to the higher number of 
interviewers (120 interviewers) employed in the general household survey 
whereas only one interviewer was used in the diary plus interview 
technique. Another possible explanation is that the sample size of the 
general household survey was nearly 8 times higher than the sample size 
of the diary plus interview. 
Table 5.1 Distribution of annual household income by techniques and 
seasons 
General household survey 
Rainy Winter Summer 
Diary plus interview 
Rainy Winter Summer 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of households 284 306 300 35 38 34 
Mean 167.923 158.350 146.117 99,918 106,588 114,026 
Standard deviation 305.714 177,811 176,795 78,438 75,975 81,368 
p value (ANOVA test) 0.51 0.76 
Coefficient of variation 1.82 1.12 1. 21 0.79 0.71 0.71 
. 
Median 103,150 109,250 102,300 84,000 88,980 78,000 
25 percentile 56,000 60,740 54,000 49,200 48,000 60,000 
75 percentile 178,800 180,000 173,400 126,000 134,700 168,000 
p value (Kruskal-Wallis test) 0.44 0.79 
======================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
Table 5.2 shows the distribution of per capita income by survey 
techniques and seasons. Per capita income is the result of dividing 
annual household income by the number of household members. Again the 
general household survey gave higher per capita income than the health 
diary plus interview technique. There were no significant differences 
between seasons. The variations within each round of the general 
household survey were higher than those of the health diary and 
interview. And the variations of per capita income were slightly higher 
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than those of annual household income. This is because variations of 
numbers of family members were added to the variations of total income. 
Table 5.2 Distribution of per capita income by techniques and seasons 
General household survey 
Rainy Winter Summer 
Diary plus interview 
Rainy Winter Summer 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of households 284 306 300 35 38 34 
Mean 46,226 43,446 41,004 27,268 28,510 30,550 
Standard deviation 96,604 55,820 50,891 24,780 26,259 29,554 
p value (ANOVA test) 0.67 0.88 
Coefficient of variation 2.09 1.28 1.24 0.91 0.92 0.97 
Median 24,300 29,284 28,784 20,880 21,206 20,600 
25 percentile 14,100 17,250 13,650 12,000 12,000 12,000 
75 percentile 46,040 48,560 48,005 32,000 30,920 42,000 
p value (Kruskal-Wallis test) 0.16 0.89 
======================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
Social characteristics 
The next household characteristics to look at are the educational level 
and occupational group of heads of households. These parameters were 
highly repeatable (95% for education level and 89% for occupation title, 
see chapter 4). No statistical differences would be expected by season 
because samples were taken from the same neighbourhood. 
Table 5.3 shows no seasonal variation of education levels of household 
heads among samples in the general household survey. Heads of households 
had predominately primary schooling. The distribution of education level 
of household head participating in the health diary and interview 
technique is also presented. There seems to be an over-representation of 
the primary level group in the diary and interview technique. One 
possible reason is that the general household survey took place only on 
weekends while health diaries were administered on weekdays and 
weekends. The lower educated were more likely to be picked up during 
weekdays. 
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Table 5.3 Distribution of education of household head by techniques and 
seasons (%) 
Education 
General household survey 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
Diary plus interview 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
No education 7.1 7.7 4.9 6.6 8.6 2.6 5.6 5.5 
Primary 33.4 31.3 30.0 31. 6 42.9 38.5 38.9 40.0 
Secondary 22.7 21.9 20.2 21.6 11.4 25.6 22.2 20.0 
Vocational 13.6 11.6 15.3 13.5 8.6 5.1 13.9 9.1 
University 20.1 23.2 22.5 21. 9 28.6 23.1 11.1 20.9 
Unknown 2.9 4.2 6.2 4.4 0.0 5.1 8.3 4.5 
n 308 310 307 925 35 39 36 110 
P value (Chi square) 0.23 0.40 
===================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
Occupational groups are believed to correlate with education levels. 
Then there should not be seasonal variation of occupational groups of 
household heads. However, table 5.4 shows that there were significant 
differences between occupational groups of household heads by season in 
the general household survey. There were more in the administrative and 
professional groups in the second and third rounds, but less traders in 
the third round. This was probably due to the fact that traders lived in 
open-door premises and were more likely to be picked up during the first 
round. leaving the closed-door premises to be picked up later. In the 
diary plus interview technique. there was no significant differences 
between occupational groups by season. 
Table 5.4 Distribution of occupation of household head by techniques 
and seasons (%) 
Occupation 
General household survey 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
Diary plus interview 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------Ci vi 1 servants 21.1 19.4 23.1 21.2 25.7 23.1 33.3 27.3 
Admin & prof 5.5 10.6 11. 7 9.3 5.7 10.3 2.8 6.4 
Traders 25.0 26.1 18.6 23.2 22.9 28.2 13.9 21.8 
Semi-skilled 6.2 2.9 2.9 4.0 2.9 5.1 11.1 6.4 
Service workers 26.3 26.8 25.4 26.2 22.9 20.5 19.4 20.9 
No job 15.9 14.2 18.2 16.1 20.0 12.8 19.4 17.3 
n 308 310 307 925 35 39 36 110 
p value (Chi square) 0.03 0.86 
======================================================================= 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
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In comparing distribution of occupational groups between the survey 
techniques, there were more service workers in the general household 
survey, but a higher proportion of civil servants in the health diary 
plus interview. This is because the occupational groups used here (see 
annex) are not mutually exclusive and coding could depend on the 
interviewer. 'Civil servant' describes the employer rather than the job: 
civil servants can be service workers or professionals and 
administrators. Interviewers in the general household survey recorded a 
variety of occupational titles whereas the interviewer in the diary plus 
interview stopped asking further details after the answer 'civil 
servant' turned up. 
Housing and overcrowding index 
Type of housing, home ownership and an overcrowding index are important 
parameters for comparison. Materials used in building the house were not 
asked, instead interviewers had to judge whether the house was permanent 
or temporary. A permanent house would last longer than five years, 
otherwise would be temporary. The differences in the type of housing 
between the two techniques in table 5.5 were due to the recording error 
of an interviewer rather than true differences (because of the high 
percentage of 'do not know'). 
Table 5.5 Type of housing and overcrowding index by survey techniques 
and seasons 
General household survey 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
Diary plus interview 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Housing (%) 
Permanent 93.0 92.5 95.0 93.5 82.9 84.6 91.7 86.4 
Temporary 6.7 6.5 5.0 6.1 5.7 2.6 5.6 4.5 
Do not know 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.2 11.4 12.8 2.B 9.1 
Ownership (%) 
Owner 58.1 65.7 60.3 61.5 40.0 59.0 69.4 56.4 
Rent 33.1 26.5 27.3 28.9 37.1 25.6 25.0 29.1 
Others/not spec 8.8 7.B 12.3 9.6 22.9 15.4 5.6 14.6 
Number of bed room 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Household member 4.3 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.2 
Overcrowding index 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.2 2.2 2.0 
======================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
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The overcrowding index tells how many people, on average, share a 
bedroom in the house. It is calculated by dividing the number of 
household members by the number of bedrooms. The households picked up by 
the diary and interview technique were slightly more overcrowded than 
those picked up by the general household survey. 
Household durables 
Family wealth may be reflected in the possession of household durables 
to make life more pleasant. Table 5.6 presents eight items of common and 
uncommon durables. It supports, to some extent the previous suggestions 
that households in the general household survey were better off than 
households in the diary plus interview sample. They owned more cars, 
bicycles, video players and washing machines than the diary group. 
Table 5.6 Household durables by survey techniques and seasons (\) 
Ownership 
General household survey 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
Diary plus 
interview 
---------------------------------------------------------
Microwave/oven 13.3 13.2 12.7 13.1 2.7 
Washing machine 35.4 36.1 39.7 37.0 15.6 
Refrigerator 82.1 88.1 84.4 84.9 79.8 
Television 95.1 93.4 93.5 94.0 89.9 
Video player 42.2 45.5 49.8 45.8 22.0 
Car 28.9 30.1 28.3 29.1 21.1 
Motorcycle 70.1 84.3 75.6 76.8 78.9 
Tricycle 9.7 10.0 7.5 8.9 20.0 
========================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
When household durables were compared with household income and per 
capita income as shown in figure 5.1, it was clearly seen that there 
were two sets of durables: high prevalent (television, refrigerator and 
motorcycle) and low prevalent (video player, washing machine, car, 
microwave/oven and tricycle). In the general household survey, all high 
and low prevalent durables, except a tricycle, were significantly 
associated with household income quintiles: but all, including a 
tricycle, were significantly associated with per capita income 
quintiles. It is surprising that tricycle ownership could be regarded as 
an underprivileged indicator. The lower the per capita income quintile, 
the higher the percentage of households that owned a tricycle. However, 
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only 9% of total households in the general household survey had a 
tricycle. 
In the health diary plus interview survey. the general pictures were 
similar to those of the general household survey, except the gap between 
high and low prevalent durables was wider. Due to the smaller sample 
size in the health diary plus interview survey. the variables 
significantly associated with household income quintiles included 
refrigerator, video player. motorcycle and car ownership. Per capita 
income quintile performed better than household income quintile in 
increasing statistical significance level for washing machine and 
tricycle ownership apart from the above durables. 
Household income 
% Possession 
1 00 I--~====~=====~::::::::===~~ 
o~------~~------~--------~--------~ Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
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General Household Survey 
Figure 5.1 Household durables and income groups 
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Figure 5.1 (continued) 
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Family wealth index 
A composite family wealth indicator was constructed by looking at the 
associations of household income or per capita income and housing 
characteristics including household durables. In the general household 
survey, the parameters that were significantly associated with annual 
household income were house ownership, microwave/oven, refrigerator, 
video player. washing machine and car ownership. However. house and 
microwave/ oven ownership were not significantly associated with per 
capita income. In the diary plus interview survey. the associations were 
the same as described above for both annual household income and per 
capita income, except that house ownership was not significantly 
associated with both types of income but microwave/oven was 
significantly associated with both. 
5.2 Morbidity and mortality 
As described in chapter 4. the general household survey and health diary 
plus interview were spread out over three periods of the year to detect 
seasonal effects on the morbidity level of the population. Neighbouring 
households in the same clusters were interviewed by different groups of 
interviewers. This section presents the usefulness of the health diary 
technique, and morbidity and mortality data obtained from both survey 
techniques. in order to highlight any seasonal effects. inter-
interviewer variations. and strengths and weaknesses of each technique. 
Health diary: usefulness 
The health diary is a tool developed to capture morbidity events and 
health seeking behaviour of all individuals in a family within a two 
week period. It is expected that positive findings of acute illness will 
be higher when followed by an interview. The questionnaire used in this 
interview was the same as the one used in the general household survey. 
A hundred and twenty households were targeted for delivering the health 
diary two weeks before an interview. These households were divided into 
3 groups to be administered in the same months as those of the general 
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household surveys. After the third round, 110 households had completed 
the diaries (92% response rate). 
The usefulness of health diaries was judged by two important criteria, 
content and consistency of recording. Content depended on giving 
sufficient details on illnesses, service use, costs, travel time and 
waiting time. Consistency was judged by the regularity of diary keeping. 
These criteria were scored by a rating scale with 4 grades, namely, 1 
was poor, 2 was fair, 3 was good and 4 was very good. Table 5.7 presents 
the usefulness of the health diary technique. 
Table 5.7 The usefulness of health diaries 
% of diary Content Consist-
Round No. of recording ---------------------------------- ency households no illness Illness Service Cost Travel Waiting 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
35 
39 
36 
41.0 
31.4 
18.2 
2.65 
2.46 
2.41 
2.52 
2.08 
2.41 
2.39 
2.21 
2.44 
2.35 
1.83 
2.00 
1.96 
1.63 
1.63 
2.43 
2.29 
2.11 
======================================================================== 
Source: Health diary 
Note: Rating scales; l=poor, 2=fair, 3=good, 4=very good 
The health diaries gave fair to good information on illness 
descriptions, service use and costs. Information on waiting time was 
frequently neglected. Forty percent of diary keepers were household 
heads, 23% were spouses, 26% were sons or daughters and 7% were 
relatives. They were fairly consistent in keeping the diaries. However, 
about 31% of households were in good health within these two weeks. Some 
of them wrote remarks such as: 
"We are all in good health. That happened after a doctor 
disappointed me by saying that I was an allergic. In fact, I was 
very sure, it was only a cold. That made us rely on ourselves. We 
take good food, some vitamin from Australia and some exercises. 
Then everything clears out. For the whole year we never go to see 
any doctor. I would like to give a plea to all doctors. Please be 
more careful in this profession to gain back good attitudes and 
create better image of hospitals." 
"I would like to know who designed this diary. I wonder whose 
family will have such a high number of family members and 
experience many disease episodes. It is a waste of paper. The 
diary could be redesigned just using a piece of paper which could 
contain all information within 2 weeks. Surely!" 
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Morbidity 
The questionnaire of the household survey asked for four types of 
morbidity: acute illness within the past two weeks, chronic illness, 
disability, and hospitalisation within the past twelve months. There 
were a maximum of two entries for acute illness that occurred during the 
two weeks including detailed descriptions of treatments for each 
individual. Chronic illness and disability were limited to only a single 
most important illness. In contrast, hospitalisation took account of all 
events during the year. The same questions were asked to respondents in 
the health diary and interview technique. 
Table 5.8 shows the incidence rates of acute illness within two weeks by 
the general household survey and health diary plus interview. The rates 
by the general household survey in each round were not significantly 
different from each other whereas they were significantly different in 
the health diary plus interview. The incidence rates of acute illness as 
detected by the health diary plus interview increased from 24\ to 47\ 
from rainy season to summer. This trend is also evident in table 5.9 
where the number of respiratory cases was highest in the third round and 
lowest in the first (in the columns of the health diary). This was 
probably the effect of the interviewer having more experience in 
administering the diary and interview. However, comparing the rates of 
acute illness between the two surveys, the diary increased the rates of 
reported illness. 
Table 5.8 Incidence rates of acute illness 
General household survey 
Round Season Individuals Rate(\) 
Diary plus interview 
Individuals Rate(\) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
Rainy 
Winter 
Summer 
1,332 
1,294 
1,223 
13.7 
12.2 
11.1 
136 
168 
168 
23.9 
32.1 
47.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3,849 12.4 474 35.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square test) 0.12 0.00 
=====================================================~=========== 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
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The patterns of illness from the general household survey by broad 
groups presented in table 5.9 showed no effects of seasonal variation 
except in the case of the incidence of circulatory and respiratory 
diseases. The third round reported a higher incidence of circulatory 
diseases (9.0 per 1,000 population in the third round, but only about 
3.0 and 3.9 per 1,000 population in the first and second rounds), but 
fewer respiratory illness than the first two rounds (46.6 per 1,000 
population in summer compared to 68.8 and 74.6 per 1,000 population in 
winter and rainy seasons respectively). The incidence of respiratory 
diseases could be easily explained by the seasonal fluctuations. The 
high incidence of circulatory diseases in the third round may be 
explained by the higher proportion of household heads in the 
administrative and professional groups than in the other rounds. Another 
possible explanation is the unmasking effect: the overall incidence rate 
of the third round was the lowest, so there was more chance of picking 
up chronic diseases as symptoms within the past two weeks. 
Table 5.9 Classification of acute illnesses (%) 
Grouping Descriptions 
Infectious and parasitic diseases 
2 Benign and malignant tumour s 
General hou sehold s urvey Diary plus interview 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 1 Round 2 Round3 
Rainy Winter Summer Rainy Wint er Summer 
5.5 12.0 13.2 6.1 5 .6 7.6 
0.5 1.3 0.0 0 . 0 1.9 0 . 0 
3 Endocr ine, nutrition & metabolic di sea ses 1 . 1 0.6 4 . 4 0.0 3.7 0.0 
4 Ha emato logic diseases 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 
5 Psychologic and emotional disturbances 0.5 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 
6 Diseases of neurological system 1 . 1 1 . 3 2.9 3 . 0 0 . 0 1.3 
7 Diseases of circulatory system 2.2 3 . 2 8.1 0.0 3.7 2.5 
8 Diseases of respiratory system 53 . 2 56.3 41.9 36.4 46.3 4B .1 
9 Diseases of digestive system 3.3 0.6 2.9 6.1 6.6 3.B 
10 Diseases of genito-urinary system 1 . 1 3.2 2 . 9 0 . 0 1.9 2 . 5 
11 Diseases of skin & subcutaneous tissue 1.6 2.5 0.7 12.1 3.7 0 . 0 
12 Diseases of skeletal system 4.4 4 . 4 e.l 21.2 7 . 4 B. 9 
13 Accidents, poisoning and violence 4 . 9 4.4 3.7 0.0 0.0 6.3 
14 Other diseases 20.2 10.1 11.0 15 . 2 20 . 4 20.0 
-------------------- - --------- --------- ---- ------------- --- --------------------- -----------
Total lB3 15B 136 33 54 79 
;;;;=================:===================~============ ====================================== 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
The patterns of disease in acute illness according to the health diary 
plus interview were not very different from that of the general surveys. 
One possible explanation ;s that the numbers in the diary survey were 
too small to see any significant difference. The percentage distribution 
of acute illness in table 5.9 gives the impression that diseases of the 
skin and subcutaneous tissue and skeletal system were high in the first 
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round. But the differences are not significant because the real numbers 
were small. 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 present the patterns of diseases for 
hospitalisations and chronic illness by the three rounds of the general 
household survey and total cases of the health diary plus interview 
survey. The season should have no effect on the patterns of 
hospitalisation and chronic illness because the recall periods were 
within the past 12 months. However, in the first round survey, there 
were more cases of haemorrhagic fever admitted to the hospitals. This 
could have been the effects of the rainy season and recent recall as 
haemorrhagic fever is an epidemic disease of the rainy season. In the 
second round survey, there were more hospitalised cases of motor vehicle 
accidents and 'symptoms and ill-defined conditions', but fewer cases of 
peptic ulcers. The third round recorded more cases of hypertensive 
diseases in the hospitalised cases (table 5.10) but not among the 
chronic diseases (table 5.11). However, these variations were not 
statistically significant. 
Table 5.10 leading causes of hospitalisation (\) 
General household Health 
IeD9 codes Descriptions 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 diary 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
008,009 Enteritis and other diarrhoea 7.1 9.2 11. 5 6.1 
010-012 Tuberculosis of respiratory system 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
065 Haemorrhagic fever 8.8 0.9 2.5 3.0 
084 Malaria 0.0 0.9 1.6 0.0 
001-136 Other infectious & parasitic diseases 0.0 0.9 0.0 3.0 
140-208 Malignant neoplasms 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
210-229 Benign neoplasms & unspecified nature 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
242 Thyrotoxicosis & goitre 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 
250 Diabetes mellitus 0.9 0.0 1.6 0.0 
280-285 Anaemia 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
401-405 Hypertensive diseases 1.8 1.8 6.6 3.0 
420-429 Other forms of heart diseases 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
480-486 Pneumonia 0.9 0.9 3.3 9.1 
487 Influenza 0.9 1.8 0.0 0.0 
490-493 Bronchitis, emphysema, asthma 7.1 1.8 4.9 6.1 
531-534 Peptic ulcer 6.2 0.9 7.4 0.0 
540-543 Appendicitis 2.7 1.8 1.6 0.0 
550-553 Intestinal obstruction and hernia 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
573 Hepatitis 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
580-587 Nephritis and nephrosis 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.0 
630-639 Abortion 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
680-709 Diseases of skin & subcutaneous 2.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 
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ICD9 codes Descriptions 
General household Health 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 diary 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
760-762 Other causes of perinatal mortality 
780.6 Pyrexia of unknown origin 
780-789 Symptoms & ill-defined conditions 
240-739 All other diseases 
E810-E825 Motor vehicle accidents 
E800-E949 All other accidents 
E863 Accidental poisoning by pesticides 
E950-E959 Suicide & self inflicting injuries 
E960-E999 All other external causes 
0.0 0.0 
5.3 8.3 
9.7 9.3 
27.7 33.0 
2.7 7.3 
7.1 8.3 
0.9 0.0 
0.0 0.9 
2.7 0.9 
0.8 0.0 
1.6 6.1 
10.7 15.2 
31.1 27.3 
0.8 9.1 
9.0 3.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 113 109 122 33 
========================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
It is difficult though to distinguish between the effect of season and 
the effect of different interviewers on the morbidity data of the three 
surveys. If season alone influenced the incidence rates of illness 
within the past two weeks, the different rates in hospitalisation and 
chronic disease would be the effects of different interviewers and 
memory of respondents. Interviewers of the third round (non-health 
related students) picked up the highest rate of hospitalisation and 
interviewers of the first round (junior sanitarian students) picked up 
the lowest rate of chronic disease (again the variations were not 
significant). Non-health related students consistently recorded 
circulatory diseases as important cause of illness within the past two 
weeks and of hospitalisation. Patterns of disease also reflect to some 
degree, memory. 
Table 5.11 Classification of chronic diseases (%) 
ICD9 codes Descriptions 
General household Health 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 diary 
Rainy Winter Summer Total 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
008,009 Enteritis and other diarrhoea 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 
010-012 Tuberculosis of respiratory system 1.3 0.6 0.0 1.4 
090-097 Syphilis and its sequelae 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 
001-136 Other infectious & parasitic diseases 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.0 
140-208 Malignant neoplasms 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.0 
210-229 Benign neoplasms & unspecified nature 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 
242 Thyrotoxicosis & goitre 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 
250 Diabetes mellitus 10.1 12.0 8.4 10.0 
260-269 Avitaminosis & other nutritional def. 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 
280-285 Anaemia 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 
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General household Health 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 diary 
ICD9 codes Descriptions Rainy Winter Summer Total 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
300-303 Neurosis & other non-psychotic dis. 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.4 
401-405 Hypertensive diseases 10.0 13.3 9.7 5.7 
410-414 Ischaemic heart diseases 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 
420-429 Other forms of heart diseases 3.8 3.6 8.4 8.6 
480-486 Pneumonia 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.0 
490-493 Bronch it is, emphysema, asthma 8.2 6.0 8.4 5.7 
531-534 Peptic ulcer 15.7 9.0 14.9 11.4 
550-553 Intestinal obstruction and hernia 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
571 Cirrhosis of liver 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 
573 Hepatitis 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 
680-709 Diseases of skin & subcutaneous 1.9 0.6 2.6 7.1 
740-759 Congenital anomalies 0.0 O.S 0.0 0.0 
780-789 Symptoms & ill-defined conditions 8.2 1.8 4.5 7.1 
240-739 All other diseases 35.8 45.8 36.4 38.6 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 159 166 154 70 
========================================================================== 
Source: General Household survey and health diary plus interview 
Mortality 
Responses to the question of how many deaths in family members had 
occurred within the past five years gave 94 deaths among 3,931 
individuals of the general household survey. The crude death rate was 
estimated at 4.8 per 1,000 per year (94 divided by 3,931 and by 5 and 
multiplied by 1,000). A seasonal breakdown is not shown in table 5.11 
because of the small number of deaths. However, the causes of death 
shown here were similar to those of the general population (Health 
Statistic Division 1992). The first three important killers were heart 
diseases, malignant neoplasms and accidents. 
Interviews on death tolls at the second visit to the families 
participating in keeping the health diary gave 17 deaths over a 5 year 
period. The crude death rate was estimated at 6.B per 1,000 per year (17 
deaths divided by 497 individuals and by 5 years and multiplied by 1,000 
population). Table 5.12 gives a short account of the causes of deaths. 
122 
Table 5.12 Leading causes of deaths 
ICD9 codes Descriptions 
General 
household 
Health 
diary 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
010-012 Tuberculosis of respiratory system 
001-136 Other infectious & parasitic diseases 
140-208 Malignant neoplasms 
250 Diabetes mellitus 
280-285 Anaemia 
401-405 Hypertensive diseases 
420-429 Other forms of heart diseases 
490-493 Bronchitis, emphysema, asthma 
571 Cirrhosis of liver 
580-587 Nephritis and nephrosis 
740-759 Congenital anomalies 
765.1 Preterm infant 
780.6 Pyrexia of unknown origin 
240-739 All other diseases 
E810-E825 Motor vehicle accidents 
E800-E949 All other accidents 
E960-E999 All other external causes 
5 
1 
10 
2 
2 
3 
10 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
38 
3 
9 
2 
o 
o 
3 
o 
o 
2 
2 
o 
o 
1 
o 
o 
o 
6 
2 
1 
o 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 94 17 
====================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
5.3 The effect of different survey methods 
This section discusses the comparison of the results from the general 
household survey and the health diary plus interview survey. Both 
surveys employed almost the same sampling technique, ie. multi-stage 
cluster sampling. The only differences were the number of clusters and 
the size of each cluster. The general household survey used twice the 
number of clusters, and four times the size of each cluster as the diary 
plus interview. The general household survey also employed higher number 
of interviewers (120 interviewers), while the diary plus interview 
employed only one interviewer. Both surveys were scheduled at the same 
periods of the year from rainy season to summer. Therefore, there are 
four kinds of biases and errors to consider: sampling bias, interviewer 
bias, seasonal variation and non-sampling error. 
Since education and occupational groups do not vary by season, they can 
be used to compare sampling bias between the two surveys. Table 5.18 
shows that the samples of both surveys were not significantly different 
in education and occupation characteristics of household heads, though 
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there were some variations as discussed in 5.1. Therefore, the selection 
of sampled households with replacements for non-cooperative households 
was comparable between the two surveys. 
However, the average annual household income and per capita income in 
the two surveys were significantly different from each other. The 
general household survey gave higher household income than the diary 
technique. The interviewer for the diary technique consistently recorded 
lower income. The reinterviews show that non-sampling error was very 
high for annual household income of the general household survey (see 
table 4.4). Unfortunately, no reinterviews were carried out in the diary 
plus interview subsample. 
Table 5.13 also compares morbidity rates and hospitalisation rates by 
both surveys. It shows that the health diary technique significantly 
increased the incidence rates of reported acute illness during the past 
two weeks (p=O.OO). The average rate in the health diary technique was 
2.8 times higher than in the general household survey. Interviewer 
experience played some part in this wide difference as the rates 
increased in subsequent rounds of the diary plus interview survey but 
not in the general household survey. 
Seasonality had some effects on incidence rates in the general household 
survey, ie. higher incidence rates were found in the rainy season and in 
winter than in summer, but the differences were not significant. Thus, 
it could not be concluded that junior sanitarians and nurse students had 
done better than non-health related students. Evidence that all of them 
had done reasonably well is provided by the patterns of illness. 
Haemorrhagic fever was high in the rainy season and respiratory diseases 
were high in the rainy season and winter. Non-health related students 
were more likely to record the episodes of chronic diseases as there was 
low incidence of acute diseases in summer. 
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Table 5.13 Comparison of results between different survey methods 
Characteristics Without 
diary 
With p value 
diary (Statistical test) 
-------------------------------------------------------
Education of household heads (') 
n 925 110 
No education 6.6 5.5 
Primary 31.9 40.0 
Secondary 21.6 20.0 
Vocational 13.5 9.1 
University 21.9 20.9 
Unknown 4.4 4.5 
Occupation of household heads (%) 
n 925 110 
Civil servant 21.2 27.3 
Prof and admin 9.3 6.4 
Trade 23.2 21.8 
Semi-skill 4.0 6.4 
Service 26.2 20.9 
No job 16.1 17.3 
Annual household income (baht/year) 
n 890 107 
Mean 157,281.2 103,900.0 
Median 106,769.7 84,000.0 
Per capita income (baht/person/year) 
Mean 43,509.8 28,752.1 
Median 27,094.5 20,800.0 
Morbidity and use of health service (') 
n 3,849 474 
Acute illness 12.4 35.0 
Chronic illness 12.2 14.8 
Disability 1.0 0.6 
Hospitalisation 9.0 7.4 
Charges of consultation within 2 weeks 
Drug store (n) 96 53 
Mean 44.5 30.2 
Median 30.0 25.0 
Private clinic (n) 123 49 
Mean 167.1 125.0 
Median 100.0 110.0 
Public hospital (n) 61 14 
Mean 377.6 368.2 
Median 200.0 210.0 
Private hospital (n) 53 10 
Mean 574.2 527.2 
Median 200.0 195.0 
Charges for hospitalisation (Baht/case) 
Public hospital (n) 85 10 
Mean 6,304.6 2,400.0 
Median 1,500.0 2,150.0 
Private hospital (n) 205 13 
Mean 4,208.4 4,219.1 
Median 3,000.0 3.250.0 
0.63 
(Chi square) 
0.40 
(Chi square) 
0.02 (ANOVA) 
0.03 (ANOVA) 
0.00 (Chi square) 
0.12 (Chi square) 
0.62 (Chi square) 
0.27 (Chi square) 
(Baht/visit) 
0.02 (ANOVA) 
0.00 (Kruskal-Wallis) 
0.06 (ANOVA) 
0.40 (Kruskal-Wallis) 
0.95 (ANOVA) 
0.69 (Kruskal-Wallis) 
0.90 (ANOVA) 
0.98 (Kruskal-Wallis) 
0.50 (ANOVA) 
0.75 (Kruskal-Wallis) 
0.99 (ANOVA) 
0.51 (Kruskal-Wallis) 
========================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
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The other response variables: prevalence rates of chronic illness and 
disability and hospitalisation rates show no significant differences by 
technique. This is because the health diary was kept for only two weeks 
to ensure a high cooperation rate, but chronic diseases and 
hospitalisation were asked over the past twelve months. 
Charges per consultation and hospitalisation from the two techniques 
show two striking variations. First, the diary plus interview technique 
showed a statistical difference in expenditure as compared to the 
general household survey only on drug store expenditure for illness 
within the past two weeks. Second, in general, the means of charges from 
the general household survey were higher than the diary plus interview, 
but the medians of charges from the general household survey were lower. 
The higher mean but lower median is observed because the sample size in 
the general household survey was bigger than the diary and interview 
survey. Diary keeping, though it increased the incidence rate of illness 
within the past two weeks, did not increase the expenditure per visit 
and per hospitalisation. 
5.4 Conclusions 
A good research methodology gives a reliable result. The same sampling 
technique was used in both the general household survey and the health 
diary plus interview survey. There was a high replacement rate {27%} in 
the general household survey (the rate was not recorded for the health 
diary plus interview group). Sampled households in both surveys were 
comparable in occupation and education level of household heads, and 
household durables, but annual household income in the general household 
survey was higher. There were no seasonal variations in income in either 
survey method. It is concluded that differences in income resulted from 
the practice of the interviewer in the diary plus interview, rather than 
from variation in the 120 interviewers or from real differences in 
income. 
The health diary had a significant effect on reporting illness during 
the previous two weeks, but not on reporting chronic illness, disability 
and hospitalisation, because the diary was kept only during two weeks. 
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The acute illness rate in the diary plus interview was 2.8 times higher 
than the general household survey. The wide gap between the two 
techniques could have been the effect of interviewer experience in the 
diary plus interview as well of the diary itself. The rate of acute 
illness at 35% of total population by the diary plus interview is 
remarkably higher than other national household surveys. 
Expenditures per visit and per case at public and private facilities 
according to both techniques were not significantly different, except 
expenditure per visit at drug stores by the general household survey was 
higher than that of the diary plus interview. The significant difference 
in drug store expenditure may be the result of a larger sample size, but 
the gap between the two techniques was not wide. 
Given the above conclusions, it was considered inappropriate to simply 
pool all the data, and weighting to correct for biases in a pooled data 
set would have been complex. The general household survey was therefore 
used as the main source of data for analysis. and at intervals compared 
with important variations from the health diary plus interview. 
5.5 Summary remarks of the chapter 
This study employed four main methodsj general household survey. health 
diary and interview, a bed census survey and health resources survey. 
This chapter compares the results from the two household surveys. Three 
important effects were explored: different survey methods, seasonal 
fluctuation and interviewer variation. 
The acute illness rate in the diary plus interview was higher than in 
the general household survey. Season did not have significant effect on 
the incidence of acute illness, but affected the distribution of the 
pattern of illness. The interviewer's practices and experience 
influenced the wide difference in acute illness rates between the two 
techniques and the rising rates of later rounds in the diary plus 
interview as well as the difference in household income between the two 
techniques. Expenditures on health care utilisation by the two 
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techniques were not significantly different except expenditures on 
visits to drug stores. 
In short, survey methods had an effect on the acute illness rate; 
seasonality had an effect on disease patterns but not on the morbidity 
rates. Interviewer biases and errors were predominant in the estimation 
of household income. 
It was concluded that the health diary plus interview technique gave a 
remarkably high incidence rate of acute illness but the interviewer's 
practice produced a lower level of income. Hence, it would be better if 
separate sets of data were analysed and compared with caution. Chapter 6 
will present the main analysis from the general household survey and 
draw in important differences from the health diary plus interview 
survey. 
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6. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 2: EQUITY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 
The central concern of this thesis is presented in this chapter. It is 
the application of the theoretical issues reviewed in chapter 2 to the 
real situation of an urban area in the North of Thailand. The framework 
for presentation adheres to Mooney's definitions of equity. The first 
part attempts to layout the state of health, and morbidity and 
mortality patterns of different groups of people. It proceeds on to the 
issues of equity in health care: access, utilisation and expenditure; in 
other terms: in health delivery and financing of health care. Details on 
public and private health care will be presented in chapter 7, and 
overall discussion in chapter 8. 
Having described the variations in the reliability of data obtained from 
different methods in chapter 5, the results presented in this chapter 
are mainly derived from the general household survey. Some figures are 
drawn from the health diary plus interview survey to illustrate 
important differences. This means that the health diary plus interview 
survey which was about 10% of the total sample was used as for 
comparison and not as an integral part of the data set. 
6.1 Equity in health status 
Health status here is judged on the basis of the mortality and morbidity 
experi"ences of each individual or a household unit. The use of negative 
health status indicators was a limitation of this study. Furthermore, 
employing self-reporting techniques and allowing a proxy respondent to 
give details of other family members will have contributed to further 
errors. 
Health status is the product of various factors: the previous level of 
his or her own health including genetic make-up (human biology), 
socioeconomic factors including housing and workplace (environment), 
lifestyle, and the use of health services when in need (Lalonde 1973)~ 
Before jumping to the end product (health status), some related 
parameters will be presented. 
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Equality in income distribution 
Disposable income is a necessity to survive in an urban environment as 
it is a means to obtain food and shelter to maintain health. In the Thai 
health care system, income (ie. absolute income) is also important to 
purchase health care when in need. It is the government's aim to achieve 
more equitable distribution of income among its population (relative 
income) and not only to increase gross national product (Wibulswasdi 
1987). But the former objective is harder than the latter. 
Figure 6.1 shows an uneven income distribution in the study area. The 
Lorenz curve, plotted from cumulative income for each income group. 
departs from the diagonal line of equal distribution; in other words. 
there was a high degree of income inequality. Numerical details are 
shown in table 6.1. 
Household annual income was estimated from the individual income of all 
members of the family plus household aggregate annual income. Columns 2 
and 3 in table 6.1 show the range of annual household income in each 
decile group. Column 4 shows the share of each decile in total earnings. 
The Gini coefficient. an indicator of distribution. from this survey was 
0.49 as compared to 0.37 for the Northern municipal area found by the 
National Statistical Office (1990). The methodology employed was 
different from that of the National Statistical Office, which asked for 
household annual income at one visit but cross-checked this with daily 
expenditure for seven successive days. This makes household expenditure 
slightly higher than household income in all regions. 
A higher Gini coefficient means that income was more unequally 
distributed in this municipality than in other northern municipal areas. 
This might be the result of the high degree of urbanisation of this city 
as compared to the country average. A study in the urban slums of 
Chiangmai in 1989 by Tangcharoensathien (1990), which employed the same 
methodology a~ this study, found the Gini coefficient for income 
distribution to be 0.305, more equally distributed than found by this 
study. This was because the Chiangmai study was confined to a more 
homogeneous area. ie. the urban slums. 
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Fig 6.1 Lorenz curve shows distribution of the income of the 
sampled households 
The ranking of household annual income has considerable uses in this 
study. as well as in many others. It shows the gradient from th e worst 
off to the better off. More detailed grouping is arranged into 10 groups 
called 'deciles', but more frequently used is a more concise grouping 
called 'quintiles' with 5 categories. 
Table 6.1 Income distribution of the sampled households 
% share in 
Decile Annual household income % share of Cumulative Northern 
group Lower Upper total income share (%) Municipality (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1 1,000 31,025 1. 08 1. 08 2.6 
2 31,200 49,000 2.58 3.66 3.7 
3 49,600 66,100 3.65 7.31 5.4 
4 66,700 85,000 4.83 12.14 5.9 
5 85,400 103,800 6. 03 18.17 6.7 
6 104,000 127,100 7.39 25.56 7.9 
7 127,340 155,800 8.87 34.43 9.9 
8 156,000 204,800 11 .36 45.79 13.6 
9 205,000 291,840 15.76 61.55 18.0 
10 291,900 4,174.000 38.45 100.00 26.3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Gini coefficient 0.49 0.37 
====================================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
* From the National Statistical Office (1990) 
Limitations in using the ranking of household income should be 
acknowledged at the beginning. Because the unit for calculating total 
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income is a household, then larger households with more earning members 
will be of higher rank (see table 4.7). To minimise this effect, per 
capita income is used also. The Gini coefficient for per capita income 
distribution was 0.52, higher than for the distribution of household 
income. It implies that taking account of the number of family members, 
income was more unequally distributed. 
Equity of mortality 
Death is commonly used as a health status indicator because of its high 
specificity, though many diseases now cause discomfort and disability 
rather than death. To follow the Black report (DHSS 1980), mortality 
data are presented first. 
There were 112 deaths occurring over the past 5 year period (pooled data 
from the general household survey and health diary plus interview 
because the number was small and the repeatability of response was 
100%). Almost half of them (49%) were deaths in those over 70 years of 
age (see table 6.2). This was an obstacle for further analysis because 
the number of preventable deaths or deaths in younger age groups (less 
than 65 years) were too small. However, the data showed that there were 
differential death rates among household income quintile groups, 
education and occupational groups of household heads. 
Table 6.2 Age at death 
Age group n 
--------------------------
0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-89 
90+ 
6 
2 
9 
4 
4 
12 
20 
26 
23 
6 
5.4 
1.8 
8.0 
3.6 
3.6 
10.7 
17.9 
23.2 
20.5 
5.4 
--------------------------
Total 112 100.0 
========================== 
Source: General household survey and 
diary plus interview 
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To remove the effect of age structure that was unevenly distributed 
among different household income, education and occupational groups of 
household heads, standardised mortality ratios (SMRs) were calculated 
and shown in table 6.3 (see population pyramids of different groups in 
Annex 1). Due to the small sample size, the only significantly different 
SMRs were those of the university level and the administrative and 
professional groups. Questions arise whether these differences are 
plausible. A possible explanation is that the more educated and 
professional household heads had better memory and were more willing to 
report deaths than the lower groups. 
Table 6.3 Standardised mortality ratios by various characteristics 
Characteristics Deaths SMR 
------------------------------------
Household income 
Cuintile 1 
Quintile 2 
Cuintile 3 
Quintile 4 
Cuintile 5 
Education of head 
No education 
Primary 
Secondary 
Vocational 
Uni versity 
Occupation of head 
Civil servant 
Admin & profess 
Trade 
Semi -sk ill 
Service 
Not working 
21 91.3 
22 121.2 
19 92.8 
20 97.5 
28 129.0 
of household 
10 63.7 
48 107.6 
21 93.6 
5 66.4 
23 158.1* 
of household 
9 56.1 
13 211.4** 
32 133.6 
3 113.2 
21 100.9 
34 84.2 
============================================= 
Note: * p<O.OS. ** p<O.Ol 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
There are many difficulties in collecting data on mortality. The most 
obvious difficulty is that deaths are rare events. They are also a 
sensitive issue so that the questions about death were put at the end of 
the questionnaire. These limitations were anticipated at the design 
stage but there were practical limits to sample size. However, this 
study has found that the deficiencies of a small sample size cannot be 
overcome by lengthening the recall period to 5 years. A longer recall 
period may reduce reliability of mortality data. Another problem arises 
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because some families recently moved into the study area. and so did not 
share the same urban environment or may have regarded deaths before 
migration as occurring in another family. Moreover. in designing the 
questionnaires. the specific characteristics of the dead persons 
themselves - ego occupation, education - were overlooked. Indirect 
parameters - education and occupation of household head - were used as 
substitutes. The failure to explore inequity in mortality necessitates 
reliance on morbidity statistics. 
Equity of morbidity 
The morbidity statistics used are of four types: acute illness within 
the past two weeks. chronic diseases. disability and hospitalisation 
within an annual period. All of them were self-reported by a proxy 
respondent for the whole family. There were nearly 500 spells of acute 
illness, nearly 500 chronic diseases and more than 350 hospital 
admissions reported. Less than 40 cases of the disabled were recorded. 
Some of the significant inequities of acute illness. chronic diseases 
and disability are presented. Inequity of hospitalisation will be 
presented later when discussing inequity of health care delivery. 
Acute illness 
The incidence of acute illness within the past two weeks as reported by 
household respondents is shown in tables 6.4 to 6.7. The variables which 
were significant in determining different incidence rates were household 
income group, education level, occupational group of each individual and 
age group. 
Per capita income ranking had no significant effect on the incidence of 
acute illness (see table 6.4), the same was found when substituting the 
occupation of the household head for the occupation of all other family 
members (table 6.6). However, age was the most prominent confounding 
variable which was unevenly distributed by education level and 
occupation group. The incidence rate in the 80 to 89 years old was the 
highest (25%). followed by children under 10 years (22%. see table 6.7). 
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Taking account only of those who were 20 years and older to remove the 
effect of younger age, the only significant variables were education 
level and household income quinti1e. The least educated people (without 
formal education) experienced the highest incidence rate and the higher 
educated reported the lower rates (see table 6.5). If a more limited age 
band was analysed, ie. 20 to 49 years old, to remove the effects of both 
younger and older age groups, only household income quinti1e determined 
differential incidence rates (see table 6.4). The lowest income quinti1e 
had the highest incidence rate. The higher rates in household income 
quinti1es 3 and 5 as compared to those of income quintiles 2 and 4 still 
exists. 
Table 6.4 Acute illness by income group 
Cuinti1e Household income 
group n % III 
Per capita income 
n % III 
Age 20-49 years 
Household income 
n % 111 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1 625 15.2 841 13.4 289 13.5 
2 707 9.8 794 10.1 336 6.5 
3 749 12.7 752 10.6 360 10.6 
4 761 8.7 708 13.6 381 6.8 
5 862 14.6 609 13.5 428 10.5 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3,704 12.2 3,704 12.2 1,794 9.5 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.01 0.08 0.01 
================================================================= 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.5 Acute illness by education level 
Age 20 years up Age 20-49 years 
Education level n % III n % III n % III 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No education 443 23.3 176 15.3 58 12.1 
Primary 1,086 13.6 715 12.7 395 11.4 
Secondary 858 8.7 475 10.3 386 8.8 
Vocational 481 8.7 378 8.7 355 8.7 
University 673 9.0 660 9.2 601 8.7 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3,741 11.9 2,404 10.9 1,795 9.4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.04 0.55 
================================================================= 
Source: General household survey 
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Table 6.6 Acute illness by occupation group 
Own occupation 
All ages Age 20-49 years Household head's 
Occupation group n % 111 n % 111 n % III 
---------------------------------------------------------~-------Civil servant 349 10.0 280 9.3 764 14.0 
Admin & professional 240 13.3 213 13.1 353 13.9 
Traders 595 11 .4 436 10.1 918 11.9 
Skilled workers 93 9.7 78 10.3 149 13.4 
Service workers 592 8.B 476 7.B 1,004 10.8 
Not working 1,980 13.5 371 8.6 661 10.7 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3,849 12.1 1,854 9.4 3,849 12.1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.35 0.23 
================================================================= 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.7 Acute illness by age group 
Age group n %111 
-----------------------------------
0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-89 
90-99 
565 
777 
634 
751 
469 
317 
216 
87 
28 
3 
21.9 
7.9 
8.8 
9.6 
10.0 
12.0 
19.0 
18.4 
25.0 
0.0 
------------------------------------
Total 3,847 12.0 
------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 
==================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Chroni c illness 
Tables 6.8 shows that the prevalence rates of chronic illness were 
unevenly distributed among different per capita income quinti1e groups. 
The rate in income quintile 5 was the highest at 17%. Education level, 
occupational group and age group had significant associations with the 
prevalence rates of chronic diseases (table 6.9 to 6.11). Trends of 
associations could be observed in education level, occupational group 
and age group. 
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When removing the effect of younger age groups, education level and 
occupational group had significant associations with chronic diseases. 
The lower the educational level, the higher the rates of chronic illness 
observed. This gradient was also evident in occupational groups but the 
reverse trend was observed because the majority of the not working group 
was the aged. However, when a more limited age band was analysed (20 to 
49 years old), all significant associations at the 95% confidence level 
were removed. Per capita income quinti1es and educational levels still 
showed some differences (though not significant). 
Table 6.8 Chronic illness by household income group 
Per capita income 
Quintile Household income All ages Age 20-49 years 
group n % ill n % ill n \ 111 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
625 
707 
749 
761 
862 
13.9 
11.5 
12.3 
9.9 
14.0 
841 
794 
752 
708 
609 
11.5 
10.8 
11.7 
11.4 
17 .1 
373 11.3 
371 10.2 
367 11.4 
363 12.1 
320 16.3 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3.704 12.3 3,704 12.3 ',794 12.2 
-------------------------------------------------------------p value (Chi square) 0.07 0.00 0.15 
======================================::z==================== 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.9 Chronic illness by education level 
Age 20 years up Age 20-49 years 
Education level n % III n , III 
-----------------------------------------------------------No education 176 25.0 58 19.0 
Primary 715 21.5 395 14.7 
Secondary 475 14.9 386 11.4 
Vocational 378 14.0 355 12.4 
Uni versity 660 10.6 601 9.7 
-----------------------------------------------------------Total 2,404 16.3 1,795 12.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.07 
=========================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
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Table 6.10 Chronic illness by occupation group of individuals 
,Age 20 years up Age 20-49 years 
Occupation group n % III n % III n \ III 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil servant 349 14.0 348 14.1 280 10.4 
Admin & professional 240 15.0 239 15.1 213 14.1 
Traders 595 17 .1 582 17.4 436 14.2 
Skill ed workers 93 16.1 90 16.7 78 14.1 
Service workers 592 11.7 558 22.3 476 10.3 
Not working 1,980 10.0 688 20.2 371 10.5 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3,849 12.2 2,505 16.3 1,854 11.9 
------------------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.01 0.30 
================================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.11 Chronic i 11 ness by age group 
Age group n \ III 
-----------------------------------
0-9 565 5.5 
10-19 777 3.6 
20-29 634 6.8 
30-39 751 13.6 
40-49 469 16.0 
50-59 317 24.3 
60-69 216 34.7 
70-79 87 31.0 
80-89 28 32.1 
90-99 3 33.3 
------------------------------------
Total 3,847 12.2 
------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 
==================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Di sabil i ty 
Household and per capita income groups had no significant relationship 
with the prevalence of disability. Age was an important factor in 
determining disability rates. The aged were found to have higher 
disability rates (see table 6.14). Education level and occupational 
group had strong associations with disability, even when removing the 
effects of younger and older age groups (tables 6.12 to 6.13). Higher 
rates were found in lower education levels and lower occupational 
groups. 
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Table 6.12 Education group and disability 
Age 20 years up Age 20-49 years 
Education group n % Disabled n \ Disabled 
----------------------------------------------------------
No education 
Primary 
Secondary 
Vocational 
University 
176 
715 
475 
378 
660 
3.4 
1.7 
0.8 
0.0 
0.5 
58 
395 
386 
355 
601 
6.9 
1.5 
1.0 
0.0 
0.3 
----------------------------------------------------------
Total 2,404 1.0 1,795 0.9 
----------------------------._----------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.00 
========================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.13 Disability by occupation group 
Age 20 years up Age 20-49 years 
Occupation group n % Disabled n % Disabled 
----------------------------------------------------------
Civil servant 348 0.3 280 0.0 
Admin & professional 239 0.0 213 0.0 
Traders 582 0.3 436 0.5 
Ski 11 ed workers 90 2.2 78 1.3 
Service workers 558 1.1 476 1.3 
Not working 688 2.3 371 2.2 
--------------------------------------------------------
Total 2,505 1.1 1,854 0.9 
--------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.03 
======================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.14 Disability by age group 
Age group n % Disabled 
------------------------------------
0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-89 
90-99 
565 
777 
634 
751 
469 
317 
216 
87 
28 
3 
0.4 
1.0 
0.3 
0.8 
1.9 
0.9 
1.9 
1.1 
7.1 
0.0 
------------------------------------
Total 3,847 1.0 
------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 
===~================================ 
Source: General household survey 
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6.2 Equity in health care delivery 
Having described the need for health services among different socio-
economic groups in terms of their mortality and morbidity experience, 
this section will discuss the use of health services. First, access to 
health services by health benefit schemes is presented, followed by the 
use of services for those who were ill in the two week period. Then, the 
use of inpatient care in public and private hospitals is discussed. 
Equity of access 
Urban dwellers have little difficulty in physical access to health 
facilities. Therefore, more attention was given to the health benefits 
of each household member which might prevent one from using a health 
facility. Tables 6.15 presents coverage levels of the health benefit 
schemes. Nearly half of the population was not covered by any benefit 
scheme at all. Thirty six percent of the population was covered by the 
civil servant benefit. either they were civil servants themselves or the 
dependents of civil servants. About six percent purchased private 
insurance policies that covered health benefits. Another five percent 
were covered by state enterprise employee benefit. About three percent 
had low income cards. Other categories of government health benefits -
veteran. village headman and health volunteer - covered only 2% of the 
population. The new Social Security Scheme covered about 1% of the 
population. 
As shown in table 6.15. some individuals (1% of total) were covered by 
more than one health benefit scheme. The most common schemes found with 
others were civil servant benefit (19 cases). private insurance (18 
cases) and state employee benefit (17 cases). To simplify further 
analyses related to types of health benefit. a single benefit per person 
was used selecting the highest benefit given as a proxy. 
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Table 6.15 Health benefits of all individuals 
Type of health benefits Percent 
-----------------------------------------------
None 47,6 
Civil servant benefit 35,6 
State enterprise employee benefit 4.7 
Veteran, village headmen, volunteer 1.7 
Low income card 2.7 
Social security scheme 1.2 
Private employee 1.7 
Private insurance 5.6 
Others 0.2 
================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
Note: Total percentage is 101.0 because some individuals are 
covered by more than one scheme 
Table 6.16 indicates that household income was significantly associated 
with the distribution of health benefits of household members. The lower 
income quinti1e were more likely to be uncovered than the higher 
quintiles. Government and state enterprise employee benefits were more 
likely to cover the higher income quintiles than the lower quintiles. 
The low income card was an important resort for members of quintile 1, 
However, some members of the income quinti1es 3, 4 and 5 had low income 
cards. They were the poor family members (single adults earning a small 
income, or house-servants) in households with high income. 
Interestingly, there were quite a number of people in the lower income 
quinti1es who were covered by private insurance schemes. When per capita 
income quintile was used instead of household income quintile, the same 
trend was observed with a stronger gradient. About 29% of income 
quintile 5 was uncovered, 
Occupation had strong associations with health benefits as shown in 
table 6.17. All members of the first occupation group, civil servants, 
should have been covered by either government or state enterprise 
employee scheme. Possible errors were that interviewers recorded loose 
occupation titles and coders gave the code of civil servant to temporary 
government employees. A high percentage of traders and semi-skilled 
workers were left uncovered. Private insurance was their only 
alternative. Almost 40% of the not working group were dependents of 
civil servants or state enterprise employees. 
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Table 6.16 Health benefits by household income group 
Quintile Not Civil State Veteran low Social Private Private 
group covered servant ent volunteer income security employer insurance 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 67.4 16.0 0.8 1.9 7.7 0.5 1.4 4.2 
2 55.7 31.8 0.1 2.1 3.0 1.6 1.1 4.2 
3 44.1 37.0 4.7 2.3 3.3 0.7 1.6 6.3 
4 34.0 50.5 6.4 1.6 0.7 1.4 1.7 3.7 
5 38.1 42.0 8.8 0.7 0.3 1.6 1.6 6.5 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 46.8 36.4 4.5 1.7 2.8 1.2 1.5 5.0 
=======================================================z=================~ 
p value 0.00, Chi square test 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.17 Health benefits by occupation group 
Occupation Not Civil State Veteran low Social Private Private 
group covered servant ent volunteer income security employer insurance 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Civil 3.2 79.1 15.8 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 
Adm & prof 8.3 85.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.3 3.8 
Trader 63.5 13.9 4.4 0.8 2.2 1.3 0.5 13.1 
Semi -ski 11 67.7 7.5 5.4 5.4 3.2 0.0 1.1 9.7 
Service 57.6 16.0 2.4 2.9 4.6 5.2 5.9 5.1 
Not work 51.5 35.6 3.7 1.6 3.0 0.1 0.7 3.7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 47.6 35.6 4.5 1.6 2.7 1.1 1.5 5.2 
:=:::::::::::::::::::=::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:==================== 
p value 0.00, Chi square test 
Source: General household survey 
When the household head's occupation was taken as a proxy for all family 
members, there were some shifts of health benefit coverage (see table 
6.18). More family members of civil servants and administrative and 
professional groups were uncovered. Only service worker families had 
more covered members though this was very little different. The same 
shifts were also observed when education level of household head was 
substituted for all family members. Families with a better educated 
household head were more likely to be covered by civil servant health 
benefits. Table 6.19 shows health benefits by education level of 
individuals. The gradient was stronger when household head's education 
level was used. The uncovered in the no education group increased to 57% 
while the university level was 33%. 
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It is unfortunate that the real figures of dependents covered by each 
scheme cannot be presented because the coding schedule did not 
distinguish main beneficiaries and dependents. However, an indirect 
estimate, assuming that dependents were those younger than 20 years and 
older than 60 years of age could be compared as a percentage of the 
total covered by each scheme. Fifty eight percent of those who were 
covered by low income cards were the young and the aged. Forty five 
percent of civil servant beneficiaries were 'dependents' as compared to 
37% of state enterprise beneficiaries. Private insurance and private 
employee schemes had about 26% and 28% respectively as 'dependents'. 
Interpreting these figures should be cautioned. The real figures of 
dependents must be higher, since spouses who acquired health benefits by 
virtue of their partner's job would be about the same age as their 
partner. 
Table 6.18 Health benefits by occupation of head of household 
Occupation Not Civil State Veteran Low Social Private Private 
group covered servant ent volunteer income security employer insurance 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Civil 15.6 67.9 12.6 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 
Adm & prof 22.9 68.8 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.1 1.1 5.1 
Trader 67.4 12.5 3.2 0.4 2.8 1.0 1.4 11.1 
Semi -skill 71.1 6.7 2.7 3.4 4.0 0.0 4.0 8.1 
Service 56.8 23.5 2.9 3.8 4.2 2.1 2.1 4.6 
Not work 51.3 37.2 2.3 1.2 3.8 0.9 1.1 2.1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 47.6 35.6 4.5 1.6 2.7 1 .1 1.5 5.2 
========================================================================= 
p value 0.00, Chi square 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.19 Health benefits by education level of individuals 
Education Not Civil State Veteran Low Social Private Private 
group covered servant ent volunteer income security employer insurance 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
No ed 53.0 29.3 3.4 2.0 5.9 0.0 0.5 5.6 
Primary 53.8 28.6 3.6 2.0 4.6 O.B 0.9 5.5 
Secondary 49.0 36.9 4.3 2.1 1.4 0.7 1.4 4.1 
Vocation 37.2 40.1 7.5 1.2 0.4 3.7 2.7 7.1 
University41.6 43.9 4.8 0.8 0.0 1.3 1.8 4.4 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 47.6 35.7 4.5 1.7 2.7 1.2 1.4 5.1 
========================================================================= 
p value 0.00, Chi square test 
Source: General household survey 
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Access to health services by entitlement to health benefit schemes 
proved to be significantly associated with morbidity and use of health 
services. Table 6.20 shows that the self-reported rates of acute and 
chronic illnesses of the covered group were significantly higher than 
the uncovered group. Further breakdown by types of health benefit (table 
6.21) reveals that veteran and volunteer benefits reported highest rates 
of acute and chronic illnesses but the rates greatly decreased when an 
age band of 20 to 49 years old was used in the analysis. This is because 
the veteran benefit provided coverage to older age groups rather than 
younger. Civil servant benefit and private insurance reported more or 
less the same rates of acute and chronic illnesses. When an age band of 
20 to 49 years old was used in the analysis, there were no significant 
associations between health benefit scheme and acute or chronic illness. 
It is interesting that all the rates for the restricted age band were 
lower except that the rates of chronic illness in not covered and 
private insurance group were slightly increased. 
Table 6.20 Morbidity by health benefit coverage 
Illness Covered Not covered p value 
n=2,017 n=1,832 
---------------------------------------------------
Acute illness 
Chronic illness 
Disability 
13.9 
14.8 
0.8 
10.0 
9.4 
1.1 
0.00 
0.00 
0.41 
=================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.21 Health benefits by acute and chronic illnesses 
Health 
benefit 
All ages 
Acute Chronic 
n % % 
Age 20-49 years 
Acute Chronic 
n % % 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Not covered 1,834 10.0 9.4 867 8.4 10.8 
Ci vil 1,369 13.2 15.3 622 9.6 14.0 
State ent 174 17.2 9.8 91 11.0 6.6 
Vet & vol 63 20.6 23.8 29 10.3 13.8 
Low income 102 12.7 14.7 29 10.3 13.8 
Social sec 44 9.1 13.6 38 7.9 13.2 
Private emp 56 12.5 3.6 40 10.0 2.5 
Private ins 200 15.0 14.0 133 13.5 14.3 
Others 7 28.6 14.3 5 20.0 0.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3,849 12.1 
p value (Chi square) 0.01 
12.2 
0.00 
1,854 9.4 11.9 
0.78 0.20 
================================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
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Consultations within two weeks 
As has been discussed in the section on equity in morbidity, age is the 
strongest confounding variable influencing most response variables. 
There was also evidence that age was associated with the choice of 
treatment between public and private sectors as shown in chapter 7. In 
this section, removing the effects of age by trimming the younger (less 
than 20 years) and the older age (more than 50 years) groups gave no 
statistically different results. The data presented here are therefore 
for all age groups, so caution is advised for direct interpretation. 
To assess the equity of utilisation for equal need, cases with an acute 
illness within the past two weeks were selected for analysis. Tables 
6.22 to 6.23 show the proportion using health services by different 
household income quintiles and health benefit schemes. The only variable 
among socio-economic characteristics which was significantly associated 
with use was health benefit of each individual. 
It has been shown in table 6.4 that the rate of acute illness was 
associated with household income quintile. This section further explores 
how those reporting illness seek health care. Some may 'wait and see' or 
treat themselves with drugs available in the household. This was 
classified as not treated. Public services included visits to the 
municipal clinic and both public hospitals. Table 6.22 shows that there 
were no significant differences in health seeking behaviour of those who 
were ill in the past two weeks by household income quinti1e. Regrouping 
into either treat and not treat or public, private and no treat gave no 
significant differences. The figures in table 6.22 suggest that the 
lower quintiles used drug stores and public services more often than 
higher quintiles. Household income quintile 4, which reported the lowest 
acute illness rate, had the highest rate of private hospital use. Per 
capita income quintiles also suggested that the lower quintiles also 
used drug stores and public services more often than higher quintiles. 
Almost one fourth of those reporting illness used private hospitals. 
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Table 6.22 Acute illness and use of health services by household income 
group 
Cuintile Person 
group ill 
Not 
treat 
Drug 
store 
Clinic Public Private Others 
service hospital 
----------------------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
95 
69 
95 
66 
126 
12.6 
18.8 
20.0 
16.7 
19.0 
25.3 
29.0 
22.1 
18.2 
18.3 
23.2 
21.7 
14.7 
19.7 
24.6 
22.1 
14.5 
23.2 
15.2 
15.1 
12.6 
10.1 
13.7 
22.7 
16.7 
4.2 
5.8 
6.3 
7.6 
6.3 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 451 17.5 22.2 21.1 18.2 15.1 6.0 
p value (Chi square) 0.67 
================================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
Occupational group and occupation of household head both had no 
significant association with use. Regrouping sources of treatment made 
no improvement to the statistical analysis. Table 6.23 suggests that 
civil servants made high use of public service for outpatient care. The 
administrative and professional group had high rates of no treatment or 
self treatment and private hospital use, but the lowest rate of private 
clinics. Traders made more use of drug stores, clinics and public 
services and had a low rate of no treatment. Service workers used drug 
stores and private clinics more. The not working group used private 
clinics more. 
Table 6.23 Acute illness and use of health services by occupation group 
Occupation Person Not Drug 
group ill treat store 
Clinic Public Private Others 
service hospital 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Civil 35 14.3 22.9 14.3 2B.6 5.7 14.3 
Adm & prof 32 25.0 21.9 6.3 15.6 21.9 9.4 
Trade 68 11.8 27.9 25.0 22.1 10.3 2.9 
Semi-skill 9 33.3 22.2 22.2 22.2 0.0 0.0 
Service 52 17 .3 2B.8 21.2 13.5 15.4 3.8 
Not work 268 19.1 19.1 23.2 16.1 16.5 6.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 464 18.1 22.0 21.3 17.7 14.9 6.0 
p value (Chi square) 0.15 
================================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
When the occupation of household head was used in the analysis, the 
number of illnesses was more evenly distributed amongst occupational 
groups because of the reallocation of the not working individuals to 
146 
other occupational groups (see table 6.24). Dependents of civil servants 
made more use of private hospitals and much less use of public services, 
but had a higher number of not treated. The administrative and 
professional group still showed high rates of no treatment and private 
hospital use. Traders' dependents made higher use of private clinics, as 
did the not working families. 
Table 6.24 Acute illness and use of health services by occupational 
group of head of household 
Occupation Person Not Drug 
group ill treat store 
Clinic Public Private Others 
service hospital 
----------------------------------------------------------------Civil 107 23.4 21.5 10.3 18.7 15.9 10.3 
Adm & prof 49 22.4 18.4 14.3 18.4 18.4 8.2 
Trade 109 12.8 23.9 31.2 20.2 11.0 0.9 
Semi -ski 11 20 20.0 30.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 5.0 
Service 106 14.8 25.9 21.3 16.7 15.7 5.6 
Not working 71 19.7 14.1 29.6 14.1 15.5 7.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------Total 
p value 
464 18.1 22.0 
(Chi square) 0.10 
21.3 17.7 14.9 6.0 
================================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.25 Acute illness and use of health services by type of health 
benefit 
Health Person Not Drug Clinic Public Private Others 
benefit ill treat store service hospital 
----------------------------------------------------------------Not covered 184 15.8 27.7 25.5 16.3 10.9 3.8 
Civil 181 22.1 14.4 13.3 20.4 18.8 11. 0 
State ent 30 26.7 23.3 30.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 
Vet & vol 13 23.1 7.7 23.1 46.2 0.0 0.0 
Low income 13 0.0 15.4 46.2 23.1 7.7 7.7 
Soci a1 sec 4 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 
Private emp 7 14.3 14.3 14.3 28.6 28.6 0.0 
Private ins 30 6.7 46.7 23.3 0.0 23.3 0.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 464 18.1 22.0 21.3 17.7 14.9 6.0 
================================================================ 
p value 0.00, Ch; square test 
Source: General household survey 
Health benefit was shown to be associated with morbidity of acute and 
chronic illnesses in table 6.20. Table 6.25 further shows that health 
benefit was significantly associated with use in acute illness. The 
uncovered used drug stores and clin;cs more. Civil servants and 
dependents used public services and private hospitals more. Nearly half 
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of those who had private insurance made use of drug stores, and the rest 
went to private clinics and private hospitals. 
Hospitalisation during the past year 
Hospitalisation rates were influenced by age as shown in table 6.26. The 
rate was as high as 11% in the under ten years and started to rise from 
40 years of age and above. The rates in females aged under ten, 20 to 39 
and 70 to 89 years old were higher than those of males but none were 
significantly different from each other at the 95% confidence level. 
Tables 6.27 to 6.30 further show hospitalisation rates by socio-economic 
characteristics. There were no significant differences in 
hospitalisation rates by household income, occupation and household 
head's occupation. The only significant factor was health benefit (which 
is confounded by age, see population pyramids in Annex 1). The uncovered 
had a lower hospitalisation rate compared to those covered by private 
insurance and civil servant and state enterprise benefits. The 
significantly different hospitalisation rates between males and females 
were shown only in those with a household head in the civil servant 
group (male 6.8% and female 12.6%) and those with state enterprise 
health benefit (male 4.9%, female 20.7%). Moreover, table 6.31 
indicates that whether the initial visit was to a public or private 
hospital had a significant effect on whether or not patients would be 
hospitalised. Private hospitals were more likely than public hospitals 
to admit cases of acute illness. 
Table 6.26 Hospitalisation by age group 
Age group Number of person % Hospitalised 
Male Female Male Female Total 
---------------------------------------------------
0-9 293 270 9.9 11.5 10.6 
10-19 374 401 7.0 3.5 5.1 
20-29 286 347 5.6 7.8 6.8 
30-39 317 434 6.0 9.7 8.1 
40-49 224 245 11.2 10.6 10.9 
50-59 115 162 13.5 14.8 14.2 
60-69 87 129 13.8 12.4 13.0 
70-79 36 51 8.3 19.6 14.9 
80-89 . 8 20 12.5 30.0 25.0 
90-99 1 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
---------------------------------------------------
Total 1,781 2,061 8.5 9.5 9.0 
=================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
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Tables 6.27 to 6.30 also give details on the choice of public and 
private hospital care in the municipal area. Household income (including 
per capita income). own and household head's occupational group and 
health benefit had a significant association with choice of public or 
private hospital. The lower income quintile disproportionately went to 
public hospitals. and the higher quintile went to private (see table 
6.27). The same trend was observed for per capita income. 
Table 6.27 Hospitalisation by household income group 
Cuintile n % Share of hospitals 
admission Public Private 
--------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
62 
58 
67 
70 
84 
9.9 
8.2 
8.9 
9.2 
9.7 
59.3 
44.1 
26.7 
16.9 
18.6 
37.0 
50.8 
68.0 
80.3 
75.6 
--------------------------------------------------
Total 341 9.0 
p value (Chi sq) 0.81 
30.7 64.6 
0.00 
==========:======================================= 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.28 Hospitalisation by occupational group 
Occupation group n % 
admission 
Share of hospital 
Public Private 
--.---------------------------------------------------
Civil servant 33 9.5 
Admin & professional 18 7.5 
Trade 53 8.9 
Semi-skill 8 B.6 
Service 49 8.3 
Not working 187 9.4 
35.5 
10.5 
20.0 
60.0 
46.3 
29.4 
54.8 
84.2 
74.8 
40.0 
53.7 
66.0 
-------------------------------------------------------
Total 348 9.0 30.5 64.9 
p value (Chi square) 0.94 0.04 
======================================================= 
Source: General household survey 
Administrative and professional groups made more use of private 
hospitals. The use of public hospitals by civil servants and service 
workers was greater than the average. After substituting the household 
head's occupation. those not working disproportionately went to public 
hospitals. Interestingly. about equal numbers of the uncovered went to 
public and private hospitals. Civil servant and state enterprise covered 
patients went to private hospitals compared to public hospitals in a 
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ratio of 2:1. Few (5%) of those who had private insurance were admitted 
to public hospitals (see table 6.30). 
Table 6.29 Hospitalisation by occupational group of head of household 
Occupation group n % Share of hospitals 
admission Public Private 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Civil servant 75 
Admin & professional 43 
Trade 65 
Semi-skill 10 
Service 92 
Not working 63 
9.8 
12.2 
7.1 
6.7 
9.2 
9.5 
23.0 
18.8 
24.6 
45.5 
37.0 
43.9 
67.6 
79.2 
71.0 
54.5 
60.5 
51.5 
-----------------------.-------------------------------
Total 348 
p value (Chi square) 
9.0 
0.07 
30.5 64.9 
0.03 
======================================================= 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.30 Hospitalisation by health benefit schemes 
Hea lth benefi t n % Share of hospitals 
admission Public Private 
----------------------------------------------------
Not covered 93 5.1 45.5 48.5 
Civil 173 12.6 26.3 68.2 
State ent 23 13.2 30.4 60.9 
Vet & vol 6 9.5 71.4 14.3 
low income 10 9.8 85.7 14.3 
Social sec 2 4.5 0.0 100.0 
Private employer 5 8.9 33.3 66.7 
Private insurance 34 17 .0 4.7 90.9 
Others 2 28.6 0.0 100.0 
-----------------------------------------------------
Total 348 
p value (Chi square) 
9.0 
0.00 
30.5 64.9 
0.00 
===================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
Table 6.31 Admission rate by place of initial visit from 
consultation within two weeks 
Place n % hospitalised 
----------------------------------
Public hospitals 83 15.7 
Private hospitals 84 34.5 
================================== 
p value 0.00. Ch; square test 
Source: General household survey 
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Regression models of morbidity and choice of treatment 
Logistic regression was then used to analyse morbidity and choice of 
treatment to control for various confounding variables. Dependent 
variables were converted into dichotomous responses of 0 and 1. The 
general model for fitting is as follows: 
Probability (event) = ____ ~1 ____ __ 
1 + 'e-2 
where Z is the linear combination of 
and the Bj coefficient is the natural logarithm of the odds of the i-th 
independent variable when it increases by one unit. 
Independent variables to determine the likelihood of morbidity (acute, 
chronic illness and disability) and choice of treatment (not 
treat/treat, drug store, private clinic, public facility and private 
hospital) are listed in table 6.32. Many variables had to be recoded so 
as to achieve a substantial number for statistical analysis. 
Occupational groups were recoded into 3 groups: the administrative and 
professional group was merged with civil servants and was called 
'Class1'; traders, semi-skilled and service workers were put into 
'Class2', and those not working were 'Class3'. However, during the 
process of analysis, Class2 was aliased in the model since this 
corresponds to both variables Class1 and Class3 taking the value O. So 
Class2 corresponds to the baseline value. The same process and 
interpretation were applied to 'Hclass' and 'Teover' in table 6.32. 
A composite family wealth indicator constructed from variables on house 
ownership, car ownership and crowding index (number of family members 
divided by number of bedrooms) was tried at earlier stages of logistic 
regression modeling. Different cut off points for 'over-crowding' index 
and the family wealth indicator were tested, but none gave impressive 
results. So, at the final stage, the family wealth indicator was dropped 
out. 
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Table 6.33 shows R coefficients for logistic regres s ion mod el s 
explaining different dependent variables. The R coefficient indicates 
how closely independent and dependent variables are correlated: th e 
higher the value the better the correlation. Variables explaining the 
probability of reporting acute illness included own education, education 
of household head and having no health coverage. Th e higher educat i on 
and having no health coverage reduced the probability of reporting 
whereas the higher the education of the household head, the higher the 
probability of reporting acute illness for all family members. 
Table 6.32 Description of variables used in logistic regression 
Variables 
Age 
Sex 
Ln(Hincome ) 
Ed 
Hed 
Class l 
Class2 
Class3 
Hcl assl 
Hc lass2 
Hc lass 3 
Tcove rO 
Tcove rl 
Tcove r2 
Ami x 
Acute 
Chronic 
Di s able 
Hosp 
Treat 
Drug 
Clinic 
Public 
Priv 
Description 
Age 
Sex 
Hou sehold incollle 
Education of individual 
Education of hou s ehold head 
Occupational group 
Occupational group 
Occupat ional group 
Occ upation of hous ehold head 
Occupation of hou sehold head 
Occupation of hou sehold head 
Type of health be nefit 
Type of health benefit 
Type of health be nefit 
Seve rity of acute ill ness 
Acute illness 
Chronic illness 
Disability 
Hos pitalisation 
Treatment 
Drug store 
Privat e clinic 
Public service 
Private hospital 
Va lue 
Real value 
o = f ema l e , 1 " ma l e 
Natu r al loga rithm 
o = no education and primary, 1 s higher 
Th e s allie as Ed 
o = other s , 1 % c ivil serva nt, 
admini s trative & pr ofessi ona l gr oup 
o = othe r s . 1 : trade r 
o = othe r s . 1 % those not working 
The s ame a s Class l 
The same as Cl ass2 
The s ame as Cl ass3 
o " Othe r s . 1 z not c overed 
o = Others. 1 : limited cove r a ge schemes . eg o 
vet e r an and volunt eer. l ow income ca rd 
o = Othe r s , 1 " ci v i l se rva nt benefit, s t a t e 
ente rp rise and private i ns ura nce 
o not s eve r e . 1 " severe 
D = non e . 1 " eve r had illness with i n the pas t 
2 weeks 
o non e , with one or more c hronic illnesses 
o non e , 1 wi th one or mo r e d isabi l i ti es 
o non e . 1 = eve r been hos p i t a li sed 
o no treatment. 1 z seek s Ollie sort of 
treat .. e nt 
o = othe r s , 
illnes s 
o " othe r s . 
illness 
o = others , 
or publi c 
o = othe r s . 
illness 
used drug s tore for acute 
K used private cl i nic for acut e 
used publi c outpati e nt s ervi ce 
hos pital for ac ute treatment 
1 = used privat e hospit a l for a cut e 
There were more variables explaining the probability of reporting 
chronic illness. Positive associations were found with age and education 
level of household head. Male, more educated individuals and the lower 
occupational group had a lower prevalence of chronic disease than 
female, less educated and the intermediate occupational group. 
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Table 6.33 R coefficients for logistic regression models 
Independent Dependent variables 
variables ------------------------------------------------------------
Acute Chronic Disable Hosp Treat Drug Clinic Public Priv 
---------------------------------------------------------------- ---- --- -
Age 
.23 .10 .07 -.14 
Sex 
-.04 
Ln(Hincome) 
- .09 . 10 
Ed 
-.14 -.06 -.16 - . 11 
Hed .05 .04 
Class1 
Class3 
-.03 .07 
Hclass1 .07 - .10 
Hclass3 
-.07 
TcoverO 
-.03 -.07 
Tcover2 .04 -.08 
Amix 
* * * * 
-.09 .10 .09 
Acute 
* * * 
.12 
* * * * * Chronic * * * .16 * * * * * Disable 
* * * * * * * * 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-2 Log 2483.0 2344.4 335.2 1923.7 422.7 408.2 409.0 366.2 334.2 
likelihood 
df 3484 3484 3484 3481 407 407 407 407 407 
======================================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Note: (.) = not significant at p < 0.05 
(*) = not included in the model 
Age and occupational group were correlated with disability: the older 
and the lower the occupational group the more frequently was di sability 
reported. Having health benefit (civil servant benefit and private 
insurance) and having acute and chronic illness increased the chance of 
being hospitalised. 
In order to analyse the choice of treatment, only those reporting acute 
illness within the previous two weeks were included in the analysis. The 
model determining whether to use any sort of health care or not found 
individual education level and occupational group of household head to 
be significant variables. The lower the education of the individual or 
the higher the occupational group of the household head, the more likely 
they used some sort of treatment. 
There were four significant variables determining the use of drug 
stores: age, household income, occupation of household head and severity 
of illness. The older age groups made more use of drug stores than the 
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younger. Those with more severe illness, and members of higher income 
households as well as members of households with a not working head, 
used drug stores less often. 
Variables determining the use of private clinics, public services and 
private hospitals were very different from one another. However, more 
severe illness increased the chances of going to a public facility as 
well as a private hospital. Older people and members of families of 
higher occupational group used private clinics less often. 
Paradoxically, those who had no health coverage and those who were 
adequately covered (civil servant benefit and private insurance) were 
less likely to use public facilities as compared to those with limited 
coverage. Finally, higher income groups were more likely to go to 
private hospitals but not the more educated. 
Table 6.34 Classification power of logistic regression models 
Dependent 
variables 
in the models 
Observed 
probability 
of outcome 
Negative results 
predicted 
correctly 
Positive results % 
predicted correct 
correctly overall 
------------------------------------------------------------------------Acute 
Chronic 
Disable 
Hosp 
Treat/not treat 
Drug store 
Private clinic 
Public service 
Private hospital 
12.0% 
12.3% 
0.9% 
9.2% 
77.1% 
21.7% 
22.4% 
17.6% 
15.5% 
88.0% 
87.8% 
99.1% 
91.1% 
0.0% 
78.7% 
78.0% 
82.7% 
85.5% 
0.0% 
40.0% 
0.0% 
65.0% 
77 .1% 
50.0% 
36.4% 
50.0% 
83.3% 
88.0% 
87.7% 
99.1% 
91.0% 
77 .1% 
78.3% 
76.9% 
82.4% 
85.5% 
======================================================================== 
It should be noted that the R coefficients in table 6.33 were very low 
even though they were significantly different from O. Table 6.34 shows 
the predictive power of the models. This predictive power ;s used 
instead of the R squared in multiple linear regression, but it is 
influenced by the observed probability of the outcome. A good model 
should give correct predictive results both for negative and positive 
outcomes. Hence, the models for choice of private hospital and 
probability of being hospitalised were better than the other models. In 
the model explaining the choice of private hospital, the chance of 
predicting any case correctly is 74% [(0.155)2 + (1-0.155)2], so 
predictive results of the model were better than by chance. (table A.15 
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in Annex 1 provides a detailed cross tabulation of expected by observed 
values in the choice of private hospital model). 
Promotive and preventive services: maternal and child health 
Apart from curative services, both public and private hospitals also 
provide promotive and preventive services. Activities on maternal and 
child health are considered here. Females aged 15 to 44 years and 
children under 6 years were analysed to highlight access to maternity 
care and child immunisation. 
About 5% of reproductive age females (total 1,149) reported use of 
antenatal, natal and postnatal care, and 10% reported use of family 
planning services within the past 12 months. Due to the small sample 
size, significant associations were difficult to prove. The trend only 
suggests that higher household income quintiles and higher occupational 
groups made more use of postnatal care in private services. 
For children aged less than 6 years (total 329), one-third reported the 
use of immunisation service within the past 12 months. Significant 
associations were observed in the choice of use and household income 
quintile and health benefit coverage. Children in higher income families 
and with health benefit coverage made more use of private services. 
6.3 Equity of financing health care 
This section is concerned with who pays for the public and private 
health services. The first part starts with a description of the costs 
to users of services. Then different payers for outpatient and inpatient 
services are discussed. The last part of this section considers the 
burden of household health expenditure in relation to household income. 
The costs to users 
Expenditure on visits to public and private health facilities are 
presented in tables 6.35 and 6.36. In table 6.35, the charges were for 
the consultations within the past two weeks excluding cases which led to 
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hospitalisation. Means and medians of the charges are presented to 
indicate how skewed the charges were. About 6% (7 cases out of 123) of 
the consultations at private clinics were reimbursable and they were 
fully reimbursed according to the median, but 93% in terms of the mean. 
Nearly 60% (41 out of 70 cases) of the consultations at public 
facilities were reimbursable and the rate of reimbursement was 99% (in 
terms of the mean). The charges at private hospitals for ambulatory 
cases were generally 15% higher than those of public facilities. For 
reimbursable cases the charges were 2 to 4 times higher. Only 23% of the 
consultations at private hospitals were reimbursable and 88% (by the 
mean) of full charges were reimbursed (see also figure 6.2). 
Table 6.36 contains similar information to table 6.35, but for 
hospitalisation. Fifty six percent of cases at public hospitals were 
reimbursable and the reimbursement rate was 97% (by the mean). There was 
a greater share of reimbursable cases at private hospitals, about 75% of 
all cases, with a reimbursement rate of 96% in terms of mean but 84% of 
the charges by median. It is interesting that the charges of public 
hospitals for reimbursable cases were 2.2 times higher than the charges 
of private hospitals when their means are compared. Moreover the 
reimbursable rates as a percentage of each total charge for inpatients 
in private hospitals were spread more evenly than in public hospitals 
and of outpatients (see figure 6.3). 
Table 6.35 Charges and reimbursement for consultation within two weeks 
Place 
All cases 
Charges 
n Mean Median n 
Charges 
Mean Median 
Reimbursable cases 
Reimbursement % Reimburse 
Mean Median Mean Median 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug store 96 44.5 30.0 
Clinic 123 167.1 100.0 
Public serv 70 348.9 177.5 
Private hosp 53 574.5 200.0 
Others 18 205.6 150.0 
o 
7 111.4 80.0 105.7 80.0 92.9 100.0 
41 388.1 200.0 386.1 180.0 99.1 100.0 
12 1,726.7 425.0 1,592.4 400.0 88.4 100.0 
14 232.9 160.0 232.9 160.0,100.0 100.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
p value 
Test of sig 
0.00 0.00 
F test K-W 
0.00 0.00 
F test K-W 
0.00 0.00 
F test K-W 
======================================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
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Table 6.36 Charges and reimbursement for hospitalisation within one 
year 
Hospital 
n 
All cases 
Charges 
Mean Median 
Reimbursable caSes 
Charges Reimbursement % Reimburse 
n Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Public 85 6,304.6 1,500.0 48 9,517.3 2,484.0 9,211.1 2,434.0 97.0 100.0 
Private 205 4,208.4 3,000.0 154 4,185.7 3,000.0 3,061.2 2,600.0 96.1 84.0 
Others 10 8,130.0 7,000.0 6 6,916.7 4,300.0 3,250.0 2,300.0 95.7 90.0 
p value 
Test of sig 
0.17 
F test 
0.00 
K-W 
0.02 
F test 
0.63 
K-W 
0.00 
F test 
0.99 
K-W 
========================================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
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Figure 6.2 Reimbursement as a percentage of charge, acute illness 
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Figure 6.3 Reimbursement as a percentage of charge, hospitalisation 
Charges for consultations were much lower than cha r ges for 
hospitalisations. Generally, private hospitals cost more than any other 
health services, and drug .stores cost the least. It is interesting that 
consultations at public services (most of the cases were public hospital 
visits) cost more than private clinic visits. Two explanations are 
possible. The first is that though self-selection, the cases presented 
at public services were more severe than cases presented at private 
clinics (see table A.9 in Annex 1), as is also suggested by logistic 
regression in table 6.33. The second is that most private clinics had no 
laboratory investigations, so the charges were only marked up drug 
pr i ces with a nominal doctor fee. Th e perceived lower price could be one 
reason why the poor went to private clinics instead of the public 
hospital. Also private clinics had a shorter waiting time (see detail s 
on waiting time in chapter 7). 
Charges for hospitalisations in publi c hospitals were highly s kewed. The 
mean for public hospitals was higher than that for private hospit als, 
but the median was lower. This was because some cases in publi c 
hos pitals stayed a very long time and hence cos t a lot. In s uch a 
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situation, the median is more appropriate for comparisons than the mean. 
Strong bias towards longer lengths of stay and higher charges was seen 
for reimbursable cases than the average in public hospital 
hospitalisations because they were not under pressure of paying for 
treatment. The reimbursable cases of public hospitals also stayed longer 
than in private hospitals, presumably because the level of reimbursement 
to private hospitals is limited in terms of the rate per day and length 
of stay. There is no limit for public hospitals. 
Sources of finance 
The charges for public and private health services were paid for by 
different payment schemes. Table 6.37 shows that about 37% of public 
service consultations were paid out of clients' pockets. The major 
financier of public service outpatients was the civil servant benefit 
scheme (50% of visits). Almost 60% of private hospital outpatient visits 
were paid by clients themselves. Other payers of private hospital visits 
were civil servant benefit scheme (20%), private insurance (10%), state 
enterprise benefit (6%) and private employers (5%). 
Table 6.37 Sources of payments (%) 
Sources of payment Consultation 
Public Private 
service hospital 
Hospitalisation 
Public Private 
hospital hospital 
-----------------------------------------------------------. 
Out of pocket 36.8 58.3 36.4 20.8 
Government benefit 49.5 20.2 40.2 47.8 
State enterprise 3.2 6.0 7.5 8.0 
Veteran & volunteer 3.2 0.0 1.9 0.4 
Low income card 1.1 0.0 2.8 0.0 
Private employer 0.0 4.8 1.9 1.8 
Private insurance 1.1 9.5 1.9 19.0 
Others 5.3 1.2 7.5 1.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
------------------------------------------------------------
Number of observation 95 84 107 242 
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.00 
============================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
For inpatient care, out of pocket payments for public hospitals were 
about the same as outpatient visits (36%). Government sources of finance 
were from civil servant benefit, veteran and volunteer and low income 
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card schemes (about 50%). Other private sources were private insurance 
(2%) and others (about 8%). Forty eight percent of private hospital 
inpatient care was financed from civil servant benefit schemes, 21% from 
out of pocket payments and another 22% from other private sources. 
Table 6.38 breaks down sources of finance for consultations at all 
public and private health services by household income quintile. Out of 
pocket payments disproportionately came from the lower quintile while 
civil servant benefit schemes paid for a greater proportion of the 
higher quintiles than the lower quintiles. The low income card scheme 
paid more frequently for the lower income quintiles and private 
insurance paid for the higher as well as lower quintiles. 
Table 6.38 Payers for acute illness by household income group (%) 
Sources of payment 
1 
Quintile group 
234 5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Out of pocket 81.2 78.4 72.4 55.9 67.7 
Government benefit 10.4 9.8 16.1 37.3 19.7 
State enterprise 0.0 3.9 2.3 0.0 7.1 
Veteran & volunteer 1.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 
low income card 2.1 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private employer 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.7 2.4 
Private insurance 2.1 2.0 2.3 5.1 2.4 
Others 3.1 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
------------------------------------------------------------
Number of observation 96 51 87 59 127 
p value 0.00, Chi square test 
============================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.39 for hospitalisation suggests the same trends of sources of 
finance as in table 6.38. A higher percentage of the lower quintiles had 
to payout of their pocket for inpatient care than the higher quintiles. 
Most of the government schemes benefited more the higher income 
quintiles; only low income cards benefited the poor. Private insurance 
scheme also benefited more the higher income quintiles. 
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Table 6.39 Payers for hospitalisation by household income group (%) 
Sources of payment Quintile group 
1 2 3 4 5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Out of pocket 43.4 36.2 27.0 9.6 20.7 
Government benefit 32.1 34.5 43.2 63.0 49.4 
State enterprise 5.7 0.0 6.B 12.3 12.6 
Veteran & volunteer 1.9 1.7 0.0 1.4 0.0 
Low income card 3.B 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private employer 1.9 1.7 0.0 1.4 2.3 
Private insurance 5.7 12.1 17 .6 12.3 13. B 
Others 5.7 12.1 5.5 0.0 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
------------------------------------------------------------
Number of observation 53 5B 74 73 B7 
P value 0.00, Chi square test 
============================================================ 
Source: General household survey 
The proportions of lower household income quintiles paid by the low 
income card scheme for their hospitalisations were low as compared with 
the results of the bed census in chapter 7. The reasons why two 
different techniques gave a wide gap of results will be discussed in 
chapters 7 and B. 
The burden of health service costs in relation to household income 
It is difficult from the survey to estimate the burden of health 
expenditure in relation to total household income. The household surveys 
asked for expenditures incurred for acute illness during the past two 
weeks and hospitalisation during the past 12 months. An assumption is 
made here to estimate the burden of health expenditure to household 
income. Annual expenditures were calculated by multiplying the two-week 
expenditure by 26 and adding it to hospitalisation expenses. Tables 6.40 
demonstrates the burden of health expenditures under this assumption. 
There are arguments against the above assumption. The strongest is that 
those households who reported no illness and no expenditure during the 
household surveys were kept free from illness and expense all the year, 
which is not plausible. And for households with acute illness, 
expenditures for the whole year were artificially high for those 
households since two weeks' expenditure was multiplied by 26. 
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Table 6.40 shows that about half of the households in each income 
quintile experienced illness and paid for their health services. The 
expenses before and after reimbursement were significantly different for 
different income quintiles. For example, in quintile 1, before 
reimbursement, 56% of households spent at least 10% of their annual 
household income on health. After reimbursement. 47% of households still 
spent at least 10% of their annual income on health. In quintile 5, 
before reimbursement, 30% of households spent less than 1% of their 
annual income for health. After reimbursement, more households (57%) 
spent less than 1% of household income. 
Table 6.40 Health expenditure as percentage of household income. 
weighted 
Cuintile No of households 
Total With exp % 
Proportion of households in quintiles with 
specified % burden to household income 
Before reimburse After reimburse 
<1% 1-4 5-9 =>10% <1% 1-4 5-9 =>10% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
178 
178 
178 
178 
178 
88 
75 
83 
82 
101 
49.4 
42.1 
46.6 
46.1 
56.7 
11.4 21.6 11.4 55.7 
21.3 32.0 24.0 22.7 
20.5 41.0 14.5 24.1 
18.3 52.4 14.6 14.6 
29.7 45.5 B.9 15.8 
21.6 20.5 11.4 46.6 
40.0 30.7 16.0 13.3 
37.3 38.6 13.3 10.8 
47.6 41.5 6.1 4.9 
57.4 30.7 2.0 9.9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.00 
======================================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Sensitivity testing was used to reduce the high weighting (26 times) 
given to expenditures within the past two weeks. Taking for example, a 
weight of 80% (that is. 0.8x26 or 20.8 was used to multiply outpatient 
expenditure within the past two weeks). the burden to household income 
both before and after reimbursement did not change much, ie. about 1% to 
2% shift from the higher to the lower groups. Until the weight was 
reduced to 5% (that is, 0.05x26 or only 1.3 was used to multiply 
outpatient expenditure) at least 20% of households in household income 
quintile 1 still spent at least 10% of their household income on health 
care after reimbursement. 
To overcome the above problems. the share of health expenditure in 
household income was analysed at the macro level, by assuming all 
households in the same quinti1e bore the total health expenditure, and 
total income was summed for each quinti1e. 
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Tables 6.41 and 6.42 show the percentage of health expenditure to 
household income and percentage of health expenditure after adjusting 
for reimbursement to household income by quintiles. Table 6.41 uses 
household income quintiles while table 6.42 uses per capita income 
quintiles. Annual health expenditure was estimated from the two-week 
expenditure on acute illness multiplied by 26, and then added to annual 
expenditure for hospitalisation. 
In table 6.41, health expenditure is 5.3% of household income as an 
average over all income groups. The lowest quintiles paid most (33%) out 
of household income, and even this remained the case when reimbursable 
expenses were subtracted out (21% while the average net expenditure over 
all income groups was 3%). The same gradient was observed when per 
capita quintile was used (table 6.42). 
Table 6.41 Annual health expenditure by household income group 
Quintile 
group 
Total 
income 
Health After 
expenditure reimburse 
Health expenditure 
as % of household income 
before after 
reimburse reimburse 
--------------------------------------------------------------
1 5,120,294 1,673,067 1,084,296 32.7 21.2 
2 11,867,019 475,353 308,697 4.0 2.6 
3 18,792,869 965,828 361,084 5.1 1.9 
4 28,523,651 819,954 247,964 2.9 0.9 
5 75,676,476 3,538,272 1,586,738 4.7 2.1 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total 139,980,309 7,472,474 3,588,779 5.3 2.6 
============================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
Table 6.42 Annual health expenditure by per capita income group 
Health expenditure 
Quintile Total Health After as % of household income 
group income expenditure reimburse before after 
reimburse reimburse 
--------------------------------------------------------------
1 6,616,330 1,560,193 1,183,940 23.6 17 .9 
2 13,789,044 961,347 356,473 7.0 2.6 
3 20,128,180 943,498 292,904 4.7 1.5 
4 30,318,165 1,031,124 447,004 3.4 1.5 
5 69,128,590 2,976,312 1,308,458 4.3 1.9 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total 139,980,309 7,472,474 3,588,779 5.3 2.6 
============================================================== 
Source: General household survey 
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Table 6.43 Annual health expenditure by other socioeconomic parameters 
Socio-
economic 
group 
Total 
income 
Health After 
expenditure reimburse 
Health expenditure 
as % of household income 
before after 
reimburse reimburse 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Household head's education 
No education 10,544,217 270,080 
Primary 32,058,244 1,580,842 
Secondary 29,190,908 1,541.997 
Vocational 24,252.237 1,959.974 
University 3.907.478 1.573.670 
Household head's occupation 
Civil servant 36,966.454 1.357.303 
Admin & prof 19.149.888 836.602 
Trader 33.568.419 2,638,278 
Semi-skilled 5.702,078 124.670 
Service work 25,738,384 991,462 
Not working 18,855.082 1,524,161 
Household head's health benefit 
Uncovered 37,212,769 2,148,525 
Civil servant 64,549,857 2,988,605 
State enterp 13,583,120 426,574 
Veteran & vol 3,039.834 91.339 
Low income 2.027.820 129,090 
Social secur 2.998,700 45,010 
Private emp 569,400 7,160 
Private insur 16.048,558 1,632,178 
100,750 
1,095,606 
857.763 
175,549 
874,790 
586,942 
279,491 
1,031,979 
109,269 
514,197 
1.006,297 
1,722,195 
1,099,318 
308,400 
45,310 
124,661 
18,510 
1,960 
268,351 
2.6 
4.9 
5.3 
8.1 
4.0 
3.7 
4.4 
7.9 
2.2 
3.9 
8.1 
5.8 
4.6 
3.1 
3.0 
6.4 
1.5 
1.3 
10.2 
1.0 
3.4 
2.9 
0.7 
2.2 
1.6 
1.5 
3.1 
1.9 
2.2 
5.3 
4.6 
1.1 
2.3 
1.5 
6.1 
0.6 
0.3 
1.7 
======================================================================= 
When income data are compared against annual health expenditure 
estimates, it is of concern that the estimation of income especially in 
income quintile 1 (both household and per capita income) might be the 
most unreliable. It is more likely that they were under-estimated. Table 
6.43 spreads out these underestimates across other socioeconomic 
parameters of household heads (see tables A.16 and A.17 in Annex 1 that 
families in household income quintile 1 were redistributed to less 
privileged groups rather than more privileged). Before reimbursement, 
household heads with vocational education, with trading occupations and 
not working, and with private insurance incurred a high percentage of 
health expenditure to household income. But after reimbursement, 
relatively high burdens were still imposed on families of household 
heads with primary education, not working, low income and the uncovered. 
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6.4 Discussion 
Different results of the general household survey from the health diary 
plus interview survey signalled that the main analyses should rely on 
the general household survey. Income distribution and Gini coefficient 
did not change when the data set of the diary plus interview was 
abandoned (Gini coefficient was also 0.49 when data from both techniques 
were pooled). This implies that both surveys picked up similar 
variations of household samples, but the diary plus interview survey 
systematically reported lower household income. 
Household income and per capita income quintiles were simultaneously 
used to compare the discriminatory power for different response 
variables. Per capita income takes account of family members, the Gini 
coefficient of per capita income distribution was higher than that of 
household income which means that unequal distribution is more prominent 
when per capita income is used. However. in general, per capita income 
quintile gave no better results (in terms of providing statistically 
significant differences) than household income quintile, except in 
determining the prevalence rate of chronic disease. 
To explore equity in health status, analyses were focused on variation 
in mortality and morbidity by socioeconomic variables. Detailed analyses 
were possible for morbidity where sample sizes were large enough. 
Excluding either the young or both the young and the aged showed that 
acute illness was negatively associated with income and education; and 
education was negatively associated with chronic illness and disability 
but occupation was positively associated with chronic illness and 
negatively associated with disability. However, strong associations of 
acute and chronic illnesses were also found with the type of health 
benefit. This suggests the possibility that access to health services 
(in terms of health benefit coverage), which was proved to be associated 
with use, may influence recall and reporting of acute and chronic 
illnesses rather than other socioeconomic factors. 
It was not possible to demonstrate any clear gradient of morbidity among 
apparent gradients of socioeconomic groups. Income quintiles, based on 
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quantitative data, have the virtue of ordinal ranking, but income 
estimation was the most unrepeatable. Educational level, though 
qualitative, correlates with number of years studied, and hence has an 
acceptable gradient. The gradient for occupational groups and health 
benefit coverage is the most debatable. The other reason for failing to 
find a clear gradient of morbidity is that socioeconomic status in 
Thailand might not behave the same way as in the UK; for example 
educational status may not be associated with occupation or income. 
It was difficult to use data on use of outpatient and inpatient services 
including maternal and child health activities to show inequity of use 
for equal need because of lack of data on need and quality of care. Type 
of benefit was associated with increased use of ambulatory services. 
hospitalisation and immunisation. It was also associated with choice of 
public or private outlets. ie. schemes with adequate coverage brought 
the patients to private more than public facilities. However, a logistic 
regression on choice of treat or not treat shows that the choice was 
influenced by education and occupational group of household head. not 
health benefit coverage. Interestingly. more of the high educated tried 
'wait and see' or 'self-treatment', but higher occupation of household 
head groups were more likely to bring their family members to any sort 
of treatment. Income had no effect on choice of treat or not treat 
because there were many health service outlets with low and high 
charges. 
Logistic regression models gave a better understanding of the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables where 
univariate analysis had limitations in controlling many confounding 
variables. Amongst important socio-economic variables. income was only 
correlated with the choices of drug store (negatively) and private 
hospital (positively) while education was negatively correlated with 
more response variables (acute. chronic, treat and private hospital). 
Health benefit coverage was correlated with acute illness (negatively). 
hospitalisation (positively) and choice of public facility (negatively). 
Severity of illness was important in making choices for drug stores 
(negatively). public facilities (positively) and private hospitals 
(positively). 
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Expenditures on health care were estimated. The general household survey 
gave comparative charges at drug store. clinic. public outpatient 
service. public hospital and private hospital for outpatient and 
inpatient services. The responses from household surveys were subject to 
a recall bias, especially a long recall of admissions within the past 12 
months. Furthermore. missing information on total charges were more 
likely to be those who did not payout of their own pocket or paid only 
a certain copayment because health services directly debit third party 
payers. 
For ambulatory cases. charges at drug stores were the lowest. It is 
interesting that user charges at ambulatory public services (dominated 
by public hospital cases) were higher than at private clinics. However. 
the charges at private hospitals were the highest. There were 
significant differences in self-reported severity of illness among cases 
at different services. The highest proportions of cases at private 
hospitals were said to be severe. the second highest was for public 
services and the least was for drug stores. Charges for reimbursable 
cases were slightly lower than for non-reimbursable cases in private 
clinics. There were no significant differences in severity between the 
reimbursable and non-reimbursable. But charges for reimbursable cases 
were higher than the average in public services and private hospitals. 
This could reflect some degree of provider's moral hazard. if 
differences in outcomes could be ruled out. Private hospitals show a 
wider gap between reimbursable and non-reimbursable charges. Apart from 
private third party payers. which reimbursed expenditures in private 
hospital ambulatory cases, this could reflect provider's moral hazard in 
recording ambulatory visits as hospitalised cases in order to obtain 
reimbursement from civil servant benefit inflating total hospital 
charges to recover the cost of ambulatory visits for civil servant 
beneficiaries. 
For hospitalised cases. average charges (in terms of the means) of 
public hospitals were higher than charges of private hospitals. Charges 
(in terms of the median) of public hospitals were lower than private 
hospitals. This is because the data from public hospitals were more 
highly skewed than private hospitals, ie. long stay cases were more 
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likely to be treated in public hospitals or public hospitals tended to 
keep patients longer (see more details in chapter 7). Unlike ambulatory 
visits, charges of reimbursable cases in public hospitals were higher 
than those of non-reimbursable cases, but this was not true for private 
hospitals. This time, public hospitals may exert moral hazard of 
admitting reimbursable cases longer or giving intensive treatment to 
recoup high revenues and provided a chance of cross-subsidising the 
uncovered. For private hospitals there is a limit of 30 days per 
admission for reimbursing private hospital inpatients. 
Charges, health benefit coverage, severity of illness including time 
costs of waiting. played important parts in influencing choice of 
treatment. Public services' share of ambulatory visits was about 22% 
excluding the 'not treat' and increased to 31% for hospitalisation. A 
high proportion of users of ambulatory services had to payout of pocket 
with few third party payers. However, for higher expenses such as 
hospitalisation. a higher proportion of cases were covered by some 
scheme of health benefit. The serious problem fell upon the lower income 
and the underprivileged households. 
The estimation of burden of health expenditure to household income by 
income quintile groups suffered from the problem of household income 
estimation. Very low estimates of household incomes in income quintile 
made the proportion an outlier from the rest. When these underestimates 
were spread out across other socio-economic parameters of household 
heads, the proportions looked more realistic. 
Underprivileged families (families with household heads in the not 
working occupati~nal group, the uncovered and low income card holders) 
had to spend as much as 5-6% of their household income for health. This 
inequitable pattern of the burden to household income is in contrast to 
a progressive pattern in the UK and Singapore. In the UK, poor families 
with an income lower than £80 a week spent 1.3% of their income for 
health, while the richest group (income higher than £650 a week) spent 
4.3% of their income for health. Rather the same pattern is shown for 
Singapore (see chapter 2). 
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6.5 Conclusions 
The analysis of inequity in terms of individuals' and households' socio-
economic variables in this urban area was not very encouraging because 
of the small sample size and problems of data quality. However. it can 
be concluded that income, education level, occupational group and health 
benefit coverage are associated with inequity in health. 
Income, although not very reliable, was associated with the incidence of 
acute illness in those aged 20 to 49 years of age. with chronic illness, 
type of health benefit and the share of health expenditure to household 
income. Educational level was negatively associated with acute and 
chronic illnesses. Occupational group was associated with disability, 
ie, disability in the not working was more prevalent. Some may argue 
that disability should not be related to education and occupation as it 
influences both if it happens at a very young age. The household head's 
education and occupation was not important in determining the health 
need of household members. 
Type of health benefit is the only variable demonstrating inequity of 
use for equal need. It is an intermediate variable which was determined 
by income. education, occupation and household head's occupation group. 
It was associated with morbidity and use of health services, both 
ambulatory and hospitalisation. 
Inequity in terms of financing health care was clearly established in 
this study .. Third party payers reimbursed the high cost of health care 
for the privileged group, and the underprivileged were at risk of paying 
for health care at a higher percentage of their income than the 
privileged. The underprivileged here included those without health 
benefit coverage. low income card holders, not working household heads, 
low educated household heads and households with low income. 
6.6 Summary remarks of the chapter 
This chapter has tried to demonstrate the degree of inequity in health 
and health care in the study area. The unequal distribution of household 
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income was described. The Gini coefficient was 0.49. The ranking of 
household income was used as an important indicator to compare the 
degree of inequity in health and health care. Other socio-economic 
variables used were occupation and education of individuals and of 
household heads. 
Inequities in health status in terms of mortality and morbidity 
differentials among different socioeconomic groups were difficult to 
identify. High standardised mortality ratios were found in families with 
household heads in the administrative and professional group and with 
university education. Acute and chronic illnesses were unequally 
distributed among income groups. Occupation and educational groups were 
associated with the incidence of acute, chronic illnesses and 
disability. The household head's occupation group was associated with 
the prevalence of chronic illness. These reflected unequal distribution 
rather than inequitable distribution, because it is difficult to judge 
the fairness of disease distribution among different socioeconomic 
groups. 
Inequities of health care delivery were presented in terms of the 
accessibility to and use of health services. It was obvious that health 
benefits were unequally distributed among income quintile, occupation, 
occupation of household head and education groups. The deprived families 
(the poorer, the lower occupation cadres and lower education levels) 
were more likely to be uncovered or uninsured. Furthermore, health 
benefits were associated with higher rates of reported morbidity (acute 
and chronic illnesses) and use of health services (consultation and 
hospitalisation). 
Inequities of utilisation for equal need were difficult to identify. 
Unequal use of health services for acute illness were demonstrated by 
different schemes of health benefits. The uncovered reported a lower 
rate of acute illness. A smaller percentage sought no treatment and they 
were more likely to use drug stores and private clinics rather than 
other public and private health facilities. However. it cannot be shown 
that they suffered from lower quality of care than the others. 
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Health benefits further influenced hospitalisation rates and choice of 
hospitals, public or private. During the past 12 months, the uncovered 
were less likely to be hospitalised, while those covered by private 
insurance were most likely to be. lower income quintiles, low income 
card holders, the underinsured and the uncovered were more likely to use 
public hospitals than the others. Differentials in hospitalisation rates 
are not appropriate for generalising about inequity of use because they 
are not standardised for equal need. Some admissions may be unnecessary 
and there was no evidence that patient care in public hospitals was 
different from care in private hospitals. 
Inequities of financing health care were presented in terms of the share 
of health expenditure in total household income for different income 
groups. Charges for consultations and hospitalisations at different 
health services were compared, including copayments of the reimbursable 
cases. The lower income quintiles were at higher risk of paying for 
health services out of their pocket than the higher quintiles. In spite 
of seeking care at lower cost health services, the share of health 
expenditure in total income in the lower income groups were higher than 
the share of the higher income group. Even after reimbursement, the 
private source of finance, out-of-pocket payment, was regressive to 
household income. 
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7. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 3: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROVIDERS 
This chapter describes details of the public and private health 
providers in the study area. It also considers the question of whether 
there is evidence that either public or private sector is more 
efficient. It explores further who are the users of the services and 
what are their attitudes towards the present health system. 
The main source of data presented in this chapter is the bed census 
survey in two public hospitals and three private hospitals. It ;s 
complemented by the health resources survey in all six hospitals. 
Relevant data from the general household survey and health diary plus 
interview survey are presented for better comprehension and cross-
checking. 
7.1 Efficiency 
This section assesses service providers' behaviours from several 
perspectives: staffing mix, outputs, patterns of diseases and charges. 
To explore the efficiency of services was not the prime aim of this 
study, therefore only a few aspects of efficiency were analysed. Because 
of the limitations of the approach and access to sensitive data, 
profitability and competitiveness of health care markets in this urban 
area cannot be studied. The health resource survey describing inputs and 
outputs of each hospital provides the basis for comparing technical 
efficiency. Prices and charging mechanisms are used as indirect 
indicators of economic efficiency. However, comparing economic 
efficiency is difficult because the public hospitals are not forced to 
recover their costs completely. 
Outputs and inputs 
Table 7.1 compares outputs and inputs of individual public and private 
hospitals. (In previous chapters and most sections of this chapter the 
results were grouped into the public and private categories to achieve a 
large sample. Wherever possible, data from individual hospitals are 
presented in this chapter to illustrate the different behaviour of each 
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hospital.) Inputs were defined as number of beds categorised into 
different types, and number of health personnel. Outputs were the 
achievements in terms of outpatient visits, inpatient cases and 
inpatient days, number of surgical operations, deliveries and 
vaccinations. 
The two public hospitals were very different in size. Public hospital 1 
was the regional hospital of the lower northern part of Thailand. Public 
hospital 2 was a military hospital that also provided services for 
civilians. It was about one fifth the size of the first public hospital 
and was comparable in size to the private hospitals. Private hospital 1 
was the first and largest private hospital. Its bed capacity was more 
than the registered number of 150. Private hospitals 2 and 3 were both 
about the same size as each other, but the latter had only been open for 
a year. Private hospital 4 was an eye hospital and the smallest. It only 
opened in September 1991. 
Table 7.1 Health resources survey 
Resources Public hospitals Private hospitals 
1 2 1 2 3 4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Beds 818 150 150 100 100 26 
ICU beds 32 0 17 6 8 0 
Operating tables 15 3 4 2 2 1 
Deli very tab1 es 6 3 2 3 2 0 
Private beds1 84 28 59 40 31 9 
Consultation rooms 16 10 9 6 6 3 
Manpower 
Medical doctors 74 10 9+39* 4+30* 2+30* 1+2* 
Dentists 7 2 1* 0 0 0 
Pharmacists 12 2 1+1* 1* 2* 1 
Registered nurses 296 32 7+15* 7+80* 5+20* 1+12* 
Technical nurses 193 0 0 4+112* 4+45* 0 
Practical nurses 97 61 173 32* 0 12 
Medical scientists 6 0 2 1 3* 0 
PhYSiotherapists 4 0 1+1* 1* 0 0 
Medical social workers 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Medical specialists 
General practitioners 1 1 0 0 8 0 
Pathologists 2 0 1* 0 1 0 
Internal medifine 10 1 3+2* 1+3* 1+1* 0 
Psychiatrists 2 0 1* ,* ,* 0 
General surgeon 9 , 1+3* 2+3* 1+2* 0 
Obstetrician & gynaeco 7 1 '+2* 1+'* 2* 0 
Paediatriciar 11 , 1+3* 2* 2* 0 
Radiologists 3 1 1+1* 2* 2* 0 
Anaesthesiologist2 3 0 1+2* 2* 2* 0 
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Resources Public hospitals Private hospitals 
1 2 1 234 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neurologist 1 
Dermatologist 1 
OPhlhalmologists2 4 
ENT 2 
Orthopaedists 6 
NeurOSurgerns2 2 
Urologists 2 
Plastic surgeons2 2 
Paediatric surgeon2 2 
Heart & chest surgeon2 1 
Rehabilitative medicine 1 
Outputs 
Outpatient visits 
Inpatient cases 
Inpatient days 
Operations 
Delivery 
Immunisation 
297,625 
32,781 
261,680 
13,105 
4,745 
BeG 4,523 
DPT/OPV 3,930 
Measles vaccine 754 
Measles, Mumps, Rubella 0 
Hepatitis B vaccine 1,184 
Encephalitis vaccine 330 
o 
o 
o 
o 
1 
o 
1 
1 
o 
o 
o 
92,579 
3,110 
23,512 
749 
232 
207 
804 
182 
128 
23 
232 
o 
o 
3* 
2* 
3* 
1+2* 
2* 
2* 
1* 
1* 
o 
60,724 
23,263 
69.789 
2.823 
668 
656 
1,780 
675 
252 
1,955 
947 
1* 
1* 
2* 
1* 
1* 
2* 
1* 
2* 
1* 
1* 
o 
54,232 
7,245 
14,774 
2,184 
252 
252 
224 
o 
24 
30 
212 
o 
1* 
2* 
1* 
3* 
2* 
2* 
2* 
1* 
1* 
1* 
17,251 
5,156 
18,468 
854 
210 
200 
198 
8 
1 
26 
32 
o 
o 
1+2* 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
9,230 
630 
**1-3 
512 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* = part-time 
** = average per case 
1 = one-bed room for private patient in either public or private 
hospital 
2 = a public doctor who practises at more than one private hospital 
Source: Health resource survey 
Hospital facilities varied slightly among those hospitals that provided 
general services. Public hospital 1 had the highest number of intensive 
care beds, operating tables and delivery suites. It also employed the 
highest number and greatest mix of medical specialists and paramedics. 
Public hospital 2 had no intensive care unit. The severe cases were 
either looked after in general wards or referred to public hospital 1 or 
elsewhere. There were quite a number of medical specialists in this 
military hospital but only one per specialty. Private hospitals 1. 2 and 
3 had almost the same facilities as each other: intensive care, surgery 
and delivery. They made use of part-time medical doctors and paramedics 
to provide 24-hour services for all specialties. Part-time manpower was 
mobilised from both public hospitals and a few medical specialists from 
elsewhere even from Bangkok. It can be seen from table 7.1 that some 
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medical specialists from the public hospital worked part-time in more 
than one private hospital. 
One-bedded rooms are an important facility to provide privacy to 
patients and their relatives in both public and private hospitals. One-
bedded rooms here are considered as private beds and do not include 
semi-private beds. Public hospitals had 10 to 19% of their beds as one-
bedded rooms. Private hospitals had 31 to 40% of their beds as one-
bedded rooms. 
Hospital output of each hospital as a percentage of total hospital 
output is interesting in many respects. Bearing in mind that users of 
hospitals were not only the municipal residents, some hospitals were 
more attractive in some services than the others and many services were 
provided in private clinics for which no data are presented here. Public 
hospital 1 had a 61% share of total beds, but the share of outpatient 
visits was 56% of the total and of inpatient cases was 45% of the total. 
The higher shares of outputs than the share of beds were inpatient days 
(67% of total inpatient days), operations (65% of total) and deliveries 
(78% of total). Private hospital 1 had a disproportionately high share 
of inpatient cases (32% of total) as compared to the bed share (11% of 
total beds), but the share of inpatient days was not very high (18%). 
Details will be discussed later when outputs are compared against the 
input mix. 
The Immunisation service in the private sector was also interesting. 
Vaccinations against tuberculosis (BeG) were very similar to the number 
of deliveries. This means that all public and private hospitals 
protected nearly all newborns against this endemic disease. Private 
hospitals, especially private hospital 1 were actively providing 
vaccinations against the other infectious diseases. There were at least 
two important reasons explaining this situation. First, private 
hospitals provide a more accessible immunisation service in terms of 7 
days a week and almost 24 hours a day service, based on individual 
dosage, while public hospitals operated the service on a rather strict 
schedule to prevent waste of unused vaccines. Second, there were more 
initiatives among private hospitals to provide new vaccines not 
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available in the national expanded programme on immunisation (EPI). 
Managers in public hospitals limited the vaccines to the EPI list to 
prevent doctors prescribing expensive vaccines to users without third 
party payers. 
Table 7.2 compares the input and output ratios of each hospital's health 
resources. Because private hospitals employed part-time staff, 
assumptions for conversion to full-time equivalent were made. Every 
part-time worker was taken to be equal to 0.5 of a full-time worker even 
though some workers may work longer hours than others. This was based on 
average working hours. It was justified for nurses who worked on a shift 
basis, but for doctors it was questionable. Conversions for manpower mix 
were as follows. All medical specialists were treated the same as one 
another. A registered nurse was taken to be equal to one, a technical 
nurse equal to 0.67 and a practical nurse equal to 0.33. This weighting 
was based on years of education rather than wages in the labour market. 
The ratios of beds to doctors in public hospitals were about two to 
three times higher than in private hospitals except for the eye 
hospital. But ratios of beds to nurse were about the same, ie. two to 
three beds to a nurse, except for private hospital 2 (about one to one). 
If no conversion factors were applied for nurse mix, the workload ratios 
were clearer. Registered nurses in private hospitals 1 and 3 were in 
charge of higher numbers of beds. Registered nurses in private hospital 
2 had the lowest number of beds in charge. This may be because private 
hospital 2 employed higher numbers of part-time registered nurses and 
the conversion factor for full-time equivalent of 0.5 was too high. The 
uses of technical and practical nurses were very different from hospital 
to hospital, even in the same type of ownership (public or private). 
Practical nurse was the most confusing terminology. Most private 
hospitals referred to a category of nurse aid that they themselves 
trained for their own use with limited theoretical training in a short 
time period. Whereas practical nurses ;n public hospitals were a two-
year trained paramedic who could later switch to technical nurses after 
another two-year training. 
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Doctors in public hospital 2 saw the highest average number of 
outpatients. Doctors in private hospital 1 treated more inpatients on 
average in a year than others but doctors in public hospital 1 saw the 
highest number of inpatients each day because patients stayed in this 
hospital longer than in any others. The real workload for nurses, taking 
account of occupied beds, was lowest in private hospital 2. During each 
shift, a registered nurse looked after only 2.7 inpatients with the help 
of technical and practical nurses. Again, the interpretation is subject 
to the conversion factor of part-time to full-time equivalent and also 
the proportion of inpatient to outpatient loads that competed for nurse 
time. 
Table 7.2 Workload and outputs per unit of health resource by hospital 
Outputs Public hospitals Private hospitals 
1 2 1 2 3 4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bed/doctofa 11.5 
Bed/nurse 2.3 
Bed/registered nurse 2.8 
Bed/technical nurse 4.2 
Bed/practical nurse 8.4 
OPO/doctor/year 4,022.0 
IP cases/doctor/yr 443.0 
Inpatients/doctor/dar 9.7 
Inpatients/nurse/day 6.0 
Inpatients/RN/day 7.2 
Inpatients/TN/day 11.1 
Inpatients/PN/day 22.2 
Operation/table/yr 873.7 
Delivery/table/yr 790.8 
Occupancy rate (%) 87.6 
Length of stay (day) 8.0 
15.0 
2.9 
4.7 
na 
2.5 
9,257.9 
311.0 
6.4 
3.6 
6.0 
na 
3.3 
249.7 
77.3 
43.9 
7.6 
5.3 
2.1 
10.3 
na 
0.9 
2,130.7 
816.2 
6.7 
7.8 
39.6 
na 
3.3 
705.8 
334.0 
127.5 
3.0 
5.3 
0.9 
2.1 
1.6 
6.3 
2,854.3 
381.3 
2.1 
1.2 
2.7 
2.1 
7.5 
1,092.0 
84.0 
40.5 
2.0 
5.9 
3.1 
6.7 
3.8 
na 
1,014.8 
303.3 
9.0 
4.5 
10.2 
5.7 
na 
427.0 
105.0 
50.6 
3.6 
13.0 
2.4 
3.7 
0.0 
2.2 
4,615.0 
315.0* 
6.9* 
3.9* 
6.0* 
na 
3.6* 
512.0 
0.0 
53.1 * 
1-3 
======================================================================== 
Note: Adjustment for one part-time is 0.5 full-time equivalent 
One technical nurse is 2/3 of registered nurse 
One practical nurse is 1/3 of registered nurse 
~ refers to all specialty doctors as denominator 
refers to all nurse using conversion factors 
C nurse workload adjusted for 3-shift duty by multiplying with 3 
* adjusted for one year by 4 because full scale inpatient care 
started only in September 1991 
Source: Health resource survey 
Looking at the level of use of health facilities, private hospital 2 
achieved the highest rate of operations per table per year. The rate of 
deliveries per bed was highest in public hospital 1. The bed occupancy 
rate was highest in private hospital 1 (127.5%!). If the actual number 
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of beds ;s corrected and 200 beds are assumed. the occupancy rate would 
be 95.6%. Lengths of stay were shorter in private hospitals. around 2.0 
to 3.6 days as opposed to 7.6 to B.O days in public hospitals. 
It ;s difficult to conclude from the above figures that one hospital was 
more efficient than the others without considering patient 
characteristics and costs. However. looking only at input mix and 
activities. some aspects of efficiency can be considered. The two public 
hospitals were similar in many respects but differed in many others. The 
ratios of beds to doctors and lengths of inpatient stay ,were similar. 
But the volume of outpatient and inpatient care were different. The 
military hospital provided more outpatient services but less inpatient 
care including surgical and obstetric services. The data for the 
military hospital has to be interpreted cautiously. since it was 
originally aimed at servicing personnel, but recently had extended 
hospitality to civilians. However. the military hospital 1s situated on 
the other bank of the river and within the army barracks. which might be 
a disincentive to civilian access (see map in Annex 3). 
The three private general hospitals were similar in bed to doctor 
ratios. But they had their own features. The highest use rate of 
operating tables in private hospital 2 was due to the high number of 
full-time surgeons in this hospital. and highest use rate of the 
delivery suite in private hospital 1 was because there were more full-
time equivalent units of obstetricians working here. A reason for 
decision to specialise in one or two specialities may relate to the 
specialisation of the founder doctors. Both public hospitals had an 
agreement with the Social Security Fund to provide care for employees 
under the Social Security Act. However, employees with injuries and 
diseases related to work were allowed to go to any public or private 
hospital because these were covered by the Workmen Compensation Fund 
(see chapter 3). Some private enterprises had agreements with certain 
private hospitals to care for their employees. But. the reason why 
private hospital 1 achieved the highest occupation rate of inpatient 
beds was hard to explain. Length of existence and reputation: private 
hospital 1 had been in service for 10 years. private hospital 2 for 5 
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years and private hospital 3 just one year, would not be sufficient 
reasons. 
It is important to consider differences in the patterns of diseases in 
public and private hospitals. Table 7.3 shows the patterns of diseases 
from the one-day bed census. Data from the bed census were biased to the 
use of public hospitals because cases from outside the study area were 
included while the household survey data reflected the use of private 
hospitals more than public hospitals (see chapter 6). However, both 
surveys show that the public hospitals cared for more severe and chronic 
cases than the private hospitals. More patients with neoplasms, 
cerebrovascular diseases, hyperplasia of prostate and other accidents 
were hospitalised in public hospitals. This could be one reason for the 
longer hospital stay among patients in public hospitals. Table 7.4 shows 
the differences in lengths of stay of some comparable diseases from the 
bed census and the household surveys between public and private 
hospitals. 
Table 7.3 Leading causes of hospitalisation by public and private 
hospitals (%) 
ICD9 codes Descriptions Public Private 
(n=554) (n=103) 
----------------~--------------------------------------------------008,009 
065 
001-136 
140-208 
250 
280-285 
290-303 
401-405 
420-429 
430-438 
480-486 
487 
490-493 
531-534 
540-543 
580-587 
600 
630-639 
640-676 
650-651 
680-709 
740-759 
780.6 
Enteritis and other diarrhoea 2.0 
Haemorrhagic fever 0.2 
Other infectious & parasitic diseases 0.7 
Malignant neoplasms 3.8 
Diabetes mellitus 0.5 
Anaemia 1.1 
Psychosis, neurosis and other diseases 0.4 
Hypertensive diseases 0.2 
Other forms of heart diseases 0.9 
Cerebrovascular diseases 4.2 
Pneumonia 2.2 
Influenza 0.2 
Bronchitis. emphysema, asthma 0.9 
Peptic ulcer 0.5 
Appendicitis 0.7 
Nephritis and nephrosis 2.5 
Hyperplasia of prostate 2.0 
Abortion 0.5 
Complications of preg, childbirth 1.6 
Delivery without mention of camp. 7.0 
Diseases of skin & subcutaneous 2.7 
Congenital anomalies 0.9 
Pyrexia of unknown origin 1.3 
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2.8 
5.6 
2.8 
0.9 
1.9 
0.0 
0.0 
4.6 
0.0 
0.9 
6.5 
0.9 
4.6 
1.9 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.9 
0.0 
3.7 
1.9 
0.0 
2.8 
ICD9 codes Public Private 
(n=554) (n=103) 
------._-----------------------------------------------------------
780-789 Symptoms & ill-defined conditions 
240-739 All other diseases 
ES10-ES25 Motor vehicle accidents 
ESOO-E999 All other accidents 
5.8 
32.7 
0.9 
23.5 
11.1 
33.3 
6.5 
5.6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 100% 100% 
===============================================:::===:============= 
Source: Bed census survey 
Pooling inpatient data from the bed census with the cases reporting use 
of all public and private hospitals in the municipality from the two 
household surveys gives the details of length of stay shown in table 
7.4. The longest stays in public hospitals were heart diseases and 
injuries (on average 52 days), whereas the longest stays in private 
hospitals were heart diseases (average 23 days). It could be argued that 
length of stay is not a good indicator for disease severity, and may 
suggest inefficiency. Diarrhoeal cases stayed in public hospitals longer 
than private hospitals, even though those covered by health benefits 
(which were over-represented in private hospitals) could have stayed 
longer and still be reimbursed. 
One case in the hypertensive, heart and cerebrovascular disease group in 
a private hospital was admitted for almost a year (without a third party 
payer). If the outlier was taken out, private hospitals on average 
admitted these conditions for 5 days. The longest stays for pneumonia 
cases were in public hospital 1 and 19% of the cases were the low 
income. A high percentage of the low income (27% of 44 cases in public 
hospital 1) were also found among the conditions related to pregnancy 
and childbirth. Pyrexia of unknown origin, the most precise code with a 
decimal point (7S0.6) might have different criteria for diagnosis in 
different hospitals. Public hospital 1 admitted the patients longer than 
any other hospitals. There was no information to confirm whether this 
speculation was true or whether there were more investigations to reach 
a definite diagnosis in any of these cases. 
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Table 7.4 Average lengths of stay (days) in public and private 
hospitals by group of diagnosis 
ICD9 codes Descriptions Public 
n days 
Private p 
n days value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------008,009 Enteritis and other diarrhoea 23 4.7 24 2.8 0.03 
401-438 Hypertensive, other forms of heart 30 52.3 18 23.4 0.09 
and cerebrovascular diseases 
480-493 Pneumonia, influenza and chronic 30 15.5 31 3.3 0.00 
obstructive pulmonary diseases 
630-651 Complications of pregnancy, 47 11.6 12 3.8 0.83 
childbirth and the puerperium 
780.6 Pyrexia of unknown origin 11 10.4 18 3.3 0.00 
E800-E999 Injury and poisoning 156 51.5 47 3.8 0.00 
=====================================================:================== 
Source: General household survey, health diary plus interview and 
bed census survey 
Big difference in lengths of stay of injuries and poisoning could be 
influenced by other factors as well as the fact that the more severe 
cases were more likely to be found in the referral hospital (public 
hospital 1). Eleven percent of cases in public hospitals had been 
treated in private hospitals before and 44% were referred from health 
centres or hospitals outside the municipality. Twenty four percent of 
cases in the public hospitals were the low income and about 23% of cases 
in the private hospitals had to pay totally out of their own pocket. 
Pricing and collection of revenue 
Table 7.5 presents the fee structures in public and private hospitals. 
The fee structures of the military hospital and private hospital 4 were 
not presented because the military hospital charges were comparable to 
the MOPH hospital. and private hospital 4 performed only eye operations. 
To counter-balance the ceiling for the reimbursable amount for 
accommodation, private hospitals tended to split the accommodation fee 
into room charge and medical service charge. The rates for anaesthetic 
and some surgical procedures in private hospitals were comparable to the 
public hospitals. It should be noted further that prices set for some 
types of surgery were quoted differently. The prices quoted in most 
private hospitals were the doctors' fees which would be transferred to 
surgeons. But in the public hospital and private hospital 1, the prices 
were set for collecting revenue from clients and the ranges were higher 
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than for the other two private hospitals. The prices ;n the public 
hospital were lower because there were no doctors' fees for surgeons who 
operated. 
Because of the variations in pricing structure, it is difficult to 
interpret table 7.5. A few specific diagnoses are therefore taken to 
compare charges. To take an example of cases with haemorrhagic fever 
from the bed census, a patient stayed in public hospital 1 for 8 days, 
and the total charge was 3,682 Baht. Three cases of haemorrhagic fever 
stayed at private hospital 2 for 3 days each, the charges varied from 
1,710 to 4,006 Baht. Another case was admitted in private hospital 3 for 
7 days and charged 9,018 Baht. It could be argued that drug costs given 
to different cases varied according to the severity of illness even 
among the cases which stayed for the same length of time in the same 
hospital. Other variations in charges would reflect differing privacy of 
the bed they were admitted to. 
Table 7.5 Fee structure in public and private hospitals (Baht) 
Item Public Private 
hospita1 1 hospital 1 
Private Private 
hospital 2 hospital 3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Accommodation 
3 or more beds 10 250 240+200* 300+100* 
1 bed 200 400+400* 500+400* 
Special room 300 400-600 500+400* 800+400* 
VIP room 500 800 800+500* 
leU room 300 500+400* 300+300* 
Meal special included included included 
meal in room in room in room 
70/day price price price 
Operating room 800/1st hr 500/1st hr l,500/1st 
400/subseq 200/subseq half hr 
hrs hrs 500/sub 1/2 hr 
Anaesthetic 400/15t hr 600/1st hr 600/1st hr 500/hr 
150/subseq 300/subseq 400/subseq 
hrs hrs hrs 
Hysterectomy 1,000-4,000 8,000-10,000 2,000 1,800-2,000 
Haemorrhoidectomy 500-1,500 5,000-6,000 1,300 1,000-1,200 
Thyroidectomy 1,000-4,000 6,000-8,000 1,800-2,000 1,800 
Tonsil 1 ectomy 1,000-4,000 4,000-5,000 1,000 1,500 
======================================================================== 
1 = Price list for the military hospital is not presented, it follows 
the list of the MOPH hospital 
* = Medical service charge 
Source: Health resource survey 
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Another example, of cases with appendicitis, a patient staying 6 days in 
public hospital 1 was charged 3,420 Baht. Another case staying 8 days in 
private hospital 2 was charged 20,023 Baht. The charge for 
appendicectomy is similar to hysterectomy, and would be about 2,000 Baht 
in the public hospital or 3,100 to 3,700 Baht in private hospital 2. The 
rest of the wide difference would be the charge for drugs and 
accommodation. 
Table 7.6 (data from the bed census survey) confirms that cases in 
public hospitals stayed longer than those in private hospitals, ie. 
about four times as long in terms of the mean and median. These were 
longer than those presented in table 7.2 because long stay patients are 
more likely to be present in the bed census survey. The charge per 
inpatient day in public hospitals was 4 to 5 times less than in private 
hospitals. However, because of the longer length of stay, the charge per 
case of public hospitals was slightly lower but not significantly 
different from that of private hospitals. This result was consistent 
with the results of the household surveys presented in chapter 6. But 
the total charges of both public and private hospitals in the bed census 
were higher than in the household surveys, the reasons could be more 
long stay cases in the bed census and more accurate charges given by the 
hospitals in the bed census survey. 
Table 7.6 lengths of stay and charges by type of hospital 
Hospital n length of stay Charge per day Charge per case 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Publ i c1 
Private 
554 
108 
31.8 
7.8 
14.0 
4.0 
440.4 295.9 
1,739.2 1,552.7 
12,597.0 
13,421.7 
4,002.5 
5,840.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------
p value 
Test of sig 
0.00 
F-test 
0.00 
K-W 
0.00 
F test 
0.00 
K-W 
0.B1 
F test 
0.00 
K-W 
================================================================== 
1 = included the military hospital 
Source: Bed census survey 
looking at the charge structures that made up total charges, three 
categories of charges were considered; drugs, investigations and others. 
In both public and private hospitals, the highest proportions of charges 
came under other charges at 50% and 4B% respectively. Drugs were the 
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second highest. 45% and 47% respectively. Laboratory and other 
investigations made up to 5% in both public and private hospitals. 
7.2 Users of public and private hospitals 
To describe who were the users of public and private hospitals. data 
from the three surveys are presented to complement each other. The bed 
census survey described characteristics of inpatients only while the 
general household survey and health diary plus interview survey give 
more details on outpatients and inpatients. Table 7.7 shows that two-
thirds of public hospital inpatients and three quarters of private 
hospital inpatients were the residents of Phitsanulok province. 
Furthermore. about one-third of public hospital inpatients and nearly a 
half of private hospital inpatients were urban dwellers. 
Table 7.7 Place of residence of inpatients 
Place Public 
n=548 
Private 
n=106 
p value 
(Chi square) 
------------------------------------------------
Provinces in the same region 
Phitsanulok 66.4 75.4 
Sukhothai 11.3 7.5 
Pichit 5.3 6.6 
Petchaboon 7.3 0.9 
Other regions 9.7 9.4 
Area 
Municipal 31.9 48.0 0.00 
Rural 68.1 52.0 
================================================ 
Source: Bed census survey 
The bed census survey gives a clearer picture than the household surveys 
that inpatient users were predominately of working age (20 to 59 years 
old) in both public and private hospitals. However. private hospitals 
had a higher proportion of children (less than 10 years old) than public 
hospitals. Oata from household surveys further support the suggestion 
that children in the urban area were admitted in private hospitals more 
than in public hospitals. In contrast. the aged were treated in public 
hospitals rather than in private hospitals (table 7.8). 
The occupational group of inpatients are shown in table 7.9. Occupation 
here used the patient's occupation or for children used their father's 
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or mother's occupation. Nearly 80% of public hospital users were 
classified as service workers and not working. Higher proportions of 
civil servants, administrators and professionals and traders used 
private hospitals. 
Table 7.8 Age structure of inpatients of public and private hospitals 
Bed census survey 
Age group Public hosp Private hosp 
Household surveys 
Public hosp Private hosp 
n=554 n=108 n=107 n=172 
------------------------------------------------------------------
0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
SO-89 
90+ 
8.5 
9.9 
1S.8 12.5 
10.6 
13.2 
12.S 
10.8 2.2 
0.7 
18.5 
B.3 
11.1 
20.4 
11. 1 
11 • 1 
6.5 
10.2 
0.9 
1.9 
13.1 
6.5 
9.3 
12.1 
18.7 
1S.1 
15.9 
2.8 
2.S 
0.0 
22.7 
16.3 
8.1 
16.9 
14.0 
11.0 
5.8 
2.9 
2.3 
0.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 100.0% 
p value (Chi square) 
100.0% 
0.01 
100.0% 100.0% 
0.01 
================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and bed census survey 
Table 7.9 Occupation of users 
Occupation Public 
n=525 
Private p value 
n=106 
-------------------------------------------------Civil servant 
Adm & professional 
Trade 
Semi -ski 11 
Service 
Not working 
9.7 
2.3 
6.1 
3.1 
47.0 
31.8 
11.0 
6.6 
10.4 
1.9 
27.3 
36.8 
0.00 
(Chi square) 
================================================= 
Source: Bed census survey 
Inpatients of private hospitals were more likely to be the better-off 
than those in public hospitals. Monthly household incomes in table 7.10 
are two to three times higher for private users than public users. Data 
from the household survey show the same difference, annual household 
incomes of private hospital users were about two times higher than 
public hospital users. It is interesting to note that annual household 
incomes obtained by the household survey, if divided by 12, were about 
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two times higher than those estimated by the bed census survey. Two 
explanations are relevant. The first ;s that the household survey asked 
more detailed questions than the bed census. Annual household income in 
the household survey was added up from individual incomes of the family 
rosters and household aggregate income. In the bed census survey. the 
questions on income were short and the environment in private hospitals 
made income questions intrusive. The second explanation is that 
households with high income could be counted more than once in total 
users for public or private services if some members of the families 
were admitted more than once, and if there was more than one 
hospitalisation in the family. 
Table 7.10 Monthly household income for hospitalised cases 
Hospital n 
Bed census survey 
monthly income 
Mean Median 
Household surveys 
annual income 
n Mean Median 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Public hosp 
Private hosp 
496 3,460.6 2,000.0 
93 7,636.6 6,000.0 
106 
169 
104,493 
224,889 
78,550 
132,000 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
p value 
Test of sig 
0.00 
F test 
0.00 
K-W 
0.00 
F test 
0.00 
K-W 
================================================================= 
Source: General household survey and bed census survey 
As shown in table 7.7, users of public hospitals were more likely to 
come from other provinces than users of private hospitals. Table 7.11 
shows that travel time for both groups was significantly different. 
Public hospital inpatients travelled on average twice as long as private 
hospital inpatients because one of the public hospitals is a referral 
centre. But travel fees were not significantly different between the 
groups because only those who paid out of their own pocket for their 
travel were taken into account and those who had no expense or came by 
their own vehicle were left out. Waiting time for both groups was 
significantly different, public hospital users waited three or four 
times longer before being seen by the doctors and admitted in the 
hospitals even though the hospitalised cases seemed to be more severe 
than general cases (table 7.12). 
Table 7.12 shows data from the household survey to describe outpatient 
users of public and private facilities. All samples in table 7.12 were 
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taken from the residents of the study site, so figures on travel are 
much lower than in table 7.11. The travel time of public hospital users 
was the longest, apart from others which included all facilities outside 
the municipal area. This can be interpreted to indicate that people in 
the outer zones of the municipality who were likely to be poorer, and 
people who travelled by 10~ speed vehicles, used public hospitals more 
than private hospitals. This is not implied for drug stores and private 
clinics because these facilities were scattered allover the municipal 
area. 
Table 7.11 Travel and waiting time for inpatients by type of hospitals 
Hospital 
n 
Travel time 
minute 
Mean Median 
Waiting time 
minute 
n Mean Median 
Travel fee 
baht 
n Mean Median 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Public 
Private 
531 
103 
84.8 60.0 
49.6 30.0 
476 53.5 
92 12.1 
30.0 
10.0 
416 106.9 28.0 
34 98.0 20.5 
--------------------------------------------------------------
p value 
Test of sig 
0.00 0.00 
F test K-W 
0.00 0.00 
F test K-W 
0.80 0.62 
F test K-W 
============================================================== 
Source: Bed census survey 
Again, waiting time in public hospitals was the longest, and apparently 
longer for those patients in the bed census survey. This may be 
influenced by the fact that general outpatient visits are less severe 
than those of patients who are admitted (appointment for admission ;s 
not very common) so outpatient visits had to wait longer. The household 
income of those who used drug stores was the lowest, followed by public 
hospital users. The wealthiest were private hospital users. 
Table 7.12 Travel, waiting time and household income for consultations 
within two weeks by places of use 
Place n Travel time Waiting time Travel fee Household inc 
minute minute baht baht 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug store 88 12.9 10.0 7.0 5.0 12.8 10.0 130,725 97,600 
Clinic 121 15.0 10.0 23.7 20.0 11.1 9.5 165,569 124,200 
Public hasp 95 20.1 15.0 67.1 30.0 13.5 9.0 141,478 108,000 
Private hasp 78 13.8 10.0 18.5 10.0 10.8 10.0 247,562 143,000 
Others 17 120.6 20.0 27.6 10.0 120.3 20.0 172,285 108,240 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
p value 
Test of sig 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
F test K-W F test K-W F test K-W 
0.00 
F test 
0.01 
K-W 
======================================================::::::=:::=:::: 
Source: General household survey 
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Table 7.13 shows the differences in sources of payment between public 
and private hospital users according to the bed census survey. The 
percentages of those who paid out of their own pocket were slightly 
higher in public hospitals than in private hospitals. Users covered by 
government health benefit and private insurance were more prevalent in 
private hospitals than public hospitals. low income card holders were 
more prevalent in public hospitals according to the bed census than in 
the household survey (see table 6.37). Apart from any bias resulting 
from the research method, low income patients from other provinces 
admitted in the public hospitals could be another explanation. 
Taking account only of those who were reimbursed for inpatient care in 
both public and private hospitals (see table 7.14), third party payers 
paid higher reimbursable amounts and a higher proportion of the cost to 
public hospitals (95% by median, 80% by mean) than private hospitals 
(65% by median, 69% by mean) (see also figure 7.1). Though average 
charges for reimbursable cases were higher than the overall average 
(table 7.6). the covered cases paid out of their pocket less than the 
uncovered. 
Table 7.13 Sources of payments 
Sources of payment Public Private 
--------------------------------------
Out of pocket 
Government benefit 
State enterprise 
Veteran & volunteer 
Low income card 
Private employer 
Private insurance 
Others 
32.4 
34.2 
1.0 
2.2 
19.1 
1.2 
1.4 
8.4 
29.2 
50.0 
1.9 
1.9 
0.0 
0.0 
14.2 
2.8 
--------------------------------------
Number of observation 491 106 
====================================== 
Source: Bed census survey 
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% Reimbursed 
60r----------------------------------------. 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
o 
Public hasp Private hasp 
% 
11<20% (fI 21-40% 11 41-60% 061-80% [11 81-100% 
Bed census survey 
Figure 7.1 Reimbursement as a percentage of charge by hospital 
Table 7.14 Charges and reimbursement for hospitalisation 
Hospital 
Public 
Private 
Charges 
n Mean Median n 
278 17.557.8 
48 9.281.0 
5.457.5 278 
6.562.0 48 
Reimbursement 
Mean Median 
13.001 . 1 
7.649.5 
3.665.5 
4.661 .5 
% 
Rei mbursement 1 
Mean Median 
80.2 
68.9 
94.5 
65.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
p value 
test of sig 
0.15 
F test 
0.18 
K-W 
0.19 
F test 
0.43 
K-W 
f=================================================== ==================== 
calculated by taking percentage of reimbursement by individual cases 
Source: Bed census survey 
The use of other services for the same episode before being admitted is 
shown in table 7.15. According to the bed census. 39% of public hospital 
users and 46% of private hospital users had not visited any other 
services before. Including only munic i pal dwellers. the rates increased 
to 62% and 70% respectively. According to the bed census. 36% of public 
hosp i tal inpatients had used other health services in their 
neighbourhood areas for the same episode before. 10% had used publi c 
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hospitals, 8% had used private hospitals and 5% had used private clinics 
in the municipal area before. The rates were the reverse for private 
hospital inpatients: 16% had used private clinics, 10% had used public 
hospitals and 9% had used private hospitals before. According to the 
household survey, about one-fifth of public hospital inpatients had 
visited public hospitals before, and one-fifth of private hospital 
inpatients had visited private hospitals before. Vast differences 
between the bed census and the household surveys were explained by 
differences in geographical origin between the two surveys. High use of 
private clinics before admission in private hospitals in the bed census 
survey included clinics outside this municipality. However, according to 
the household survey, one-fifth of hospitalised cases in both public and 
private hospitals had used the same category of hospital before. 
Table 7.15 Use of other services before being hospitalised 
Bed census survey 
Prior use of services Public Private 
Household surveys 
Public Private 
--------------------------------------------------------------None 38.8 46.2 61.7 69.8 
Drug store 1.5 2.9 1.9 0.6 
Clinic 5.3 16.3 10.3 5.2 
Public hospitals 10.3 9.7 20.6 2.9 
Private hospitals 8.0 8.7 4.7 20.9 
Others 36.0 16.3 0.9 0.6 
n 544 104 107 172 
--------------------------------------------------------------
p value (Chi square) 0.00 0.00 
============================================================== 
Source: General household survey and bed census survey 
7.3 Consumer satisfaction 
Within the household survey, there was a set of questions on consumer 
satisfaction and attitudes towards existing health services. Table 7.16 
summarises the results from the general household and health diary plus 
interview surveys. The most common facilities used and appraised were 
public hospital 1, drug stores and private clinics. Commonly used 
private hospitals were private hospitals 2 and 1. Respondents with no 
past experience of using those health facilities were reluctant to 
criticise them, so the groups of people responding to those facilities 
were different. 
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Table 7.16 Consumer satisfactiori towards public and private health 
services 
Health Criteria Very Poor Good Very n 
facil i ty poor good 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public Qual ity of care 4.8 13.7 68.4 13.1 766 
hospital 1 Cost of care 2.2 9.0 73.9 14.8 
Doctor's attention 5.5 16.5 62.4 15.6 
Other personnel 9.8 24.6 55.8 9.4 
Public Quality of care 0.5 4.5 70.1 24.9 221 
hospital 2 Cost of care 0.5 2.7 76.0 19.5 
Doctor's attention 0.5 5.9 65.6 27.6 
Other personnel 2.3 9.5 67.9 19.0 
Private Quality of care 0.5 3.6 63.3 32.6 414 
hospital 1 Cost of care 8.7 34.1 47.3 9.7 
Doctor's attention 0.2 2.7 56.3 40.3 
Other personnel 0.7 4.1 65.0 29.2 
Private Quality of care 1.1 3.6 64.1 31.2 446 
hospital 2 Cost of care 4.9 28.3 54.7 11.9 
Doctor's attention 0.4 4.5 57.0 37.9 
Other personnel 0.4 4.9 64.1 29.4 
Private Qual ity of care 1.2 3.6 61.1 34.1 167 
hospital 3 Cost of care 5.4 25.1 53.9 15.0 
Doctor's attention 1.2 3.0 55.1 40.1 
Other personnel 1.2 2.9 59.8 36.2 
Private Quality of care 1.1 1.1 74.5 23.4 94 
hospital 4 Cost of care 2.1 21.3 67.0 7.4 
Doctor's attention 1.1 1.1 64.9 30.9 
Other personnel 1.1 1.1 77.7 17 .0 
Municipal Qual ity of care 1.0 6.9 72.8 19.3 202 
clinic Cost of care 0.5 3.5 70.8 24.B 
Doctor's attention 1.5 7.9 69.8 19.8 
Other personnel 3.0 7.9 71.8 15.8 
Private Quali ty of care 0.4 2.7 68.4 28.5 716 
clinics Cost of care 3.2 19.0 66.5 11.2 
Doctor's attention 0.1 2.2 64.4 33.1 
Other personnel 0.3 2.8 72.9 23.2 
Drug Quality of care 1.1 7.1 81.5 10.3 729 
store Cost of care 1.1 9.1 BO.9 7.B 
Other personnel 0.4 6.7 80.8 9.5 
=================================:==================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
Satisfaction with public hospital 1 was slightly lower than public 
hospital 2 in most aspects. Private hospitals generally satisfied their 
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clients better than public hospitals except for the costs of care which 
were considered too high. Satisfaction with the municipal clinic 
resembled that of public hospitals, and that for private clinics was the 
same as for private hospitals. Drug stores satisfied nearly 90% of their 
clients in all respects including cost. 
7.4 Consumer views of the health care system 
Questions in the household surveys further asked about attitudes towards 
doctors' incomes, household payments for health benefit schemes and the 
present health system. Due to the complexity of the issues, about half 
or less responded to these questions, except for questions on attitudes 
towards the present health system. Table 7.17 shows that 43% of 
household respondents thought that doctors working in government 
services were underpaid. On the other hand, 97 to 98% of respondents 
thought that doctors working in private hospitals and clinics were 
highly paid. 
Table 7.17 Attitudes towards incomes of doctors who work in different 
places 
Place of work n Too low Low High Too high 
-------------------------------------------------
Public service 482 5.4 
Private hospital 539 0.2 
Private clinic 533 0.2 
37.6 
2.6 
1.7 
52.1 
60.5 
58.9 
5.0 
36.7 
39.2 
================================================= 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
When asked on attitudes towards general tax payments, 75% of respondents 
complained that taxes were high or too high. Not more than 20% of 
households responded to questions on the social security scheme and 
private health insurance. Nearly 60% of respondents commented that their 
payments for the social security scheme was low or too low. But 60% of 
respondents said that the payments for private health insurance were 
high or too high (see table 7.18). 
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Table 7,1e Attitudes towards payments for tax and health insurance 
schemes 
Payments n Too low Low 
----------------------------------------------------------
General taxation 508 
Social security scheme 178 
Private health insurance 196 
1.6 23.8 
8.4 48.3 
2.6 37.8 
56.5 
37.1 
49.5 
18.1 
6.2 
10.2 
========================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
Final questions on attitudes towards the present public and private 
health systems were widely responded to. Table 7.19 shows attitudes 
towards the public health system which are significantly different 
between household income. education and occupation of household heads 
groups. More than half of income quintiles 4 and 5, secondary and 
university education levels. civil servants. professionals and 
administrators and semi-skilled groups wanted some minor or major 
changes to the present health system. The most common complaints were 
lengthy waiting time. ill-mannered doctors and health personnel, and 
neglect. 
Table 7.19 Attitudes towards the public services by household income. 
education and occupation of household head 
Household n No Minor Major Radical 
characteristics change change change change p value 
---------------------------------------------------------
Household income 
Quintile 1 189 61.9 26.4 
Quintile 2 189 52.4 38.1 
Quintile 3 206 51.5 37.4 
Quintile 4 198 42.9 39.9 
Quintile 5 192 35.4 45.8 
Education of household heads 
No education 58 69.0 24.1 
Primary 392 56.9 32.4 
Secondary 220 42.3 44.5 
UniverSity 301 38.2 41.5 
Occupation of household heads 
Civil servant 224 39.3 43.3 
Prof & admin 92 41.3 33.7 
Trader 234 54.7 33.8 
Semi-skilled 42 45.2 42.9 
Service 260 53.8 35.0 
Not working 166 51.B 36.1 
11. 2 
9.5 
10.2 
16.2 
16.7 
5.2 
9.7 
12.3 
19.3 
16.1 
23.9 
9.8 
9.5 
10.8 
11.4 
0.5 
0.0 
1.0 
1.0 
2.1 
1.7 
1.0 
0.9 
1.0 
1.3 
1.1 
1.7 
2.4 
0.4 
0.6 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
---------------------------------------------------------Average 1018 49.0 36.9 13.0 1.1 
========================================================= 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
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Table 7.20 presents the attitudes towards the present private health 
system. The results differed from attitudes towards the public health 
system. On average, 77% of households were satisfied with the present 
system. There were no significant differences in attitudes among 
different groups of households. 
Table 7.20 Attitudes towards the private health services by household 
income, education and occupation of household head 
Household n No Minor Major Radical p value 
characteristics change change change change (Chi square) 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Household income 
Quintile 1 190 82.6 15.8 1.6 0.0 Quintile 2 190 81.6 14.2 3.7 0.5 Quintile 3 195 79.0 17.9 3.1 0.0 0.07 Quintile 4 197 75.1 20.3 4.6 0.0 Quintile 5 193 69.4 27.5 2.6 0.5 
Education of household heads 
No education 54 74.1 22.2 3.7 0.0 
Primary 383 81.5 15.1 3.1 0.3 
Secondary 216 80.6 17 .1 2.3 0.0 0.05 
Uni versity 301 69.4 26.2 4.0 0.3 
Occupation of household heads 
Civil servant 221 76.5 19.5 4.1 0.0 
Prof & admin 92 68.5 30.4 1.1 0.0 
Trader 233 78.5 18.5 2.1 0.9 0.16 
Semi-skilled 42 73.8 23.8 2.4 0.0 
Service 253 79.1 17 .8 3.2 0.0 
Not working 159 79.9 15.1 5.0 0.0 
----------------------------------------------------------Average 1000 77.3 19.3 3.2 0.2 
========================================================== 
Source: General household survey and diary plus interview 
7.5 Discussion 
The input mix of public hospitals was very different from that of 
private hospitals. Most private hospital doctors worked full-time at the 
public hospitals. From table 3.18, public hospital doctors worked an 
average of 26 hours per week in the private sector. When a conversion 
factor for full-time equivalent was applied, the bed to doctor ratios 
were 5-6 to 1 for private hospitals but twice as high for the public 
sector. The bed to nurse ratios established more prominent differences. 
Private hospitals made more use of less skilled nurses than the public 
hospitals. This might be appropriate, because hospitalised patients in 
private hospitals were less severe than in the public hospitals. The use 
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of less skilled professionals in the private sector was also observed by 
Yuen (1992) in a new economic zone of China where 85\ of registered 
private practitioners had less than university training. 
The activities in public and private hospitals varied from hospital to 
hospital. Considering the ratios of outpatients and inpatients to 
doctors. the MOPH hospital had high ratios for both inpatients and 
outpatients while the military hospital had a higher ratio for 
outpatients but lower for inpatients. Private hospitals had lower 
outpatient to doctor ratios but rather comparable inpatient to doctor 
ratios. excluding private hospital 1. These differences reflected the 
fact that admission rates in public and private hospitals were not the 
same (see table 6.31). Considering activities on operations and 
deliveries per table or suite. these depended on the tendency to 
specialisation of each private hospital. One private hospital achieved 
the highest use of surgical theatres and the MOPH hospital achieved the 
highest use of delivery suites. 
Users of private hospitals were of younger age groups than users of 
public hospitals. The bed census survey confirms this observation of the 
previous chapter. However. this may reflect the fact that illnesses in 
children are more acute and need fewer days in hospital (giving an 
affordable total charge) than illnesses in adults. When removing the 
children's group from the analysis. the average lengths of stay of both 
public and private hospitals were slightly longer and also charges were 
higher. Apart from household income, medical benefits also influence the 
choice of hospitalisation. Those with limited medical coverage, ie. low 
income card holders, were obliged to use public hospitals; but the good 
medical benefit schemes, ie. private insurance, civil servant benefit 
and state employee benefit, provided wider choices and many chose 
private rather than public hospitals. 
Taking account of only those who resided in the municipality from the 
bed census survey, the majority of the civil servant beneficiaries were 
admitted in public hospitals (56 cases) as compared to private hospitals 
(22 cases). There are likely to be many reasons other than medical 
benefits. The range of services, not only the capacity of beds, in the 
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public hospitals is wider than in private hospitals. The costs and 
copayments in the public hospitals were also lower than private 
hospitals. 
7.6 Conclusions 
Limited information make it difficult to produce firm conclusions on 
whether public or private hospitals are more efficient. However, the 
prime concern of this chapter is not efficiency. Due to great 
differences even in hospitals under the same type of ownership, more 
information on the nature of services used is needed and the public or 
private hospitals have to be compared individually. In this study, it 
seems that the comparisons were not made 'like with like'. Is it fair to 
compare the MOPH hospital, a regional hospital, with smaller private 
hospitals? However, some conclusions can be drawn. 
Inpatient cases in the public hospitals were more likely to be severe 
and chronic diseases (eg. cancer cases) than in private hospitals. 
However, the comparison of lengths of stay between the two sectors for 
specific disease groups shows that the public hospitals admitted 
patients longer than the private hospitals. Possible inefficiency in the 
public hospitals should be further explored. 
Many data suggest that the MOPH hospital is a competitor to private 
hospitals. The fee structure was quite close to those of private 
hospitals. It also succeeded in attracting cases with third party payers 
who would increase hospital revenue. As a regional hospital, it had the 
advantage of providing a wider range of services by specialists. 
Private hospitals were competitors amongst themselves, but saw the MOPH 
as a good reserve for manpower resources. They mobilised skills and 
labour from the personnel of public hospitals. People's poor attitudes 
towards public hospitals moved them to private hospitals. Each hospital 
tried to establish its area of specialisation to build up a good market 
share. 
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Consumer views towards the private health sector were better than those 
for the public health sector. Nearly half of respondents felt that 
public doctors were low paid compared with less than 2\ for private 
doctors. However, about three-fourths commented that they already paid 
high taxes, and 60% of those who had private insurance said that the 
premium rate was high. About twice as many respondents said that the 
public sector needed changes. The Social security scheme, a kind of 
population rated risk insurance, was said to impose a low burden, 
especially for those in higher quintiles. 
7.7 Summary remarks of the chapter 
The bed census and health resource surveys shed some light on the 
production, process, efficiency and user characteristics of public and 
private hospitals. The household survey provides some missing 
information, validates the results and further describes consumer views 
towards the present health system. 
Private hospitals have recently expanded their capacity to meet high 
demand for private health care. They were highly dependent on part-time 
doctors and nurses. To compare their workload with public hospitals, 
assumptions had to be made. Doctors at public hospitals worked harder 
than doctors at private hospitals, in terms of the number of outpatients 
and inpatients to be seen each day. Other resources of private hospitals 
were under-used in comparison to those of the public hospital (MOPH 
hospital), ego inpatient beds, delivery suites. However, one private 
hospital achieved a higher rate than public hospitals in the use of 
operating rooms, but no data were available to justify the use of 
surgery. 
Patients stayed much longer in public hospitals than in private 
hospitals. Patterns of diseases according to the bed census and 
household surveys suggested that cases in public hospitals were more 
severely ill than cases in private hospitals. This is one explanation of 
a longer stay in public hospitals. Unfortunately, the number of cases in 
each disease group was too small to check for unnecessary longer stays 
in public hospitals. 
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The pricing structures of public and private hospitals suggested 
competitive behaviours between public and private hospitals and among 
the private hospitals themselves. Competition between public and private 
hospitals was obvious in the pricing of private beds. However, when 
summing up the bill. the charge per day in private hospitals was 4 to 5 
times higher than in public hospitals. But the charge per case was only 
slightly higher. 
Users of public hospitals were predominately rural people. The aged and 
service occupational group were more likely to be admitted in public 
hospitals, whereas children and civil servants were disproportionately 
represented in private hospitals. The household income of private 
hospital users was twice to 3 times higher than the income of public 
hospital users. However. fewer users of private hospitals paid out of 
their own pocket. 
The lengthy waiting time at public hospitals was one prominent cause of 
dissatisfaction of consumers towards public health services. The 
relationships between consumers and doctors and other personnel were 
perceived to be better in private hospitals than in public hospitals, 
even though the same doctors worked in both. Strong dissatisfaction 
against private hospitals concerned the costs of care. Consumer views 
towards public services were different among different income, household 
heads' education and household heads' occupational groups. The strongest 
dissatisfaction was from the higher socio-economic groups. 
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B. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF EQUITY IN HEALTH AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE MIX 
The main objective of this study was to assess the equity of access to 
public and private health services in Phitsanulok municipal area. This 
chapter will tie together the three results chapters and discuss the 
results according to the conceptual framework in chapter 4. It starts 
with the health financing system. Health provision is discussed in terms 
of access and use of health services including consumer choice. The 
interface between the public and private sector is also debated. 
Finally, equity is discussed as an ultimate goal of the health care 
system. 
8.1 The health financing system 
Existing information on the financing pattern of health care in Thailand 
as discussed in chapter 3 incorporates a big potential error involving 
overestimating household expenditure because reimbursable expenses are 
double-counted. This section derives the financing pattern by analysing 
each sector of health services and third party payers, taking account of 
reimbursable expenditures. However, it is limited to the financing of 
health care in the urban area of concern to this study. 
In this study, only certain aspects of health care financing were 
analysed. Household health expenditures of urban dwellers were studied 
in great detail. Some information from the bed census survey gave an 
indirect account of the financing of private hospitals. Further 
literature review can increase the comprehensiveness of this picture. 
The health care system covers the whole range of promotive, preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative services. From what has been presented in 
chapters 5 to 7, it is clear that this study focused on curative 
services rather than the others. However, this implies only that 
curative services were of greater public interest and were more often 
paid for out of pocket, so more frequently reported on by household 
informants than other services. In discussing the health finanCing 
system, the whole health care system must be considered. 
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Financing of the public hospitals 
Public hospitals in Thailand have raised user charges as an important 
source of hospital expenditures. Users of various health benefit schemes 
including the uncovered payout of their pocket at differing rates to 
the hospitals (Mongko1smai et a1 1991). This section sums up who are the 
financiers of the public hospitals and in what proportion. 
The two public hospitals provided services for people of Phitsanu10k 
province as well as for others. About 30% of inpatients were people in 
Phitsanulok municipality (table 7.7). For outpatients, the proportion 
would be higher. It is not meaningful, as well as being difficult. to 
tease out only what relates to the municipal inhabitants in terms of 
financing and expenditure in order to draw policy recommendations for 
the urban area only. Hence, the total financing patterns of public 
hospitals are discussed. 
Government hospitals receive an annual budget from the central 
government. The budget is mainly for the payroll, medical equipment and 
construction. User fees are collected to meet the high expenses on drugs 
and medical supplies. In 1990, 40% of total (recurrent including 
capital) expenditures in the provincial hospital were provided by the 
revenue from user charges (Provincial Hospital Oivision 1991). The more 
revenue they collect, the higher chance hospital administrators have of 
spending for hospital developments: purchase of equipment. building new 
wards or quarters for personnel and giving higher payments for night 
shifts. 
The regional hospital fell into debt and development plans were 
suspended by the Ministry of Finance in 1987. The hospital 
administrators set out an accounting system to increase the efficiency 
of revenue collection. The principle was to try to sum up all items of 
services (drugs, operations, dressings, oxygen therapy, etc.) provided 
to patients and charge them. In 1988, the real cost recovery1 rate was 
1 Real cost recovery is calculated by div;ding hospital revenue by non-salary 
operating cost, excluding development expenses 
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89% and the accrual cost recovery2 rate was 125% excluding labour and 
capital costs (Provincial Hospital Division 1989). Thus this hospital 
set a price list high enough to cover non-salary operating cost, but not 
total recurrent cost. 
The bed census survey showed that public hospital revenue could be 
collected from direct payments (32% of total patients), civil servant 
benefit scheme (34%), state enterprise benefit scheme (1%), private 
employers (1%), private insurance (1%) and others (8%). The household 
surveys estimate sources of payments for public outpatient services by 
urban dwellers: 37% paid out of their own pocket, 53% from the 
government benefit scheme (civil servants and veterans and volunteers), 
and 9% from other third party payers. 
If assumptions are made that information from the household survey is 
representative of all users, and that the share of different payers in 
total patients were the same for those who were inhabitants of this 
municipality and those who cross administrative boundaries for services 
at this public hospital, revenue collected from outpatient services 
would be almost 99% of total charges made at outpatient services (see 
table 6.37, excluding low income scheme). This assumption is likely to 
be true because charges are collected at the point of service delivery. 
Revenue collected from inpatient services would be 81% of total charges 
made at inpatient wards (see table 7.13, the bed census survey takes 
account of all cross boundary flows). 
Because there were no figures on the relative share of outpatient and 
inpatient revenue, more assumptions are made: that revenue from 
outpatient services was equal to that from inpatient services (for 
SimpliCity) and these two sources made up 40% of total public hospital 
expenditure. By subtracting the reimbursable expenses of the government 
benefit schemes - which were estimated at 53% of outpatient revenue and 
36% of inpatient revenue - the private sources of finance to public 
hospital can be estimated at 20% of total expenditure [{20% - 53/99x20%} 
2 Accrual cost recovery includes tn revenue an estt.ate of the 108s of revenue which 
could have been raised from services provided to the poor and low inCOMe card holders. 
This is added to hospital revenue and divided by non-salary operating cost, excluding 
development expenses. 
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+ {20%- 36/81x20%}). Taking an example from 1992. the hospital revenue 
was 100 million Baht. the annual budget from the MOPH was 150 million 
Baht. revenue from outpatient departments was equal to that from 
inpatient wards at 50 million Baht. The reimbursable revenue f~om 
taxation would be 49.0 million Baht [{50m - 53/99*50m} + {SOm -
36/81*SOm}). Then net private finance was 100-49.0 million Baht. which 
was 20% of total expenditure [51.0m/250m*100). The biggest share of this 
20% would be direct payments with a smaller share from other private 
third party payments. General taxation thus contributed 80% of total 
expenditure. 
Another set of assumptions can be applied by using workload data and 
charges: inpatient revenue was 65% of total revenue (as indicated by 
inpatients and outpatient numbers in table 7.1 and the charges per 
case)i and the copayment rate for inpatients was 5% (using the median in 
table 7.14). Private sources of finance would then be 22% of total 
expenditure3• Public sources of finance would make up 78%. In terms of 
Baht. inpatient revenue was 65 million Baht and outpatient revenue 35 
million. Reimbursable expenses from general taxation would be 46.1 
million Baht4• leaving 53.9 million Baht from private sources. or 22% of 
total hospital expenditure. 
The above two approaches on the shares of outpatient and inpatient 
revenues gave similar estimates of the shares of public and private 
sources of finance: changing the shares of outpatient and inpatient 
revenue from one half to one-third (about a 17% change) resulted in a 2% 
change in the shares of sources of finance. At the least. this implies 
that the estimates are likely to be the right orders of magnitude. 
There was no information on cost recovery of the military hospital. The 
prime objective of the hospital was to serve the military, and cost 
recovery was expected to be lower than the regional hospital. General 
3 Under these assumptions, revenue from outpatient services amounted to 14~ of total 
hospital expenditure and inpatient services 26~ of total hospital expenditure. Government 
sources of finance for outpatient services to be subtracted would be 63x14/99~. For 
inpatient services, a factor of 0.95 was introduced to compensate for copay.ents, then 
subtraction was 36x26xO.95/81~. 
4 Reimbursable expenses from outpatient departments were 53/99*35. and from 
inpatient wards were 36/81*0.95*65m. 
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taxation support to the military hospital would be higher than 79% of 
total hospital expenditure. 
Financing of private hospitals 
All private hospitals in this study are classified as private-for-
profit. They were built up by groups of public hospital doctors who saw 
that demand for private health care was high and people were able to 
pay. The second private hospital was set up about five years after the 
first private hospital, and also the third was five years later than the 
second. Despite the competition, the first and second private hospitals 
were undergoing further expansion. This implies that the profits of 
private hospitals was high enough to make further investments or raise 
further loans. 
The bed census survey provides data on which to estimate sources of 
finance for private hospitals. About half of inpatients in private 
hospitals were covered by the civil servant benefit scheme. Nearly 30% 
paid out of their own pocket and the other 20% had some kind of other 
coverage. The household surveys provide data on the sources of finance 
for outpatient visits. Nearly 60% of users paid out of their own pocket, 
20% had civil servant benefit coverage, and the remaining 22% were from 
other sources. 
The outputs of private hospitals and charges for inpatients in chapter 7 
together with charges for outpatients in chapter 6 indicated that two-
thirds of hospital revenue was from inpatients and one-third from 
outpatients. For reimbursable cases, copayments were 35% for inpatients 
and 22% for outpatients. Putting these conditions together under the 
assumption that patients ~nder different schemes were charged the same 
amount (though this assumption may be invalid, the information on type 
of payment was more complete than information on revenue under the next 
assumption), the final estimates for sources of finance of private 
hospitals were as follows: 52% in monetary value were from out of pocket 
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payments (copayments included). 27% from general taxation and 21% from 
other sources5. 
Taking another assumption. that the proportions of revenue from all 
payment schemes were representative of private hospital total revenue. 
estimates of revenue for outpatient services from only those who were 
not later hospitalised were as follows: 32% of total outpatient revenue 
came from direct out of pocket payments. 19% from government benefits 
(with only 7% copayments) and 49% from other sources. Total revenue of 
inpatient services was 54% from out of pocket. 32% government benefits 
(with 36% copayments) and 14% from other sources. This assumption faces 
the problems of cross boundary flows when estimating outpatient revenue 
(as described previously) 'and missing data on charges in both the 
general household survey and the bed census survey. Furthermore, the bed 
census survey is more likely to pick up cases with high charges. By this 
approach. government source of finance of private hospital revenue was 
reduced to 20%. with 54% out of pocket payments (copayment included) and 
26% from other sources. 
These two approaches gave wider variations as compared to the estimated 
shares of public hospital financing. The share of public finance to 
private hospitals in the second approach is lower (20% of total private 
hospital expenditure) than that of the first approach (27%). This may 
imply that the regulations of the civil servant scheme in reimbursing 
private hospitals could substantially reduce the drainage of government 
tax revenue to private hospitals. 
Financing of private clinics 
From table 6.25. it can be estimated that nearly half of private clinic 
users were uncovered. one-fourth was covered by civil servant benefit 
but had to payout of pocket as the expenses would not be reimbursed. 
5 Sources of revenue were calculated separately for outpatients (33.~) and 
inpatient services (66.7~ of total revenue). 
Out of pocket 
Copayments 
Government tax 
Other sources 
Outpatient service. Inpatient services Total 
33.3 x 0.58 88.7 x 0.30 39.3 
33.3 x 0.20 x 0.22 68.7 x 0.50 x 0.35 13.1 
33.3 x 0.20 x 0.78 88.7 x 0.50 x 0.65 28.9 
33.3 x 0.22 68.7 x 0.20 20.7 
Grand total 100.0 
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Ten percent of private clinic users were covered by state enterprise 
benefit of which 25% of the expenses (about 1.7% of total revenue of all 
private clinics) were reimbursed. Seven percent were covered by private 
insurance of which 13% of the expenses were reimbursed (about 1.1% of 
total revenue of all private clinics). Six percent of users were low 
income card holders who had to payout of their own pocket. In 
conclusion, the revenue of private clinics mainly came from out of 
pocket payment (97%) with only 3% from third party payers. 
Financing of other health services 
Apart from hospitals, there were many other health institutions in the 
municipal area providing comprehensive health services. The government 
health sector included the municipal health centre. the provincial 
health office and other disease prevention centres. The private health 
sector included private clinics, drug stores and other traditional or 
modern healers. The private health sector was most concerned with 
treatment of disease. The public health sector provided a wider range of 
health services. 
The municipal health centre was financed by the local government. In 
1990, the cost recovery of the centre for treatment activities was 73% 
of operating cost (including salary but not including capital cost). 
This means that quite a number of patients were able to pay for services 
at the centre. Most of them were reimbursed from the civil servant 
benefit scheme. Revenue raised was sent to the municipal treasury. 
The total expenditure of local government was 92 million baht in 1991. 
Health expenditure was about 20% of total expenditure. From health 
expenditure, about one-third went to curative activities (which could be 
recovered from user charges and reimbursed by civil servant benefit). 
and two-thirds were for disease prevention and environmental sanitation. 
Total expenditure was met by general taxation (85%). local government 
assets and business (10%) and fees (health fees not included) and 
permits (5%) (Phitsanulok Municipality 1992). Therefore. the financing 
of the health services of the Municipality was mainly from taxation. 
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The provincial health office's main function was the administration of 
health programmes and personnel in urban and rural areas. However. the 
office also provided outpatient services for general and specific 
diseases, ego sexually transmitted diseases. There were a few other 
government institutions providing outpatient services. ego Centre of 
Oisease Control specifically for tuberculosis and leprosy. These 
services were mainly financed by general taxation. 
A few of the visits to private clinics were reimbursable but all visits 
to drug stores were paid out of household budgets. The reimbursements to 
private clinics were made by private employers and insurance. In the 
past. there were government subsidies (from foreign aid) given to 
private clinics for every vasectomy performed in the clinics. but this 
later stopped. Therefore. private clinics and drug stores were totally 
financed by private expenditure. 
Third party payers 
According to the 1992 estimation of the Health Planning Division. 19% of 
the total population in Thailand was covered by low income cards. 19% by 
the civil servant benefit. 5% by the health card project. nearly 4% by 
the Social Security scheme. 3% by the Workmen Compensation Fund. 1.5% by 
state enterprise benefit and 0.5% by private health insurance (see table 
3.16). This study produced estimates that were different from those of 
the general population. In this urban area. the coverage of government 
employee benefit was as high as 36% of the total population. state 
enterprise benefit was almost 5%. private insurance was 6%. but the low 
income card was 3% and Social Security scheme was only 1%. The 
differences were partly explained by the urban setting of this study. 
The existence of headquarters of government offices and state 
enterprises in this municipality increased the proportions of those 
covered by civil servant and state enterprise benefits. In 1990. the 
municipal office renewed and issued 2,320 low income cards which covered 
about 7% of the municipal population (Bamrungchart 1992). The low 
prevalence of low income card holders in the household survey is 
explained by the sampling frame of the study: temporary houses were not 
mapped in the National Statistical Office's sampling frame. 
206 
The main third party payers in this study were the government employee 
benefit, private insurance and state employee benefit. The Health Card 
project, a voluntary health insurance scheme, had never been tried in 
this urban area. The Social Security scheme will be of growing 
importance because of its expansion plans and industrialisation. 
Table 8.1 summarises the estimates of sources of finance of health 
providers in this urban area. Different methods of estimation gave 
different results. The ranges of private hospital estimates were 
particularly wide. The total revenue approach gave higher estimates for 
out of pocket and other third party payers because there were few long 
stay cases under these payment schemes. 
Table 8.1 Sources of finance of health facilities in an urban area 
Sources of finance 
-----------------------------------------------
Providers Taxation 
Direct Indirect 
payment payment 
Out of 
pocket 
payment 
Other 
third party 
payers 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Public hospital 
Private hospital 
Private clinic 
60% 
0% 
0% 
18-20% 
20-27% 
0% 
20-22% 
52-54% 
97% 
20% 
21-26% 
3% 
================================================================= 
8.2 The use of health services 
This section further discusses how health services were provided and 
utilised in this urban area. Charges of public and private health 
services and consumer choices are also discussed to explain the patterns 
of utilisation. Finally, the matrix of the public and private mix in 
financing and provision of health services in this urban area is drawn 
up to compare with the general picture of the whole country. 
6 This is paYMents to public and private hospitals for giving treatMents to those 
who are covered by civil servant benefit. The .oney comes frOM general tax revenue. 
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Health care provision 
An urban area contains a concentration of both public and private health 
services. These services provide care to not only the urban population 
but also rural people. In this study area, the bed to population ratio 
was about 1.7 beds per 1,000 population of the whole province (slightly 
increased from table 3.19 in chapter 3 because two new private hospitals 
had opened recently). This does not take account of those who crossed 
the provincial boundaries for services in both public and private 
hospitals. The share of private hospital beds had increased from .17% in 
1989 to 28% of total beds in 1991, at a faster rate than the whole 
country. 
Other private health services also grew at a rapid rate. Private clinics 
in the municipality, mostly run by single-handed practitioners, 
increased from 32 clinics in 1988 to 79 in 1991. Drug stores7 increased 
from 58 to 78 in the same period. Though private clinics are run after 
office hours, the researcher estimated, in terms of doctor-hours of 
work, that 79 private clinics in total provided 1.3 times more hours of 
service than the outpatient service in both public hospitals. And, four 
private hospitals provided about one-third of the outpatient doctor-
hours of public hospitals8• These sum up to a 38% share of public and 
62% share of private outpatient services in terms of doctor-hours 
available. 
Health service utilisation 
The health seeking behaviour for acute illness was as follows: 22% used 
drug stores, 21% went to private clinics, 18% to public health services, 
7 Drug stores included first class drug store. that dispense drugs as prescribed by 
a doctor. and drug stores that sell prepacked for.ula. In 1990, the govern.ent allowed 
pharmaCists outside Bangkok to set up new drug stores of their own. This could be a reason 
for an increase in this urban area. 
8 Various assumptions were made: public hospitals provided 40 hours of outpatient 
services in a week, with 30 doctors in hospital 1 and 8 doctors in hospital 2; private 
hospitals worked like public hospitals during office hours with 2 doctors for a hospital; 
outside office hours they worked like private clinics with 5 doctors per hospital for 3 
hospitals and 2 doctors for an eye hospital; private clinics worked 3 hours a day for 
weekdays and 10 hours during weekends. These assumptions give 1,520 doctor-hours a week 
for public hospitals, 505 doctor-hours for private hospitals and 1,975 doctor-hours for 
private clinics. 
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15% to private hospitals, 6% to other services and 18% reported no 
treatment. Excluding drug stores, other services and no treatment, the 
share of private clinics would be 40%, public services 33% and private 
hospitals 28%. If this pattern is compared to the provision of public 
and private outpatient services as described above, it can be seen that 
private clinics were more popular among urban dwellers than public 
services. The figures on hospitalisation also confirmed the high 
popularity of private hospitals: 64% of hospitalised cases belonged to 
private hospitals while private hospitals owned 28% of the beds. 
The patterns of utilisation that are the reverse of the patterns of 
provision do not imply that public services were left under-used. In 
fact, public services were crowded for both outpatient and inpatient 
services. This created long waiting times at the public hospital 
outpatient department. This might have been a reason for choosing 
private health services. Other possible reasons were that private 
services provided more courteous care and better quality care as 
suggested by the consumer satisfaction survey. and private health 
services were available after office hours which were more convenient to 
urban dwellers. There is one important reason retaining users within 
public outpatient services: civil servant benefit reimburses ambulatory 
visits to public services only. 
It is interesting to note that the no treatment group in this study was 
rather high (18%) as compared to the health seeking behaviour of urban 
people in table 3.6 (14% of ill people in urban areas sought no 
treatment and self-prescribe in 1985), and if the choice of drug store 
is included, self-prescribed care (plus no treatment) would be as high 
as 40%. However, the non-consultation rate in Chiangmai urban slums was 
even higher at 29% (Tangcharoensathien 1990). Further scrutiny of the no 
treatment group revealed that the families with a less educated 
household head and families with a household head in the administrative 
and professional group reported more severe illness but sought no 
treatment. 
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Charges of public and private health services 
For hospitalised cases, average charges per case (in terms of means) of 
public hospitals were slightly higher than charges of private hospitals 
from the household survey, but slightly lower from the bed census 
survey. Charges (in terms of the median) of public hospitals were lower 
than private hospitals by both methods. This is because the data from 
public hospitals were more highly skewed than private hospitals, ie. the 
long stay cases were more likely to be treated in public hospitals or 
cases were more likely to stay longer. The estimates on charge per case 
of the bed census survey were two to three times higher than those of 
household survey. The figures on inpatient charges from the bed census 
survey should be more reliable: they were not subject to memory bias. 
But big differences were observed in both public and private hospitals: 
this was due to bias in picking up long stay cases in the bed census 
technique. 
For the reimbursable cases, charges in public hospitals were higher than 
for the non-reimbursable in both surveys, but in private hospitals the 
higher charges for reimbursable cases were found only by the bed census 
survey (both mean and median). Again, the estimates of the bed census 
survey were two to three times higher than those of the household 
surveys. The proportions of the total charges reimbursed are 
interesting. The rates in private hospitals were 69\ (by mean) in the 
bed census survey but 96\ by mean and 84\ by median in the general 
household survey. The share reimbursable in public hospitals was higher 
in both surveys: the bed census at 95% by median, 80\ by mean and nearly 
fully reimbursed in the household survey. The explanation may be that 
the recall of copayments in the bed census was more recent than that of 
the household survey and thus more accurate in addition to the bias 
towards longer stays in the bed census survey. 
The average charge for reimbursable cases in the public hospitals as 
found by the household survey was comparable to the study on the civil 
servants' medical benefit scheme done by the Health Planning Division 
(1992b) observing reimbursement claims in Bangkok. But the average 
charge for reimbursable cases in private hospitals in the Health 
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Planning Division's study was three times higher than in this study. 
This could reflect real differences in pricing structures where private 
hospitals in Bangkok set higher charges for doctors' fees and surgical 
procedures. The other reason could be fraud in inflating charges to 
reach the reimbursable ceiling (Thai Government 1985) . The average 
reimbursable amount was only 1.3 times higher (4,019.8 Baht in the 
Health Planning Division's study and 3,020.2 baht in hou sehold s urveys). 
This implies that the rates of reimbursement of private ho spital 
inpatients in this study were much higher. 
Does this suggest that the possibility of fraud from pr i vate ho spital s 
raising total charges so as to help their clients claim the hi ghes t 
possible amount was not a problem in Phitsanulok? The an swer i s not 
clear. In the household surveys, some household respondent s complained 
about the ethics of some private hospitals in inflating total charges . 
On the other hand, some hospital administrators revealed to the 
researcher that they faced the problem of clients bargaining to pay th e 
least copayments. 
Figure 8.1 summarises the public and private mix in the financing and 
provision of health care in this urban area. The figures are derived by 
multiplying utilisation rates (to be discussed later in section 8.4) by 
charges for ambulatory services and hospitalisations (in chapter 6), 
then reallocating health expenditures to different sources of finance 
(using ranges of proportions in table 8.1)9. The estimation of annual 
per capita health expenditure was 1,086.5 baht, only 61 % of the 1991 
projected per capita expenditure in table 3.4. Apart from the high 
9 Table for calculation of annual health expenditure by s ources i s a8 follow s: 
Health Utilisation Charge 
facilities /year baht 
Expenditure Taxation Private 
per year Direct Indirect Out of poc k t Othe r s 
--------- ------- ------ --------- ----- ---- -- ---------------------------------------------
Public 
Outpatient 
Inpatient 
.60 
.03 
346.9 
6.304.6 
209.34 
169.14 
60~ 
60~ 
16 - 20~ 
18 - 2~ 
20 - 2 2~ 
20 - 2 2~ 
20~ 
2 0~ 
----- ----------------- ------- ---------- --- ----------------------.----------------------
Private 
Hospital (OP) .50 574 . 5 267.25 O~ 20 - 2 7~ 52 - 54~ 21 - 26~ 
(IP) .06 4,206.4 252 . 50 O~ 20 - 27~ 62 - 5 4~ 21 - 2 6~ 
Clinic 
.70 167.1 116.97 0% 0% 97~ 3% 
Drug store 
.70 44.5 31 . 15 ~ ~ 100~ O~ 
-------- ------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------
Total 2.59 1,086.35 22% 17 - 21~ 33 - 48~ 18 - 20~ 
=========================================== ======~=;====~=====;==c======~=============z= 
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estimation made by the NESDB resulting from double-counting of public 
expenditure, reasons for very low estimation here are that expenditures 
of the residents for health services outside this municipality, and 
expenditures on promotive and preventive services which are given free 
of charge, are not included. 
Figure 8.1 suggests that public financing of health services in this 
municipality was 39-42% of total health expenditure and 52-67\ came from 
private sources of finance. The public health facilities spent about 44\ 
of total health expenditure while all private health facilities spent 
47-65% of total health expenditure. The estimate of public finance was 
high as compared to national figures (of not more than 30% of total 
health expenditure in table 3.1) because all reimbursements were 
adjusted and this study was in an urban area. 
For the public health services, 34\ of total public health expenditure 
(or 15% of total health expenditure) came from private sources. And for 
the private health sector 17-23% of revenues (or 10-13% of total 
expenditure) were from government taxation. It is speculated here that 
if the Civil servant medical benefit scheme were to reimburse outpatient 
visits at private hospitals, more taxes would drain to the private 
sector with the shrinking of indirect taxation revenue to the public 
services. 
FINANCING 
PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PUBLIC 29% 15% 44% 
PROVISION 
PRIVATE 10-13% 37-52% 47-65% 
39-42% 52-67% 
Figure 8.1 The public and private mix of financing and provision of 
health services in terms of total health expenditure 
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Consumer choices: determinants of who are the users of public and 
private health services 
The pluralistic characteristics of health care in Thailand allow clients 
to make choices between health services. People in rural areas have 
limited choices compared to urban dwellers. Table 3.6 in chapter 3 
(comparing health seeking behaviours of urban and rural people at two 
periods in time) clearly shows that the availability of modern health 
services (hospitals) influences the choices people make in both rural 
and urban areas. 
Consumer satisfaction is considered to be an important determinant of 
choice. In the household surveys, respondents were more satisfied with 
the quality of care in private hospitals than in public hospitals. 
Furthermore, the consumer-provider relationships in private hospitals 
were better than in public hospitals. Only in terms of the costs of care 
in private hospitals and clinics were people the least satisfied. It 
must be kept in mind that consumer satisfaction is influenced by 
consumer knowledge. In the health care environment, perceived charges 
(different total charge bands of public and private health services) 
tend to be the only information that is shared between provider and 
consumer. Quality of care is the most difficult area to ascertain. 
Professional judgements on quality of care have been difficult to obtain 
because different casemix and severity of cases give different outcomes. 
Consumer views of quality of care tend to reflect immediate rather than 
long term outcomes, ego consumers are concerned with waiting time rather 
than cure rate.-
Waiting time was an important factor influencing the level of 
satisfaction. Waiting time in public hospitals was the longest: 66 
minutes in terms of the mean and 45 in terms of the median. If the whole 
process of care was included, ie. waiting for laboratory investigations. 
fee estimation, fee payments and drug collection. total time spent could 
have been the whole working day. It seems likely that the urban dwellers 
tried to avoid the public services and visited private services. The no 
education group (dominated by children) used clinics more than any other 
groups, presumably so as to save the waiting time of parents (and 
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clinics were cheaper). Those with vocational and university education 
tended to use drug stores for their trivial ailments. 
Health benefit coverage is another important factor influencin~ choices 
of health services. The uninsured, who reported a lower incidence of 
acute illness, used drug stores and private clinics more. The government 
schemes providing limited benefits (ie. veteran, volunteer and low 
income) used public hospitals more, but still used clinics and drug 
stores as other resorts. The civil servant benefit scheme provides 
access to private hospitals hence private hospitals were more utilised 
for inpatient care than public hospitals. Private third party payers 
(private insurance and private employer benefit) led to higher use of 
private hospitals. 
If consumers had the right to vote for changes in the present health 
system, they would vote for an improvement in public services rather 
than private services. Household income, education and occupation of 
household heads influenced the degree of dissatisfaction. The more 
privileged expressed stronger desires for change. They were the better 
informed and had more freedom to choose. However, this does not mean 
that future changes should confine to the public sector. It implies that 
the public sector needs more urgent changes to increase consumer 
satisfaction. 
8.3 Interface between the public and private sectors 
This section discusses relationship between the public and private 
sectors in terms of referrals of patients, share of personnel and share 
of medical technology. 
The referrals of patients 
little information was collected on the referral of patients between the 
two sectors. Table 7.15 suggested that the flow of inpatients from 
either private to public or public to private was less than 5\ of total 
inpatients according to the household surveys, and less than 10% 
according to the bed census survey. The formal referrals would be even 
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lower. There were no obvious benefits from referring patients as the 
patients would be attended by the same physicians in either public or 
private hospital. Some doctors in a public hospital revealed that the 
most common reason for transferring patients from private to public 
hospitals was the patients' financial problems. Reasons for patients 
self-referring themselves from public hospital to private hospital were 
less privacy and greater neglect in public hospitals. 
Share of personnel 
From table 7.1 of the health resources survey, it is apparent that 
private hospitals depended on part-time health personnel who worked full 
time in the public sector. Normally a public hospital doctor is expected 
to work 40 office hours a week in a public hospital, plus extra hours on 
call and ward rounds as necessary. Apart from this, he or she is allowed 
to work freely in private clinics and private hospitals. Working longer 
hours may cause exhaustion and neglect which were more likely to be 
expressed as problems for public hospitals than private hospitals. This 
is because doctors who worked an extra hour in the private sector could 
earn 4.6 times more than their normal earnings per hour in public 
hospitals (Chunharas et al 1992), so the majority of public doctors work 
also in the private sector. 
The high pay in the private sector was suspected to be an important 
cause of the 'brain drain' (public doctors who resigned and worked in 
the private sector). During 1986-1990, 45% of the newly trained 
specialists who should work in the 89 provincial hospitals had broken 
their contracts and worked in the private sector only (Provincial 
Hospital Division 1991). However, this was not a problem for public 
hospitals in Phitsanulok. Hospital directors commented that private 
hospitals created the opportunity for public hospital doctors to work 
part-time and achieve their expected income. Recent government policies 
on doctor payment, ego giving an extra 10,000 Baht a month to a full-
time public hospital doctor (not working in the private health sector), 
will not rapidly change the patterns of doctors working in both sectors. 
Reasons can be listed as: the extra pay is low, the government has been 
under pressure not to increase doctor salaries faster than other civil 
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servants. and the private sector would increase its wages to compete for 
the time of doctors. 
Apart from doctors. private hospitals also shared nurses with the public 
sector. The public hospitals lost some senior nurses to private 
hospitals. But the private hospitals do not have as high a nurse to bed 
ratio as the public hospitals; they tended to train the lower categories 
of personnel who help nurses give care to patients. 
Share of medical technology 
In an environment where formal referral is not promoted, sharing medical 
technology seems unlikely. The regional hospital owned an electro-
encepha10grapher (EEG. a machine to record brain waves). but access by 
private hospitals was not as easy as it should have been. On the other 
hand, one lithotripter (a machine to smash kidney stones) and two CT-
scanners owned by private enterprises could easily have provided 
services to all public or private hospital patients. Some financial 
incentives were given by the enterprises to doctors in both public and 
private sectors who made referrals. Unfortunately. the competition 
between the two CT-scanners and the moral hazard of over-utilisation of 
medical technology could not be explored in this study. 
8.4 Equity in health and health care 
The final part of this chapter discusses equity in health and health 
care. or social efficiency in Hollingsworth et a1 (1990)'s terms. 
Equity of health care 'delivery 
The provision of public and private health services in this municipal 
area was above the average for the country 
Phitsanulok. the consultation rate for all 
person per year. of which 0.9 was for drug 
clinics. 0.6 for public hospitals. 0.5 for 
excluding Bangkok. In 
health services was 3.1 
stores. another 0.9 for 
private clinics and 0.2 
per 
for 
services elsewhere. The hospitalisation rate was 0.09 per person per 
year. of which 0.03 was for public hospitals and 0.06 for private 
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hospitals. These rates were slightly higher than the utilisation rates 
in 1985 found by the national Morbidity and Mortality Differentials 
survey (IPSR 1988). In 1~85, urban people visited the public hospital 
0.7 times per person per year and another 0.7 for private facilities 
(private clinic and private hospital combined), and there were 0.06 
admission episodes per person per year. Comparing the two studies, 
consultations in private facilities are markedly higher in this study. 
Private facilities provided more choice for urban dwellers both the rich 
and the poor. The rich chose to go to private hospitals and the poor to 
cheaper private clinics. Inequities of utilisation for equal need cannot 
be clearly demonstrated as there were insufficient data on which health 
facilities were appropriate for a given illness severity. Working under 
the assumption that private clinics provide acceptable quality of care, 
the poor then made use of good ~are when needed (not considering the 
burden to household income). But the rich were more privileged and used 
more expensive treatments for common ailments. 
Inequity of access to health care was obvious in this study. Three 
groups of the population can be identified. First, the insured, 
constituting about 47% of the total population. This group included 
people covered by the civil servant benefit, state enterprise employee 
benefit, social security scheme and private insurance. Second, the 
uninsured, they constituted about half of the population. And the third 
group consists of those with limited insurance. This included government 
schemes with limited benefits; ie. veteran and volunteer benefit and low 
income card holders; and private employee benefit. The least advantaged 
group was the uninsured. They used cheaper health facilities and were 
less likely to be hospitalised. 
Equity of health care financing 
Two main financing mechanisms were studied: third party payments and out 
of pocket payments. As described in chapter 6, there were a higher 
number of third party payers in the privileged group (the rich, the more 
educated and higher occupational groups). Out of pocket payments were 
the differences between charges and reimbursements. It is unfortunate 
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that premium payments for private insurance were not taken into account. 
However, those who pay premiums were less than 7% of the total 
population (table 6.15). User charges in the government health sector 
which could raise up to 40% of total (recurrent including capital) 
expenditure in government hospitals put a heavy burden on the uncovered. 
Out of pocket payments levied from the insured group were not very high 
compared to their household income, 0.3-2.3% from table 6.43 (compared 
to the average figure of 3.0% for the UK (Central Statistical Office 
1991) and 2.6% for Singapore (Department of Statistics, Singapore 
1990». Inequities of health care financing were clear. 
An important concern in equity of health care financing is the 
channelling of government tax revenues to support private hospitals. 
About 20-26% of private hospital revenues were siphoned from general 
taxes under the civil servant benefit scheme. If this mechanism is seen 
as a cash transfer to entitle people to use private health services to 
reduce overcrowding at public health services, it should be expanded to 
cover wider groups not just civil servants and their dependents. 
Alternatively civil servants should pay some contributions to the fund, 
so that expenses will not come from general tax only. 
Equity in health status 
Finally the ultimate goal in health for all, equity in health status, 
was difficult to explore in this study. This was a problem of research 
methodology and sample size. Standardised mortality ratios by 
occupational group of household head showed higher deaths than expected 
in the privileged group. Morbidity levels were unequally distributed 
amongst income, occupation and education groups of household heads. But 
no firm evidence was available on inequitable distribution. 
8.5 Conclusions 
Making use of information from the general household survey and the bed 
and census survey, financing patterns of public and private health 
facilities can be estimated in monetary terms. All approaches tried to 
subtract reimbursable expenses from total charges to give more accurate 
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figures. Though there are a lot of assumptions in making estimates, 
alternative sets of assumptions were made to give a range. It is 
concluded that the public sources of finance of public hospitals were 
about four-fifths of total hospital expenditure, and of private 
hospitals were about one-fourth. 
When financing patterns were put into a matrix of public and private mix 
against utilisation patterns, the shares of publicly-financed public 
sector, publicly-financed private sector, privately-financed public 
sector and privately-financed private sector can be estimated. The 
shares of public financing to private financing (40% to 60%) were 
different from the country estimates. This matrix can be useful for 
developing policy recommendations to change the balance of the mix from 
one cell to others. 
Generalisation of the above estimates must be cautious. Rural areas are 
more likely to have a more prominent public sector but less public 
finance. These conditions would make the matrix shift towards private 
finance and public provision. 
B.6 Summary remarks of the chapter 
This chapter constructs financing patterns of public and private health 
facilities in the municipal area from the results of the previous two 
chapters. Different sets of assumptions were made to increase the 
accuracy of the estimates. Information from the household survey was 
used to estimate outpatient characteristics, and information from the 
bed census survey was used as representative of all inpatients. 
Provision of health care facilities and utilisation of health services 
are not the same. The share of public health service provision in total 
provision was greater than the share of public health service use in 
total use. Consumer satisfaction plays an important part in choosing 
between public and private services. The privileged criticised public 
services more than the underprivileged. 
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A matrix of the public and private mix in financing and provision of 
health care was drawn up. The interface between public and private 
health services in terms of referral of patients. and share of health 
resources was discussed. And finally. inequity of health care ~inanc;ng 
was emphasised. 
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9. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Having discussed equity issues in relation to the public and private mix 
of health care, it is obvious that there is inequity 1n the Thai health 
care system and the growing private health sector will widen the gap. 
This chapter will discuss current policies and recommend further 
policies in the light of the findings of this research. 
To consider how to tackle the problems of inequity, cost escalation, the 
rapid growth in the private health sector and inefficiency in the public 
health sector, basic ideas on the philosophy of the Thai health care 
system are discussed first. Financing capacity, especially the 
transition of public financing from less than one third of total healt~ 
expenditure to more than a half or higher is the next important issue. 
The chapter goes on to recommendations on privatising the health 
service, adjustment of the public health sector and controlling quality 
of health care. The chapter ends with suggested steps for a long term 
(10-year) health reform in Thailand. 
9.1 The philosophy of the Thai health care system 
Disruption in implementing the first social insurance law since 1954 has 
shown that the Thai bourgeoisie is afraid of socialist philosophy. Later 
developments of national health insurance and private employment-based 
health insurance in many countries have brought forward newer concepts 
of social insurance. With the leadership of the elected Prime Minister 
in 1990 and for other political and economic reasons, the House of 
Representatives finally passed the Social Security Act unanimously. This 
Act will extend coverage to the self-employed and Singkaew (1991) 
advised that the final goal of national health insurance in Thailand 
should be for universal and equitable coverage by the year 2000. 
Ambitious goals of reaching total coverage have been achievable in South 
Korea where health care financing and provision is quite similar to that 
of Thailand. Though South Korea is much richer and more industrialised 
than Thailand, strong political commitment has been a key for success in 
South Korea. Strong leadership is needed from the more democratic but 
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less stable Thai governments in further enacting the laws to reach full 
health insurance coverage. These sequential steps will change the 
philosophy of the Thai health care system from "pay according to 
ability" to "universal access". The universal access philosophy requires 
continuous political support and a well-managed transition of the 
financing system. 
Professional associations are opponents of health care reforms in many 
countries, nevertheless in the US, they have changed from being 
opponents to be supporters and leaders of national reform. Professional 
associations in Thailand, ego the Thai Medical Council, the Thai Dentist 
Council and the Thai Nurse Council, should take part in the foundation 
of the system reform. The Thai Medical Council has been active in 
maintaining medical practice and ethics. Neglecting other professional 
associations may turn allies into opponents, ego there was a protest 
from nurses when an increase in payment for professional groups did not 
include nurses. 
Rapid economic growth in Thailand has exacerbated unequal income 
distribution rather than eliminated it. A recent World Bank (1993) 
report advocates an income distribution policy for economic development 
in Thailand. However, it is difficult, even impossible, to achieve 
equitable income distribution in a short period. In its place, equal 
access to health care should be regarded as top priority in the social 
development agenda along with economic development targets, because 
equal access to health care will ensure that people from different 
economic groups will equally use health services when needed and will 
reduce the heavy burden of health expenditure on household income for 
lower economic groups. 
9.2 The transition of financing patterns 
In the 1980s, the share of public expenditure as a percentage of total 
health expenditure. was decreasing. This contradicted the governments' 
policies of providing care to the poor since the financing increment was 
inadequate. Since 1990, there has been a new source of finance relating 
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to the Social Security Act. This will slightly increase the share of 
public financing from 24% in 1987 to 33%. 
The research found that patients from lower income quintiles we~e more 
likely to payout of their own pocket and had the lowest coverage of 
government health benefit schemes. The share of public financing should 
be increased and directed to poor families and the uncovered group. 
Under a universal access philosophy, these groups would be universally 
covered. Since 1990, politicians have supported a vast increase in 
budget for low income groups. This strategic increase 1n the share of 
public financing will last only a few more years. It cannot be seen as 
an alternative means of achieving universal access. Fundamental reform 
of health care financing is inevitable to reduce the burden of 
administrative costs and laborious data collection at the periphery. 
A tax-financed universal access system is equitable if the taxation 
structure is not regressive to income. However, the system would require 
a huge increase in public spending which the Ministry of Finance would 
dislike. An alternative is the national health insurance system where 
premiums offer another source of finance. In Thailand, tax contributes 
to the fund only half or the same amount as the collected premiums. The 
administrative costs of premium collection are higher than those of tax 
collection particularly for collecting from the self-employed and 
subsistence farmers. Experiences from community financing programmes, 
ego the health card project, village crematory fund, etc., together with 
experiences from other developing countries, can guide design of the 
mechanisms of premium collection for these hard-to-reach groups. 
Neither a national health service (tax-financed) nor national health 
insurance necessarily leave out copayments at the point of service 
delivery. Differential copayments can be established at different levels 
of care and for different socioeconomic groups. Adjusting copayment 
rates will provide an opportunity for balancing revenues (from 
copayments) and budget (from general tax) with the required expenditure 
of health institutions during a transitional period, but the copayment 
rates should not be too high as they may delay health seeking. Means 
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tests have to be developed related to income, occupation or household 
assets to establish differential copayment rates. 
One of the government policies recently developed to reduce the brain 
drain of the scarce categories of manpower (eg. engineers, doctors, 
etc.) from the public to private health sectors and to increase 
efficiency in the public service is to reimburse civil servants and 
their dependents for their ambulatory visits at private hospitals. This 
policy has not yet been implemented. It is expected that this extension 
of the fringe benefit may be more costly than increasing the pay scale 
of these professionals because health care costs especially in private 
hospitals are high. It can be argued that the benefits for civil 
servants should be limited or grow at a slower pace compared to other 
groups, because civil servants and their dependents already enjoy 
greater health benefits than any other group. 
To achieve equity amongst civil servants and between civil servants and 
other occupational groups, the researcher suggests that those with 
salaries exceeding a certain level should join in the Social Security 
Scheme. That is, they should contribute to the fund some percentage of 
their salaries. This policy will cause strong resistance from civil 
servants. So a new fund established for civil servants will have to give 
more benefits than the Social Security Fund, ego low interest loans for 
household investment, payments for private health care. An example from 
Singapore, the Central Provident Fund and Medisave, could be borrowed. 
There are no magic figures that total health expenditure should be 5% or 
10% of GOP, or that the government should share 30% or 70% of total 
health expenditure. However, recent international health care reforms 
show that a larger share of public expenditure with control through 
contracts or global budgets could contain the country's health 
expenditure while providing more choice and efficiency. Therefore, with 
a higher share of total health expenditure, it would provide an 
opportunity to the Thai government to exercise more effective control 
measures to reach equity and efficiency goals while maintaining choice 
within the Thai health culture. The most challenging issue is how well 
the present bureaucratic administration can cope with a new environment 
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of management by objectives (backed by a good information system). 
Liberalising the red tape of the bureaucratic system is needed. It is 
Thai government policy to trim down the size of civil service in order 
to increase efficiency in management. 
9.3 Privatising the health services 
There have been strong arguments put forward by the National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB) that the government should not 
increase public health expenditure and should adopt a privatisation 
policy in health care. This policy would involve freezing big 
investments and projects of building new public hospitals and letting 
private hospitals flourish especially in newly industrialised areas. 
This is a narrow view of privatisation because there are many other ways 
of privatising, ego contracting out, jOint public-private ventures, 
liberalisation, etc. (Dhiratayakinant 1990). 
In the financing of health care, a higher share of public expenditure is 
recommended by the researcher through either a national health insurance 
or national health service system as it will increase public control and 
contain total health expenditure. Competition of private health insurers 
is not recommended because it will not achieve universal access and 
social efficiency principles especially with an aging population. 
Private contributions - insurance premiums, copayments and user charges 
in the public health sector - can be seen as transitional steps to an 
increased role of public financing. 
The national health insurance fund would contract with competing health 
providers, public and private. Recent experiences of the Social Security 
Scheme Show that the private sector is prepared to compete with public 
hospitals for a higher number of the insured with payment on a 
capitation basis. It is too soon to observe problems of under-provision 
because of the capitation system: these are expected to be greater in 
the private sector than in the public sector. 
This contract model could be extended when the scheme reaches national 
coverage. Basic comprehensive health benefits under national health 
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insurance should include primary care as well as catastrophic coverage. 
Experiences from the Social Security Scheme suggest that there should be 
two schemes of contracting primary and catastrophic care. Contracting 
for these two services with public and private health sectors requires 
further reforms on the supply side. The most important changes are 
linkages between primary care and hospital care and networking between 
the public and private health sectors. 
The research found that private primary care in this urban area -
private clinic and private hospital visits - as twice as frequently used 
as public primary care, ie. hospital ambulatory services and other 
public health facilities. The average charge for ambulatory care at a 
private clinic was about a half of the charge at a public facility. The 
researcher recommends that primary care should be separated from 
hospital care to contain total health expenditure while maintaining good 
linkages between both services. This recommendation is likely to 
encounter great difficulties in implementation. In urban areas where the 
socioeconomic status of people is better than in rural areas, there is a 
tendency for the private sector to set up private health facilities as 
there is demand in excess of supply. Contracting for primary care with 
public or private services on a capitation basis would limit consumer 
choice but would provide a better opportunity for developing a good 
referral system between primary and hospital care (the gate-keeper role 
of private clinics). Contracting out primary care on a capitation basis 
may create an opportunity for setting up private clinics in densely 
populated rural areas. This would improve geographical equity of health 
resource input. Furthermore, contracting on a capitation basis would 
promote continuity of care. 
Contracting on a per-visit basis with global budget control is an 
alternative to contracting on a capitation basis. This model would limit 
the overall budget and pay providers proportionately to total visits at 
all primary care contractors. This would discourage hospitals from 
providing primary care because the unit cost of primary care in hospital 
is higher than in private clinics. Moreover, contracting on a per-visit 
basis would maintain consumer choice as clients could go to either the 
public or private sector. However per-visit payment would induce repeat 
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visits in both sectors and disrupt continuity of care. Equity in health 
status or outcome should be monitored to reduce inequity between urban 
and rural areas. 
Privatising health care by contracting out primary care to the private 
sector does not mean that government responsibility would shift to the 
private sector. The government has to monitor and intervene periodically 
to achieve equity and efficiency goals. Apart from establishing a 
referral network of patient care between the public and private health 
sectors, a network to ensure equity and efficiency is crucial. This will 
be dealt with in detail in section 9.5. 
Contracting for hospital care with public or private hospitals is more 
complex. Experiences from the early years of the Social Security Scheme, 
which started from a capitation basis and then added emergency cases, 
paid on a per visit basis, will shed some light on partitioning primary 
care, hospital care and extra-contractual referral expenditures in 
relation to the capitation allowance. Information is also needed to 
monitor under or over-treatment in relation to outcomes in the public 
and private hospitals under the capitation system. Furthermore, the 
capitation system gives an incentive to the hospital to shorten length 
of stay. 
Contracting for hospital care on fee-for-service basis or diagnostic 
related groups (ORGs) basis has proved elsewhere to be an expensive 
system. Even the reimbursement scheme limited by maximum reimbursable 
days as practised in the civil servant benefit scheme for private 
hospital care is also expensive. The subsidisation of private hospitals 
by general tax revenues through the civil servant benefit scheme has to 
be revised. The alternatives are capitation and DRG-based payment. This 
change will put private hospitals under harder competition with public 
hospitals. However. private hospitals are allowed to compete amongst 
themselves for lower copayments from their clients or greater consumer 
satisfaction. The fee-for-service alternative is generally thought to be 
undesirable. The DRG system would increase the administrative burden to 
both financier and providers. 
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As doctors' salaries and fees in private hospitals are high, they 
contribute more than a half of total hospital expenses. This labour cost 
is a major contributor to the rising health care cost. However, it is 
difficult to control physician income through the private health sector. 
Increasing salary scales for full-time public doctors, to make them 
comparable with private doctors' earnings, would counteract the brain 
drain problem and improve doctor-patient relationships as public doctors 
would have more time to spend with patients. The latter issue will be 
dealt with in section 9.4. However, the high cost of care in private 
hospitals is likely to become even higher because of increased 
competition in employing doctors, and the gap of earnings between 
private and public doctors may return. 
The Social Security Office has proved to be an important body in 
influencing the mix of public and private providers in the Social 
Security Scheme. Bennett and Mills (1993) suggest that insurance schemes 
may be effective 'disciplinarians' of private providers by restructuring 
incentives, monitoring performance and ensuring that preventive services 
are also delivered. The national health insurance body that ;s 
recommended here could act as purchaser of health care to regulate 
payments to and control the distribution of providers. 
As long as demand is greater than supply and regulators cannot put a cap 
on total cost, a high accumulation of public and private health services 
is likely to happen in privileged areas. Guidelines for the distribution 
of health resources should be established and reviewed periodically in 
the five-year National Health Plans. There should be guidelines for the 
share of public and private health sectors in urban and rural areas in 
different economic zones. The granting of permission for new health 
facilities in both public and private sectors should follow these 
guidelines. This is to ensure equity and efficiency in the public and 
private mix. 
Allowing growth to occur in private health sector would change the role 
of the public health sector and require good capacity to implement. 
Strong initiatives have to come from the Ministry of Public Health to 
influence other ministries to join the reform movement as well as 
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provincial levels. Provincial health offices would be more involved in 
planning for curative services than they are at present through 
contracting or purchasing health care from public and private providers 
for their resident population. Provincial health offices would oversee 
standards and balance the mix of public and private health care in their 
provinces. Public hospitals would have to be more cost-conscious to 
compete with the private sector. 
9.4 Adjustment of the public health sector 
During the 1980s there was a rapid growth in private hospital beds, and 
public hospitals were growing at a slower rate. New community hospitals, 
10 to 30 bedded hospitals, have been established in rural areas to cover 
all districts. Urban public health infrastructure has not been well 
developed. Public primary care in urban areas is delivered from hospital 
outpatient services which are already crowded. It was recommended in the 
previous section that primary care for urban people should be contracted 
out to private clinics. 
The alternative of setting up publicly-owned primary care in urban areas 
requires investments in physical establishments and manpower. But public 
clinics would have to compete with the well established hospital 
outpatient services. Strong incentives would be needed to channel 
patients to this newly established type of facility, otherwise it would 
be under-used. Doctors in these establishments would work as general 
practitioners or gate-keepers of the hospitals. This alternative may not 
reduce patient choice if more than one of these establishments exist in 
an area, or if competition between public and private primary care is 
allowed. There has been a policy in the Ministry of Interior to expand 
the Municipality's role in providing primary care in urban areas but 
this policy has failed to attract medical doctors. A recent field trial 
in Ayudhaya on this alternative, though under Ministry of Public Health 
management, will throw some light on further possible developments. 
However, the option of setting up publicly-owned primary care facilities 
in urban areas is not very attractive. The already existing private 
clinics are likely to be more economic and culturally acceptable. 
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This research has found that many private hospitals provided preventive 
and promotive services with higher achievements than the public 
hospitals, but private services are scattered and not organised to be 
community-based institutions. Public services in urban areas should 
focus on organising preventive and promotive health care so as to 
evaluate the coverage of the services, and also on providing secondary 
and tertiary medical care. Preventive and promotive health care 
including education on self-care will reduce morbidity and the demand 
for service utilisation. Public hospitals in urban areas should stress 
secondary and tertiary medical care, and coordinate preventive and 
promotive health care with other public health facilities, but have a 
limited role in primary medical care. 
Doctors working in a public hospital in an urban area should be given 
the opportunity to choose between being a full-time or a part-time 
doctor. A part-time doctor would be allowed to work in private health 
facilities. A full-time doctor would be given a high salary but would be 
under a review system (with national standards and locally assessed by a 
provincial committee) in order to maintain a full-time position. The 
'full-time' versus 'part-time' recommendation is expected to increase 
doctor efficiency, to raise the morale of doctors who devote themselves 
to public practice only and to improve doctor-patient relationships in 
public hospitals. 
Public hospitals in urban areas are not the sole providers of secondary 
and tertiary care but rather are competitors of private hospitals. They 
also act as referral hospitals for community hospitals and more often 
for private hospitals, and as reference centres for quality assurance. 
Under the contract model, public hospitals would compete for insured 
patients with private hospitals. In general, public hospitals outside 
Bangkok are better equipped than private hospitals, and doctors working 
in public hospitals are under less financial pressure than doctors 
working in private hospitals when treating patients. Presumably, 
practice standards in public hospitals are better and can be taken as 
quality reference points. However, to achieve this role, public 
hospitals should be liberalised from inefficient bureaucratic 
constraints by being given 'self-governing' authority. Self-governing 
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public hospitals would work with more flexible personnel and financial 
management to respond quickly to local health needs and to compete 
better with private hospitals. 
Liberalising public hospitals to be self-governing would need 
fundamental changes in public sector regulations. The prime minister 
appointed by the military coup leaders almost succeeded in liberalising 
government universities to be self-governing, but resistance came mainly 
from inside the universities. Liberalising public hospitals would face 
resistance from other ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance who 
strictly controls hospital expenditure. Hospital managers should be 
rewarded according to their efficiency achievements. Self-governing 
hospitals would be independent from the provincial and central 
bureaucracy. However, there should be a national independent body to 
oversee the management of these self-governing hospitals. 
The research found that there were more cases with very long lengths of 
stay in public hospitals than in private hospitals. These very long 
lengths of stay of patients treated in public hospitals should be 
reduced accordingly to reduce total costs of providing care. Self-
governing public hospitals would pick up this problem quickly to 
increase hospital efficiency. Many conditions might be discharged 
earlier if community care for chronic diseases were available. Patient 
education may be used to reduce long stays in hospital. And a good 
referral system would transfer non-acute patients to spend their 
convalescent period in a local health facility. 
The pUblic hospital is the safety valve for the 'pay according to 
ability' system. Hospital expenditure on care given to the poor who do 
not have a low income card and are not able to pay high hospital bills 
is twice as much as expenditure on low income card holders. This implies 
that the government subsidy for health care to the poor has been 
inadequate. The poor without a low income card may find administrative 
procedures too complex to be exempted from medical bills. An increasing 
role of the public hospital in providing care for the poor ;s 
inevitable. In spite of the increase in budget for those on low incomes, 
the allocation mechanisms of this fund should go in line with the 
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mainstream of reform, ie. capitation, global budget control or ORG-
based. 
9.5 Quality assurance versus regulations 
Though quality of care was not examined in this research, it is of 
obvious concern that a quality control system should be applied to 
health care to solve long term problems. Health care is a complex system 
where regulations alone can never work, ego cost containment by price 
control has never been successful as physicians can increase treatment 
volume to reach their target income. Quality assurance is a positive 
approach to ensuring good clinical practice and outcome while 
maintaining professional freedom. Contracting out primary care to 
private clinics and hospital care to private hospitals needs quality 
assurance mechanisms to ensure professional standards. 
Quality assurance is not aimed only at the private sector. Public 
hospitals in urban areas, as they will become self-governing, need to be 
assessed periodically. This should be applied also to community 
hospitals and health centres to ensure that rural people also get good 
quality health care. A national centre for quality assurance should be 
set up to oversee the standards of both public and private health care, 
and both urban and rural areas. Guidelines should be drawn up to 
recommend each health facility to undertake its own quality assurance 
practice. 
As many laws in health care are outdated, especially the Health Premise 
Act which is concerned with private health facilities, they should be 
amended accordingly. However, it takes a long time to amend or legislate 
a law, and it is quicker for the Ministry of Public Health to issue 
regulations according to the law. 
Health care reform will require a series of laws to be legislated. 
Participation from legislators is needed. The laws on financing health 
care, ego the civil servant health benefit act, should be revised or 
enacted. 
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9.6 Phasing in the Thai health care reform 
Three phases for the Thai health care reform are suggested. 
Phase I Philosophy and planning for the changes 
The first phase is required to build up consensus for change, in the 
government ministries, professional groups and the public. Proposals for 
changes in financing and provision of a future health system would be 
scrutinised. 
Phase II Macroeconomic and microeconomic adiustments 
In this phase, movement towards universal access would be implemented. 
An increasing share of public expenditure for National Health Insurance 
would be phased within the next national socioeconomic development plan. 
It is foreseen that subsidies would have to be given to the group of 
hard-to-reach (the urban and rural poor) to achieve universal coverage. 
The civil servant benefit scheme would be adapted to be a bipartite fund 
(with contributions from civil servants and the government budget). 
Meanwhile, contracting models would be tried out in the public and 
private sectors. Public hospitals would become self governing. 
Phase III Quality assurance 
To monitor the equity and efficiency consequences of the changes, 
including consumers' views on the changes, quality assurance would take 
an important role as a compulsory process in every health institution. 
Providers need to pass periodic assessment (and quality assurance is one 
element) so that they could renew the contract to provide care to 
clients. Information derived from quality assurance would indicate 
further directions for changes. 
9.7 Conclusions 
Universal coverage is proposed to reduce inequity in health care 
financing in Thailand. It would require great effort to change the 
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philosophy of "pay according to ability" to universal access. Tax 
financing and national health insurance should be used in combination to 
reach universal coverage. 
Contracting primary care to the private health sector on a capitation 
basis is a way to contain costs and restructure primary care and 
hospital care to achieve continuity of care through a referral network. 
Public competition is a way to increase efficiency in the public health 
sector. Public health facilities competing for clients with the private 
sector should be given self-governing authority. 
9.B Summary remarks of the chapter 
A long term health care reform is proposed. The first step is to make 
the philosophy of the government clear that accessibility to health 
services is a basic human right. Various ways of financing a national 
health service or national health insurance are discussed including 
drawing contributions from civil servants, the most privileged group in 
the existing health delivery system. The private health sector would 
contract for primary and hospital care with the Provincial Health Office 
to provide care to beneficiaries. Public health facilities should 
compete with the private sector in contracting with the Provincial 
Health Office. Given their power stemming from financing health care 
providers, government could regulate the quality of care through quality 
assurance process. 
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10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Despite data deficiencies. this research has shown that inequity in 
health unsurprisingly did exist in an urban area in Thailand. Inequity 
of health care financing amongst household income. health benefit and 
occupational groups of household heads was the most clearly established. 
while inequity in health status and inequity of utilisation for equal 
need were difficult to prove. Public and private health providers 
reached different groups of consumers and were competitors for the 
groups with third party cover. However. it was not clear which provider 
was more efficient than the others. This chapter summarises the 
strengths and weaknesses of the research methods and suggests further 
research activities. 
10.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the research methodology 
This research employed four main methods which complemented each other. 
The household health interview was complemented by the health diary used 
by ten percent of the total sampled households for data on morbidity and 
health seeking behaviours within the period of two weeks. The one-day 
bed census survey and a quick health resource survey were intended to 
complement the household survey for information on provider behaviour. 
The strength of the research methodology was to provide an opportunity 
to check the reliability of each method. 
Unfortunately. the strength in design was counteracted by an ambitious 
agenda. The household surveys were spaced over three different times of 
the year to reflect seasonality. Different groups of interviewers were 
used for each survey round to test Kroeger's observation that 
interviewers with a non-health background did better than interviewers 
with a health background (Kroeger 1990). Attempts to explain variations 
with too many variables varying at one time proved to be a weakness of 
this approach. 
A simple health diary was developed to help respondents remember 
illnesses and health seeking behaviour of all family members in the past 
two weeks. It was shown that the health diary increased self-reported 
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morbidity. However, it put respondents under continuous responsibility, 
and some respondents asked their neighbours to write down their 
household events as they were not good at writing. Diary keepers were 
compensated with one hundred baht at the end of the interview sessions 
without prior notification that there was a money incentive. Diary 
keeping is an expensive method so it should be applied only for small 
scale studies. 
This was the first research to be explicitly aimed at describing equity 
in health in Thailand against a set of variables on socioeconomic 
status. A new approach for occupational grouping was experimented with, 
following the Registrar General's classification (OpeS 1980) rather than 
the National Statistical Office's because the latter classification is 
not related to social class gradient. There had been no sociological 
research in Thailand to support the researcher's modification, and the 
findings related to occupational group were not conclusive. 
As summarised by Tangcharoensathien (1990), whose study devised this 
research's household questionnaire, income estimation was not accurate 
because it did not impute the rents of owner-occupied households, or 
include debts. It was clear from the research here that income was the 
most unrepeatable response. However, no adjustments were made in the 
analysis of income data because the data set of reinterviews was too 
small to give a good correction factor, and per capita income estimation 
did not use an adult equivalent scale as advocated by Atkinson (1984) 
because no studies have developed this concept for Thailand. The 
National Statistical Office has yet to apply the adult equivalent scale 
in its analysis. 
This study was also the first attempt to relate health benefit coverage 
with morbidity, service utilisation, household income and health 
expenditure. Health benefit coverage was revealed to be a very important 
factor in determining access to health care and expenditure as a 
percentage of household income, since the country could not guarantee 
universal access to health care. This study asked for all the health 
benefits each individual had, but the scheme providing the highest 
coverage was used for analysis at the individual level, and the highest 
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benefit scheme of the household head was used when the household was the 
unit of analysis. 
And it was also the first time in Thailand to compare mortality 
differentials by standardised mortality ratios. Unfortunately, the 
summary statistics were not convincing because of the small sample size. 
Death is a rare event, so a survey of about 1,000 households could not 
yield a large enough number of deaths to prove significant 
differentials. Furthermore, data collection for death events did not 
obtain specific characteristics of the dead individuals. A national 
survey would provide more powerful data to study differentials. 
In a relatively big household survey, it is inevitable to use proxy 
respondents for important household events like annual experience of 
hospitalisation and the past two week illnesses, as accepted by Kroeger 
(1990). However, this study also used proxy respondents for household 
income and health expenditure, and even for keeping a health diary for 
all family members for a two week period. The research shows that proxy 
respondents are useful and cooperative. 
The one-day bed census survey provided a snapshot of public and private 
hospital activities and the annual health resource survey provided 
further information on the circumstances of hospitals. The one-day bed 
census proved to be a lengthy method if lengths of stay and total 
charges are the main aim of the study, because all cases on the survey 
date have to be followed till discharged from hospital. The results also 
show considerable bias toward chronic cases. Extrapolation from a one-
day census alone has to be done very cautiously. 
10.2 Suggestions for further research 
Given the concern of how to reform the Thai health care system, many 
areas of study are suggested. 
There should be sociological studies of the relation between 
socioeconomic status and health status, apart from health care 
utilisation alone. The ultimate goal of 'well-being not merely the 
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absence from ailments' should be similar within each of those 
sensible socioeconomic groups. 
The standardised mortality ratio (SMR) is one of the more powerful 
measures of health status. The Health Statistics Oivision should 
explore the possibility of establishing SMRs as a routine 
statistic, so that the comparison of SMRs amongst different 
socioeconomic groups can be easily accomplished to explore equity 
in health. 
National surveys, ego the health and welfare survey of the 
National Statistical Office, should incorporate useful variables -
ego health benefit coverage, health expenditure - to monitor 
periodically for equity of access and equity in relation to health 
care financing. 
Further studies on different mixes of financing schemes are 
recommended to move towards universal coverage with financial 
feasibility. User charges and copayments would be necessary during 
the transitional period, and they must not compromise equity of 
access and equity in health status. 
A contracting model with the public and private health sectors on 
the basis of capitation and global budget control should be 
piloted to see its financial and cultural feasibility. The Social 
Security scheme's contracting model on a capitation basis is a 
good prototype for expansion to other benefit schemes. The model 
with global budget control has not yet been tried. In long term 
health care reform, one contracting model may be a transitional 
step for another model so as to reduce resistance. 
As regulations are not successful ways of containing costs and 
might hamper quality of care, a model for quality assurance has 
been recommended as an educational process and a way of achieving 
high quality of care. A case-mix index or severity index must be 
developed to standardised cases for quality evaluation. 
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A one day bed census may be used in a process of quality assurance 
in both public and private health sectors. Individual patient 
records are another possible tool for quality assurance. An annual 
health resource survey, with indicators of full-time equivalent 
staff gives useful information on input mix, and should be applied 
more widely. 
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ANNEX 1 
Additional tables and f;gures 
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Table A.l Age and sex distribution by education group 
Age group No ed Primary Secondary Vocational University Unknown Total 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-89 
90-
Total 
156 140 173 
2 4 50 
5 9 24 
7 17 57 
5 22 72 
10 22 76 
8 38 54 
9 24 14 
4 14 4 
111 
207 291 525 
169 2 0 0 
33 195 220 60 
45 81 85 112 
141 93 70 62 
113 69 43 27 
115 40 11 14 
74 17 14 3 
25 11 2 0 
7 2 0 0 
100 0 
723 510 445 278 
o 
61 
101 
68 
11 
5 
2 
o 
o 
o 
248 
5 
106 
97 
122 
58 
32 
7 
2 
o 
o 
429 
2 
125 
150 
178 
62 
15 
5 
1 
o 
o 
538 
o 0 336 311 
2 5 415 448 
3 6 322 396 
16 14 357 488 
9 19 240 270 
7 14 179 182 
7 9 96 142 
3 4 39 56 
o 3 10 24 
o 1 2 3 
47 75 1996 2320 
======:=:========================:==============:==:~=::::::::::::::z::::: 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
Table A.2 Age and sex distribution by education group of household heads 
Age group No ed Primary Secondary Vocational University Unknown Total 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-89 
90-
Total 
22 15 94 
16 21 142 
19 20 105 
19 33 89 
9 23 79 
11 11 78 
8 20 51 
7 15 12 
345 
o 1 0 
114 163 655 
102 77 64 
151 98 107 
149 62 96 
150 81 102 
95 63 64 
95 38 31 
62 18 24 
24 12 10 
924 
210 
839 452 504 
40 
47 
64 
51 
24 
16 
4 
1 
o 
o 
247 
51 
48 
70 
53 
18 
14 
8 
1 
2 
o 
265 
85 
93 
58 
97 
56 
29 
8 
3 
o 
1 
430 
68 
97 
47 
132 
53 
21 
19 
5 
4 
o 
446 
18 11 
19 24 
14 12 
20 18 
9 17 
7 10 
7 9 
4 1 
o 1 
o 0 
98 103 
336 311 
415 448 
322 396 
357 488 
240 270 
179 182 
96 142 
39 56 
10 24 
2 3 
1996 2320 
===========================================:=====:==~======.==~===.===cs •• 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
Table A.3 Age and sex distribution by occupational group 
Civil Prof & Trade Semi- Service No job Total 
Age group servant admin skilled 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
------------------------------------------------~-------------------------0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-89 
90-
Total 
o 0 
1 0 
35 23 
100 72 
63 24 
61 9 
4 1 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
264 129 
00010 
1 0 753 
13 28 60 82 15 
42 90 68 120 18 
24 38 60 87 12 
15 11 36 58 8 
3 1 30 31 1 
o 0 5 7 0 
o 001 0 
00000 
98 168 266 392 57 
o 0 
1 16 
13 126 
20 113 
10 75 
5 42 
o 14 
o 1 
o 0 
o 0 
49 387 
o 
22 
93 
82 
41 
18 
11 
2 
o 
o 
269 
335 310 336 311 
387 420 415 448 
73 157 322 396 
16 104 357 4S8 
6 70 240 270 
17 81 179 182 
44 98 96 142 
33 47 39 56 
10 23 10 24 
232 3 
923 1312 1996 2320 
========================================================================== 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
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Table A.4 Age and sex distribution by occupational group of household 
head 
Age group 
Civil Prof & Trade 
servant admin 
M F M F M F 
Semi-
skilled 
M F 
Service 
M F 
No job 
M F 
Total 
'" F 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
BO-B9 
90-
Total 
75 72 3B 31 70 61 11 
93 98 40 46 99 115 18 
55 67 19 14 81 108 10 
84 114 39 57 67 111 18 
58 51 23 28 65 76 11 
60 36 14 12 36 50 8 
7 19 4 10 31 25 1 
3 4 0 3 9 11 0 
050 204 1 
0000110 
435 466 177 203 459 562 7B 
13 91 88 
26 116 110 
10 96 127 
25 97 107 
15 69 62 
5 39 42 
1 14 22 
1 6 10 
014 
010 
96 532 572 
5146336311 
49 53 415 446 
59 70 322 396 
52 74 357 486 
14 38 240 270 
22 37 179 162 
39 65 96 142 
21 27 39 56 
8 9 10 24 
o 2 2 3 
315 421 1196 2320 
========================================================z==============z= 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
Table A.5 Age and sex distribution by household income quintile group 
Age group Q 1 a 2 a 3 Q 4 a 5 Total 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-89 
90-
Total 
56 50 61 
65 64 78 
64 65 71 
41 66 66 
32 48 34 
28 37 25 
19 31 17 
12 20 7 
222 
111 
320 384 362 
76 58 63 
78 97 103 
83 49 74 
69 77 102 
39 58 58 
31 26 37 
31 19 24 
5 6 10 
425 
o 0 1 
416 392 477 
73 
66 
66 
83 
56 
39 
15 
7 
3 
o 
408 
60 
92 
83 
100 
57 
35 
20 
11 
4 
o 
462 
74 
90 
63 
81 
53 
56 
21 
5 
o 
o 
443 
56 322 305 336 311 
88 396 425 415 448 
80 313 385 322 396 
135 348 472 357 468 
57 233 259 240 270 
36 174 176 179 162 
32 91 138 96 142 
6 37 52 39 56 
8 9 23 10 24 
02223 
496 1925 2237 1996 2320 
========================================================================= 
Source: General household survey and health diary plus interview 
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Household qulntlle 1 
Ag. 
• 0 ...... 1. II Fem.11 
70.71-
10-11-
100U-
co.4t -
Jo.,.-
10.21-
10."-
0.1 -, 
100 .0 10 .0 20 0 20 .0 10 .0 100 
Household qulntlle 3 
Ag. 
• 0 ...... 1. m F.m.l. 
70·71-
10·U-
ao·u-
.0·41-
SO·3II-
20·21-
10·" -
o·e-, 
100 .0 60 .0 20 0 20 .0 60 .0 100 
Household qulntlle 5 
Ag. 
• 0._lbl. ElFem.l. 
7o.1t-
10.1'-
10.51-
co.4t-
aO·38-
20'21-
1o.n-
0.1-, 
100 10 10 .0 20 0 20 .0 10 101001201.0 
Household qulntlle 2 
Ag • 
100 .0 10 CO 20 0 20 .0 10 .0 100 
Household qulntlle 4 
Ag • 
100 .0 10 .0 20 0 20 CO 10 .0 100 
All groups 
Ag • 
coo SOO 200 100 o 100 200 aoo .00 100 
Figure A.1 Population pyramids of different household income quintiles 
and all samples of the general household survey 
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Civil servant 
Ag. 
10 ..... 1 •• F.m.l. 
10-11-
10-,,-
10-51-
40-"-
'0-31-
10-21-
10-11-
0-. ;-
100 10 80 40 20 0 20 40 .0 .0 100 
Admin & Professional 
Ag. 
• 0._ .... 1. mlF.m.l. 
10-11-
'O·st-
SO·5I-
40·"-
30·U-
20-21-
10-1'-
0-,-
I 
100 80 80 40 20 0 20 40 80 .0 100 
Trader 
Age 
• 0 ..... 1. IlFem.l. 
70-71-
80·U-
10-51-
40-41-
30-31-
20·21-
10-11-
0.1-
I 
120100 .0 80 40 20 0 20 40 80 .0 100 120 
Head, civil servant 
Ag. 
120 100 .0 80 40 20 0 20 40 .0 .0 100 120 
Head, admln & professional 
Ag • 
80 SO 40 3D 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 10 .0 
Head, trader 
Ag • 
100 .0 .0 40 20 0 ZO 40 .0 10 100 120 
Figure A.2 Population pyramids of different occupational groups by 
individuals and household heads (General household survey) 
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Semi-skilled 
Age 
.0 ..... 1. ElFamala 
T()'Tt-
10-11-
S()'St-
~ .. -
'().3t-
2().21-
1().1t-
0.1-
0 
20 15 10 
Age 
'O •• 'obla mlFam.la 
TO·78-
eO·II-
SO·S'-
40.41 -
30·38-
20·21-
10.18-
0·'-, 
5 0 5 
Service 
10 15 20 
120 100 .0 10 40 20 0 20 40 10 10 100 120 
Not working 
Age 
.O •• ',hla ElFamala 
70·71-
10-11-
I()'SI-
40. .. -
30·31-
20·21-
10.1'-
0.,-, 
400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 
Figure A.2 (continued) 
Head, aemi-akilled 
Age 
25 20 15 10 5 o • 10 15 20 IS 
Head, ervlce 
Age 
120 100 .0 10 40 20 0 20 40 10 .0 100 120 
Head, not working 
Age 
200 150 100 10 o 10 100 150 200 
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No education 
Age 
lo._"ai. mFam.,. 
70·71-
10-,,-
10·U-
40-41-
'0-31-
20-21-
10·1. -
0-', 
14012010080 110 40 20 0 20 40 110 80100120140 
Age 
80._Mal. BF.mal. 
70·71-
110·"-
50·58-
40·48-
'0·31-
20-21-
10·"-
0·. , 
Primary 
160140120100801104020 0 2040110801001201401110 
Secondary 
Age 
10._Mal. &IF.mal. 
70-71-
10-"-
10-5'-
40-"-
'0-38-
20-2. -
10-,.-
0-'-, 
200 150 100 10 o 10 100 150 200 250 
Head, no education 
Age 
120 100 10 80 40 20 0 20 40 110 10 100 120 
Head, primary 
Age 
140120100 10 10 40 20 0 20 40 80 80 100 120 140 
Head, a condary 
Age 
120 100 10 80 40 10 0 10 40 80 10 100 120 
Figure A.3 Population pyramids of different educational groups by 
individuals and household heads (General household survey) 
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Vocational 
AQ. 
10 •• "'.'. ElF_'. 
10-78-
ao.lI-
10·51 -
40·4'-
SO·3. -
10·U-
10·,,-
0., -
I 
120100 10 110 40 20 0 20 40 80 .0 100120 
University 
Ag. 
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Figure A.3 (continued) 
Head, vocational 
Ag. 
120 100 .0 .0 40 20 0 20 40 80 10 100 120 
Head, unlv r Ity 
Ag • 
120 100 .0 80 40 20 0 20 40 10 10 100 120 
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Not covered 
Age 
10._ ... 1. IlIFem.le 
70.78-
10·at-
10·58-
.0..,-
'0·38-
20·28-
10·18-
O·g-, 
250 200 150 100 50 0 50 100 150 200 250 
State enterprise 
Ag. 
10._"bl.OF.m.l. 
70·78-
10·at-
10.58-
.0.48-
'0·38-
20·28-
10.1t-
O·t-, 
50 .0 '0 20 10 0 10 20 SO .0 50 
Civil .ervsnt benefit 
Ag. 
200 150 100 50 o 10 100 150 200 
Veteran & volunteer 
Ag. 
50 .0 so 20 10 0 10 20 so .0 50 
Figure A.4 Population pyramids of different health benefit coverage 
by individuals (General household survey) 
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Low Income card 
Age 
10._Mlle ElFemlle 
TO·7I-
eo·e,-
SO·St-
40·41-
SO·3t-
20·21-
10·11-
0·'-, 
50 40 SO 20 10 0 10 20 SO 40 50 
Private employee 
Age 
eo._MIII ElF_II 
TO·7I-
10·11-
50·51-
40·411-
SO·3t-
20·21-
10-11-
0-'-, 
SO 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 SO 
Figure A.4 (continued) 
Social Security scheme 
Age 
30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 SO 
Private Insurance 
Age 
SO 40 SO 20 10 0 10 20 SO 40 50 
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Table A.6 Distribution of household income (HINCOME) and per capita 
income (HeAP) by educational group of individual (ED) and 
household head (HED), by occupational group of individual 
(CCC) and household head (HOeC), and by type of health 
benefit of individual (CTVPE) 
GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
SUillmaries of HINCOME by levels of ED 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 109141.531 224279.028 3603 
ED 0 NO EO 140839.448 240284.647 424 
ED 1 PRIMARY 145191 .307 185649.752 10 51 
EO 2 SECONDARY 162826.260 184779.702 820 
ED 3 VOCATIONAL 192927.203 265851.242 469 
EO 4 UNIVERSITY 206322.474 261106.553 839 P~ O.O 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of HED 
Variable Value Label Mean Std De v Cases 
For Entire Population 170401.91<4 226934.676 3531 
HED 0 NO ED 175312.759 476504.566 232 
HED 1 PRIMARY 129440.848 177438.734 1272 
HED 2 SECONDARY 171332.984 197174.921 820 
HED 3 VOCATIONAL 212460.357 2<46960.417 457 
HED 4 UNIVERSITY 211707.496 185109.992 750 P~ O.O 
Summaries of HINCONE by levels of OCC 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Ca ses 
For Entire Population 168700.162 223482.152 3704 
OCC 480000.000 0 . 0 1 
OCC 0 CIVIL SERVANT 207529.775 203891.593 346 
OCC 1 PROFESSIONAL 253029.144 312366.129 236 
oce 2 TRADE 182996 . 487 236963.550 552 
OCC 3 SEton -SKI LL 161112 . 011 1956<48.865 89 
OCC 4 SERVICE 135821.576 170182.129 583 
OCC 5 NO J08 167324 .624 221722.152 1891 P"' .OOOO 
Summaries of HINCONE by levels of HOCC 
Variable Value Label Nean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 168700 . 162 223482.152 3704 
HOCC 0 CIVIL SERVANT 199545.135 204634.486 756 
HOCC 1 PROFESSIONAL 238444.587 167164.932 351 
HOCC 2 TRADE 194859.297 256517.796 844 
HOCC 3 SEMI-SKILL 150918.135 197272.041 141 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 115956.048 137382.84<4 915 
HOeC 5 NO J08 1<43669 . 353 302206.120 637 P", O.O 
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Summaries of HINCOME by level s of CTYPE 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Ca ses 
For Entire Population 168700.162 223482.152 3704 
CTYPE NOT COVERED 146530.902 227531.469 1732 
CTYPE 1 CIVIL SERVANT BENEFIT 182843.553 197686.61 5 1348 
CTYPE 2 STATE ENTERPRISE 295950.133 307194.590 166 
CTYPE 3 VETERAN AND VOLUNTEER 109974 .5 16 95243.8527 62 
CTYPE 4 LOW INCOME CARD 70846.8627 54504.561,( 102 
CTYPE 5 SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME 181918 . 045 136388.322 44 
CTYPE 6 PRIVATE EMPLOYER 181006.071 199593 . 718 56 
CTYPE 7 PRIVATE INSURANCE 225182 .738 307190.239 187 
CTYPE 8 OTHERS 168334 . 286 13,(618 . 229 7 P=.OOOO 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of ED 
Variable Value Label Me an Std De v Ca ses 
For Entire Population 38359.2465 60142.9046 3603 
ED 0 NO ED 29929.9505 71435.6539 424 
ED 1 PRIMARY 31582.6974 41887.3741 1051 
EO 2 SECONDARY 35192.1793 39686.,(216 820 
ED 3 VOCATIONAL 46790.5565 78166 . 1449 469 
ED 4 UNIVERSITY 49490.2181 74530 . 1617 839 P=O.O 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of HED 
Variable value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 38820.7907 60868.9595 3531 
HED 0 NO EO 45966.9741 157946 . 346 232 
HED 1 PRIMARY 25608.8113 34836.4043 1272 
HED 2 SECONDARY 36140.0061 41452.5318 B2D 
HED 3 VOCATIONAL 52620.6236 56831.7936 457 
HED 4 UNIVERSITY 53540.0480 56654.9301 750 P=O. O 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of OCC 
Variable value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Enti re Population 38331.4420 60032.8023 3704 
oce 0 CIVIL SERVANT 54698.1098 51431.0238 346 
DeC 1 PROFESSIONAL 64052.7119 97992.1305 236 
DCC 2 TRADE 41273.7138 50999.11859 552 
oee 3 SEMI-SKILL 46417.3258 82128.0928 89 
OCC 4 SERVICE 30804 . 7530 48867 . 5879 563 
Dec 5 NO JOB 33208.0659 68174.3177 1898 P=.OOOO 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of HOeC 
Variable value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 38331.4420 60032.8023 3704 
HOeC 0 CIVIL SERVANT 49344.2870 48081.4358 756 
HOCC 1 PROFESSIONAL 55992.0798 45727.9268 361 
HaeC 2 TRADE 40249 . 7002 48855.0859 844 
HOCC 3 SEMI-SKILL 40392.8794 77670.5424 141 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 26829.8379 39850.7439 975 
HOee 5 NO JOB 30136.4600 97838.2464 637 P=O.O 
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Summaries of HCAP by levels of CTVPE 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 38331.4420 60032.6023 3704 
CTVPE NOT COVERED 30956.3389 60515.2012 1732 
CTVPE 1 CIVIL SERVANT BENEFIT 44982.2708 58416.1226 1348 
CTVPE 2 STATE ENTERPRISE 70214.B253 80325 . 8435 166 
CTVPE 3 VETERAN AND VOLUNTEER 27264.8226 25757.1533 62 
CTVPE 4 lOW INCOME CARD 12684.9804 11906 . 1665 102 
CTVPE 5 SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME 46150.9091 42206.3593 44 
CTVPE 6 PRIVATE EMPlOVER 34402.3214 36196.2595 56 
CTVPE 7 PRIVATE INSURANCE 47309.6417 62305.7972 167 
CTVPE 8 OTHERS 40451.4286 24827.0870 7 P: .OOOO 
Table A.7 Distribution of household income (HINCOME) and per capita 
income (HCAP) by occupation of household head (HOCC), type of 
housing (PERMANEN, OWNER) and household durables (MICROWAV, 
FRIDGE, VDO, WASHING, CAR, TRICYCLE) 
GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of HOCC 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 157281.246 226252.887 890 
HOCC 0 CIVIL SERVANT 189571.564 167323.396 195 
HOCC 1 PROFESSIONAL 225292.824 156805 . 627 85 
HOCC 2 TRADE 169537.465 229430.715 196 
HOCC 3 SEMI-SKILL 162916.543 241067.724 35 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 106600.761 136994.549 237 
HOCC 5 NO JOB 134679.157 363996.653 140 P =.0001 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of HOCC 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 43509.7663 70109.5261 890 
HOCC 0 CIVIL SERVANT 54644.2718 52459.1041 195 
HOCC 1 PROFESSIONAL 63648.1529 51566.1352 85 
HOCC 2 TRADE 42859.9343 50416.3621 198 
HOCC 3 SEMI-SKIll 51009.6857 99498 . 1665 35 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 30915.0802 51461 . 4991 237 
HOCC 5 NO JOB 35660.6143 121207.769 140 P=.0005 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of PERMANEN 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Enti re Population 157281.246 226252.887 890 
PERMANEN 0 334200.000 223162.900 2 
PERMAN EN 1 MORE THAN 5 VRS 159780.935 229106.760 632 
PERMAN EN 2 lESS THAN 5 YRS 114924.463 176874.325 54 
PERMAN EN 3 OTHERS 64125.0000 76544.3091 2 P= .3309 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of PERMAN EN 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 43509.7663 70109.5261 690 
PERMAN EN 0 104050.000 64762.1031 2 PERMANEN 1 43572.4543 66910.8368 632 PERMANEN 2 40674.5741 67689.7922 54 PERMANEN 3 28041.5000 25514.5340 2 P=.6453 
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Summaries of HINCOM E by levels of OWN ER 
Variabl e Value Labe l Mean St d Dev Cas e s 
For Entire Population 157281.246 226252.887 890 
OWNER 0 124160 .690 109347 .869 30 
OWNER 1 OWN ER OCCUPI ER 177673 .726 257996.210 647 
OWN ER 2 RENT 133574 . 086 175664 . 123 257 
OWNER 3 OTHERS 85242.5179 62126.0569 56 P"' .0083 
Summaries of HCAP by l e ve l s of OWNER 
Variable Value Labe l Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 43509 .7683 70109 .5261 890 
OWN ER 0 34438.4138 27069.8006 30 
OWNER 1 OWN ER OCCUPI ER 46815.0603 76327.7686 547 
OWNER 2 RENT 40825 .4664 61082.3096 267 
OWN ER 3 OTHERS 28461.9643 19616.6855 56 P"' .3212 
SUlllmaries of HINCOM E by l evels of MICROWAV 
Vari abl e value Label Mea n Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 157281.246 226252.667 890 
MICROWAV 0 NO 1<48691 . 330 229850.527 773 
MICROWAV 1 YES 213890.612 193137.637 117 P"' . 0144 
Summaries of HeAP by l eve ls of 104 I CROWAV 
Variable Value La be l Mean Std Oev Cases 
For Entire Population 43509.7663 70109.5261 890 
MICROWAV 0 41360.0931 70826.6957 773 
MICROWAV 1 57554.6552 63899.8255 117 P" .0608 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of FRIOG 
Variable Value Labe l Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 157261 .246 226252.887 890 
FRIDG 0 7<4263.1250 92922.6264 136 
FRIDG 1 172251.729 239623 .2 11 754 p c .OOOO 
Summaries of HCAP by leve ls of FRIDG 
Variable Value Labe l Mean Std De v Cases 
For Entire Population <43509.7663 70109.5261 a90 
FRIOG 0 24722.7794 34033.9389 136 
FRIDG 1 <46898 . 4005 74298.0537 754 P"' .0007 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of VDO (Video playe r) 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 157281.2<46 226252.887 e90 
VOO 0 113062.741 136030.903 486 
VDO 210474.795 292334.646 404 P"'. OOOO 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of VDO 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 43509.7663 70109.6281 e90 
VDO 0 33589.4527 49274 . 4601 <486 VOO 55443.6089 87519 . 0276 404 P=.OOOO 
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Summaries of HINCOME by levels of WASHING 
Variable Value Label Wean Std Dev Ca5es 
For Entire Population 157261.2~6 226252 . 887 690 
WASHING 0 135359.342 243286.605 556 
WASHING 194125 . 892 166976.134 332 P=.0002 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of WASHING 
Variable Value Label Wean Std Dev Cas e s 
For Entire Population 43509.7663 70109.5261 690 
WASHING 0 39312 . 9570 79064.8061 556 
WASHING 1 50563 . 4398 51015 . 4594 332 P=.0205 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of CAR 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Oev Cas es 
For Entire Population 157261 . 246 226252.887 890 
CAR 0 120519.927 207166.560 632 
CAR 1 247332.229 245430.935 256 P" .OOOO 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of CAR 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Oev Cases 
For Entire Population 43509.7663 70109.5261 890 
CAR 0 34568.6655 66251.4915 632 
CAR 1 65411.5076 7-4464.9550 256 P" .OOOO 
Sumll1aries of HINCOME by levels of TRICYCLE 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Oev Cases 
For Enti re Population 157281.246 226252.887 890 
TRICYCLE 0 159491.809 228082.255 810 
TRICYCLE 1 133467.646 207730.226 80 P=.5737 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of TRICYCLE 
Variable Value Label Nean Std Oev Cases 
For Entire Population 43509.7663 70109.5261 890 
TRICYCLE 0 44993.7889 72437.4429 810 
TRICYCLE 1 27798.1772 36153.6061 80 P=.0981 
Summaries of MEMBER by levels of HOCC 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 3.9901 1.6276 905 
HOCC 0 CIVIL SERVANT 3.8B78 1.4807 196 
HOCC 1 PROFESSIONAL 4.0696 1.6577 86 
HOCC 2 TRADE 4.0385 1.6590 208 
HOCC 3 SEMI-SKILL 4.0270 1.6070 37 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 4.0126 1 .6187 238 
HOCC 5 NO JOB 3.9643 1.7929 140 P=.9390 
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SUlllmar;es of HlNCOME by levels of HOCC 
Variable Value Labe l Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 106769.720 77986.1854 107 
HOCC 0 ClVIL SERVANT 148020.667 68691 . 4062 30 
HOCC 1 PROFESS lONAL 161005 . 714 8042".9727 7 
HOCC 2 TRADE 86660.8696 62031.7348 23 
HOCC 3 SEMI-SKlLL 91242.8571 120731.574 7 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 86743.4783 46967.7896 23 
HOCC 5 NO JOB 72335.2941 53089.2284 17 P" . 001 5 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of HOCC 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 28752.0654 26671.1414 107 
HOCC 0 CIVll SERVANT 39293.1667 32807.4886 30 
HOCC 1 PROFESSIONAL 53847.7143 39313.9530 7 
HOCC 2 TRADE 21734 . 6522 19506.5964 23 
HOCC 3 SEMI - SKlLL 26707 . 1429 30465. 1499 7 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 21150.5217 11850.6978 23 
HOCC 5 NO JOB 20437.2353 20121.7633 17 P=.0049 
Summaries of HINCOME by leve ls of PERMANEN 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 106769.720 77986.1854 107 
PERMANEN 0 100817.778 60768.8518 9 
PERMANEN 1 110350.538 80541.8702 93 
PERMANEN 2 50880.0000 17319.1224 5 P= .2465 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of PERMAHEN 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 28752.0654 26671.1414 107 
PERMANEN 0 30143.8889 26744.4978 9 
PERMANEH 1 29621 . 8925 27151 . 0095 93 
PERMANEN 2 10068.0000 2614.7887 5 P=. 2781 
SUlllmaries of HINCOME by levels of OWNER 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 106769.720 77986.1854 107 
OWNER 0 118822.857 100895.016 7 
OWNER 1 114343.333 87926.6662 60 
OWNER 2 87170.3226 49567.7770 31 
OWNER 3 11"413.333 67822.2471 9 P" ."321 
Summaries of HCAP by l evels of OWNER 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 28752.0654 26671.1414 107 
OWNER 0 36630.7143 33910.1673 7 
OWNER 1 30153.9667 28700.5768 60 
OWNER 2 22453.0323 13946 ... 0 .. 1 31 
OWNER 3 34974 . 8889 38629.6514 9 P=.3967 
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Summaries of HINCOME by levels of MICROWAV 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
for Entire Population 106769.720 77966.1854 107 
MICROWAV 0 NO 103491 . 923 74853 . 6520 104 
MICROWAV YES 220400.000 117699 . 958 3 P=.0098 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of MICROWAV 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Ca s e s 
For Entire Population 28752.0654 26671 . 1414 107 
MICROWAV 0 NO 27816.0673 25962.8319 104 
MICROWAV 1 YES 61200.0000 36175.1296 3 P=.0319 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of FRIDG 
Variable Value Labe l Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Ent ire Population 106769.720 77986.1854 107 
FRIOG 0 59895 . 2381 41915.6233 21 
fRIOG 118215 . 614 60 595 . 4685 66 P=.0018 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of FRIDG 
Variable Value label Mean Std Oev Ca s es 
For Entire Population 26752.0654 26671.1414 107 
FRIOG 0 16051 . 7143 11194.7057 21 
FRIOG 31853.3140 26425.6054 86 pz .0142 
Sumllaries of HINCOME by levels of VDO 
Variabl e Value label Mean Std Oev Ca s es 
for Entire Population 106789.720 77986.1854 107 
VDO 0 90948.7605 67668.3995 82 
VDO 158662.400 88017 .4122 25 P=.OOOl 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of VOO 
Variable Value Label Me an Std Dev Cases 
For Enti re Population 28752.0654 26671.1414 107 
VDO 0 23608.1707 21200.8838 82 
VDO 45624.0400 35183.5605 25 P=. 0002 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of WASHING 
Variable Value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Enti re Population 106769.720 77986.1854 107 
WASHING 0 95244.2697 66025. 6848 89 
WASHING 1 163756.667 105933 . 261 18 P=.0005 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of WASHING 
Variable value label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 28752.0654 26671.1414 107 
WASHING 0 23980.5281 20020.7920 89 
WASHING 1 52344.6667 40645.1954 18 P=.OOOO 
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Summaries of HINCOME by levels of CAR 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 106769.720 77986.1664 107 
CAR 0 NO 93695.7647 67865.2688 86 
CAR YES 157282.727 94398 . 7708 22 P=.0005 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of CAR 
Variable value Label Mean Std Dev Ca s es 
For Ent ire Population 28752.0654 26671.1414 107 
CAR 0 24768.5882 21703.1759 85 
CAR 44142.7727 37338.0472 22 P=.0020 
Summaries of HINCOME by levels of TRICYCLE 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Enti re Population 106769.720 77986.1654 107 
TRICYCLE 0 110944.941 78966.6692 65 
TRICYCLE 1 90638 . 1818 73562.5997 22 P=.2764 
Summaries of HCAP by levels of TRICYCLE 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 28752.0654 26671.1414 107 
TRICYCLE 0 30963.3882 27889.6265 85 
TRICYCLE 1 20208.3162 19571.2393 22 P=.0919 
Summaries of MEMBER by levels of HOCC 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Ent ire Population 4.1376 1.4303 109 
HOCC 0 CIVIL SERVANT 4.2759 1.3065 29 
HOCC PROFESSIONAL 3.6671 1.7726 7 
HOCC 2 TRAOE 4.2917 1.3345 24 
HOCC 3 SEMI-SKILL 3.5714 1.3973 7 
HOCC 4 SERVICE 4.3478 1.3007 23 
HOCC 5 NO JOB 3.7695 1.7620 19 P=.6264 
Table A.a Charge and reimbursement by type of health benefit 
CONSULTATION WITHIN 2 WEEKS 
Summaries of CHARGE by levels of CTYPE 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 462.2443 2106.7627 526 
CTVPE NOT COVERED 412.6367 1472.6422 236 
CTVPE 1 CIVIL SERVANT BENEFIT 433.0811 956.6522 185 
CTYPE 2 STATE ENTERPRISE 498.0303 1398.0329 33 
CTVPE 3 VETERAN AND VOLUNTEER 138.8667 133.4363 15 
CTYPE 4 LOW INCOME CARD 231.0714 344.4627 14 
CTVPE 5 SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME 220.0000 180.6084 7 
CTYPE 6 PRIVATE EMPLOYER 198.8671 222.5514 7 
CTYPE 7 PRIVATE INSURANCE 1771.9643 7557.5997 26 
CTYPE 8 OTHERS 2000.0000 0.0 1 P=.1421 
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Summaries of REIMBURS by levels of CTYPE 
Variable Value Label 
For Entire Population 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
NOT COVERED 
CIVIL SERVANT BENEFIT 
STATE ENTERPRISE 
VETERAN AND VOLUNTEER 
LOW INCOME CARD 
SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME 
PRIVATE EMPLOYER 
PRIVATE INSURANCE 
OTHERS 
Mean Std Dev 
2 11.0053 1772.10~6 
43.4308 
270.5427 
103.4286 
48.5294 
0.0 
152.8571 
86.6889 
1537.0966 
1500 . 0000 
366.2501 
795.6791 
371.6313 
60 . 2295 
0.0 
211.8737 
142.1669 
7203.2470 
0.0 
HOSPITALISATION 
Summaries of CHARGE by levels of CTYPE 
Variab l e Value Label 
For Entire Population 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
Summaries of 
Variable 
REIMBURS by l evels of 
Va l ue Labe l 
For Entire Population 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
CTYPE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
Mean Std Dev 
4611. 1543 9947.9288 
3543.6202 
534 1 .7563 
6696.5909 
3456 . 6667 
1068 . 0000 
4450 . 0000 
1836.6667 
5315.0769 
4000.0000 
CTYPE 
Mean 
3664.3673 
13267.3061 
5664.4269 
5667.3304 
534.7616 
5727.5649 
1428.9973 
6544.0511 
0.0 
Std Dev 
2544.1737 8750.2102 
669.2929 
3420 . 5865 
4 103.2609 
1161 . 4286 
0.0 
1200.0000 
468.0000 
3006.5455 
4000.0000 
1842.8058 
11912.4195 
4562.5595 
3008.3906 
0.0 
113 1 .3708 
857.3039 
3122.74 16 
0.0 
Table A.9 Severity of cases by place of consultation 
Cases 
570 
253 
199 
35 
17 
18 
7 
9 
31 
1 P= .0067 
Cases 
324 
89 
160 
22 
3 
5 
2 
3 
39 
1 P:. 8752 
Cases 
380 
99 
192 
23 
7 
7 
2 
5 
44 
1 P= .3936 
Not Drug Private Public Private Others 
PLACE-> Count 
Col Pct 
MIX 
0 
Seve re 1 
Mode rate 2 
Mi l d 3 
Not aHe cted 4 
Column 
(Continued) Total 
treat 
1 
25.0 
1 
25.0 
1 
25 . 0 
1 
25.0 
4 
.7 
0 
store 
10 
6.4 
5 
3.2 
11 
7. 0 
26 
16.6 
105 
66.9 
157 
27.5 
1 
clinic 
13 
7.~ 
24 
13.6 
17 
9.7 
39 
22.2 
83 
47.2 
176 
30.9 
2 
268 
facilit 
4 
3.5 
25 
22.1 
15 
13.3 
23 
20.4 
46 
40.7 
113 
19 . 8 
3 
hospita l 
5 
5.2 
32 
33.0 
16 
16.5 
14 
14.4 
30 
30.9 
97 
17 .0 
4 10 
4 
17.~ 
5 
2 1 .7 
4 
17 . 4 
10 
43.5 
23 
4.1 
Row 
Total 
37 
6.5 
92 
16. 1 
59 
10.4 
107 
18.8 
275 
48.2 
570 
100.0 P= .OOOO 
Table A.10 Severity of cases by admission of consultation 
Count No Yes AOMIT-> Row 
MIX 
Severe 
Modera 
Mild 
Not aHe 
Col Pet 
0 
1 
te 2 
3 
eted 4 
Column 
Total 
36 
6.9 
68 
13.0 
47 
9.0 
102 
19. 5 
271 
51.7 
524 
91.9 
0 
1 
2 . 2 
24 
52 . 2 
12 
26.1 
5 
10 .9 
4 
8.7 
46 
8.1 
1 Total 
37 
6.5 
92 
16.1 
59 
10.4 
107 
18.8 
275 
48 . 2 
570 
100.0 P= .OOOO 
Table A.11 Severity of cases by reimbursement of consultation 
Count No Yes REIMBURS-> Row 
lUX 
Col Pet 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Column 
Total 
28 
6. 1 
68 
14 .8 
44 
9.6 
91 
19.8 
229 
49.8 
460 
80 .7 
0 
9 
8.2 
24 
21.8 
15 
13.6 
16 
14.5 
46 
41.8 
110 
19.3 
1 Total 
37 
6.5 
92 
16 .1 
69 
10.4 
107 
18.8 
275 
48.2 
670 
100.0 P=.1253 
Table A.12 Severity of hospitalised cases by type of hospital 
SEVERE-> 
HOSNAME 
Publ 
Other pr 
Count 
Row Pet 
1 
;c 
2 
ate 
7 
ov;nees 
Column 
Total 
1 
.B 
3 
1.2 
4 
1.1 
0 
Eme rgene 
81 
66.9 
200 
82.6 
10 
58.8 
291 
76.6 
1 
Not 
emergent 
26 
21.5 
21 
8 .7 
7 
41.2 
54 
14 .2 
2 
269 
Others 
13 
10.7 
18 
7.4 
31 
8.2 
3 
Row 
Total 
121 
31.8 
242 
63.7 
17 
4.5 
380 
100.0 P".0020 
Table A.13 Severity of hospitalised cases by type of health benefit 
SEVERE-> Count 
Row Pct 
CTYPE 
Not cov ered 
Civil s 
2 
State e 
3 
Veteran 
4 
Low inc 
5 
Social 
6 
Private 
7 
Private 
8 
Others 
ervant 
nterp 
& vol 
ome 
security 
emp 
ins 
Column 
Total 
1 
1 . 0 
3 
1.6 
4 
1 . 1 
0 
Emergency 
75 
75 . 8 
144 
75.0 
14 
60.9 
6 
85.7 
5 
71 .4 
1 
50.0 
5 
100.0 
40 
90.9 
1 
100.0 
291 
76.6 
1 
Not 
emergent 
17 
17 .2 
21 
10.9 
8 
34.8 
1 
14.3 
2 
28 . 6 
1 
50.0 
4 
9.1 
54 
14.2 
2 
Others 
6 
6.1 
201 
12.5 
1 
4.3 
31 
8.2 
3 
Row 
Total 
99 
26.1 
192 
50.5 
23 
6.1 
7 
1.8 
7 
1.8 
2 
.5 
5 
1.3 
44 
11.6 
.3 
380 
100.0 P=.2486 
Table A.14 Severity of hospitalised cases by reimbursement 
SEVERE-) 
REIMBURS 
Not reim 
Reimburs 
Count 
Row Pet 
0 
bursable 
1 
ab le 
Column 
Total 
2 
1.3 
2 
.9 
4 
1.1 
0 
Emergency 
114 
72.2 
177 
79.7 
291 
76.6 
1 
Not 
emergent 
28 
17.7 
26 
11 . 7 
54 
14.2 
2 
Others 
14 
8.9 
17 
7.7 
31 
8.2 
3 
Row 
Total 
158 
41.6 
222 
58.4 
380 
100.0 P=.3450 
Table A.1S An example of logistic regression by SPSSPC+ 
HOSPITALISATION 
logistic regression hosp with age,sex,lhincome,ed,hed,tcoverO,tcover2 
class1,class3,hclassl,hclass3,acute,chronic,disable 
/method =enter/classplot/external. 
Total number of cases: 3497 (Unweighted) 
Number of selected cases: 3497 
Number of unselected cases: 0 
Number of selected cases: 3497 
Number rejected because of missing data: 1 
Number of cases included in the analysis: 3496 
Oependent Variable.. HOSP (Hospitalisation) 
Beginning Block Number O. Initial Log Likelihood Function 
- 2 Log Likelihood 2140.0468 
• Constant is included in the mOdel. 
270 
Beginning Block Number 1. 
Variable(s) Entered on Step 
Method: Enter 
Number 
1.. AGE 
SEX 
LHINCOME 
ED 
HED 
TCOVERO 
TCOVER2 
CLASSl 
CLASS3 
HCLASSl 
HCLASS3 
ACUTE 
CHRONIC 
DISABLE 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Model Chi-Square 
Improvement 
Goodness of Fit 
Chi-Square 
1923.687 
216.359 
216.359 
3411.239 
Classification Table for HOSP 
Predicted 
a 1 
a 1 
Observed +- ------.-------+ 
a 0 3169 : 7 : 
t------- t-------+ 
307: 13: 
t------- t-------t 
Overall 
df 
3481 
14 
14 
3481 
Significance 
.0000 
.0000 
.0000 
.0000 
Percent Correct 
99.78% 
4.06% 
91.02% 
Variables in the Equation -----------------------
----------------------
Variable 
AGE 
SEX 
LHINCOME 
ED 
HED 
TCOVERO 
TCOVER2 
CLASSl 
CLASS3 
HCLASSl 
HCLASS3 
ACUTE 
CHRONIC 
DISABLE 
Constant 
1600 t 
F 
R 
E 
a 
U 
1200 t 
E 800 + 
N 
C 
V 
400 t 
Predicted 
Prob: 
Group: 
. , 
B S. E. Wa1d df Sig 
.0040 .0035 1.3102 1 .2524 
-.0170 .1253 .0183 .8923 
-.0813 .0649 1 .5705 . 2101 
-.2697 .1451 3 . 4533 .0631 
.1833 .1605 1.3046 1 .2534 
-.4399 .2720 2.6162 1 .105B 
.6128 .2661 5.3026 1 .0213 
-.4159 .2259 3.3887 1 .0656 
.0432 .1662 .0677 1 . 7948 
.0616 .1739 .1255 1 .7231 
-.0436 .1934 .0508 .8216 
.8788 .1479 35.3168 . 0000 
1 .1440 .1485 59.3427 .0000 
.8516 .4745 3.2203 .0727 
-1.9854 .7843 6.4079 .0114 
Observed Groups and Predicted Probabilities 
o 
o 
o 
00 
000 0 
000000 
000000 
00000000 o 1 
R 
.0000 
.0000 
.0000 
-.0261 
.0000 
-.0170 
.0393 
- .0255 
.0000 
.0000 
.0000 
.1248 
. 1637 
.0239 
Exp(B) 
1.0040 
.9832 
. 9219 
.7636 
1.2012 
.6441 
1.8456 
.6597 
1.0442 
1 . 0635 
.9573 
2.4080 
3.1393 
2.3433 
t 
t 
, 
, 
I , 
I 
I 
--------------t ______________ t ______________ t _________ ------
o .25 .5 .75 1 
000000000000000000000000000000111111111111111111111111111111 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for 1 
Symbo l s: 0 - 0 
1 - 1 
Each Symbol Represents 100 Cases. 
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logi st ic regression atreatl with age,sex,lhincome,amixl,ed,hed,tcoverO,tcover2 
classl,class3,hclassl,hclass3/method;enter/classplot/external. 
Total number of cases; 421 (Unweighted) 
Number of selected cases; 421 
Number of unselected cases; 0 
Number of selected cases; 421 
Number rejected because of missing data ; 1 
Number of cases included in the analysis; 420 
De p e ndent Variable Encoding; 
Original 
Value 
o 
Internal 
Value 
o 
De pe ndent Variable. . PRIV 
Beg inning Block Number O. Initial Log Likelihood Function 
-2 log likelihood 361.9399B 
* Constant is included in the model. 
Beginning Block Number 1. Method : Enter 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
log likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. 
-2 log likelihood 
Model Chi-Square 
Improvement 
Goodness of Fit 
Chi-Square 
336.545 
23.395 
23.395 
428.948 
Classification Table for ATREATl 
Predicted 
df Significance 
407 .9942 
12 .0246 
12 .0246 
407 .2180 
a 1 Percent Correct 
o 1 
Observed +-------+-------+ 
o 0 : 355: 0 100.00% 
+-------+-------+ 
62 3 4.62% 
+-------+-------+ 
Overall 85.24% 
---------------------- Variables in the Equation ------ -- ---------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B) 
AGE 
. 0009 .0068 .0165 .8919 .0000 1.0009 
SEX 
-.3174 .2982 1.1330 .2871 .0000 .7280 
lHINCONE .3850 .2884 1.7826 .1818 .0000 1.4697 
AMIXl 
.7857 .3309 5.6368 .0176 . 1002 2.1940 
EO 
-.9209 .3626 6.4488 .0111 - . 1109 .3982 
HED 
.3031 .3904 .6029 .4375 .0000 1.3541 
TCOVERO 
-.0201 .6146 .0011 .9739 .0000 .9801 
TCOVER2 .4096 .6010 .4645 .4955 .0000 1.5062 
CLASSl .1530 .5359 .0815 .7753 .0000 1 .1653 
CLASS3 .0534 . 4187 .0163 .8985 .0000 1.0548 
HClASSl .1903 .3803 .2503 .6169 .0000 1.2096 
HCLASS3 .0923 .4811 .0368 .8479 .0000 1.0967 
Constant -2.3881 .7604 9.8645 .0017 
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F 
R 
E 
a 
U 
E 
N 
C 
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. 
. 
Observed Groups and Predicted Probabiliti es 
1 1 
o 1 
010 
000 
0000 
0000 
00 00001 
00 000001 0 1 
0010000001100 0 
0000000000000 0 
0000000000000000100 11 
Predicted --------------f--------------f--------------f--------- _____ _ 
Prob: 0 .25 .5 .75 1 
Group: 000000000000000000000000000000111111111111111111111111111111 
Predicted Probability is of Me mbership for 1 
Symbols: 0 - 0 
1 - 1 
Each Symbol Represents 5 Cases . 
COMPUTATION FOR SELECTION OF THE CUT OFf POINT 
compute Z= 
- 2.3881 f O.OOl*age - 0.317*sex t 0.3850*lhincome + 1.7857*amixl - 0.921*ed 
f O. 3031*hed - 0 . 0201*tcoverO + 0.4096*tcover2 f 0.1530*clas s 1 + 0 . 053*class3 
t 0.1903*hclassl + 0.0923*hclass3. 
In{Z). 
1/1Z. 
compute lZ 
compute invZ 
compute V = 1/ (1 t invZ). 
V by PRIV 
Count Observed value 
Use of private hospitals 
No Yes Row 
0: 1: Total 
Y --------f------t------t 
Expected low - 0 21: 
value 
.001-.10 
.101-.20 
.201 - .30 
+--- ---+------t 
. 
. 
10: 1 : 
9.1: 
+------+------t 
16: 1 : 
5.9: 
t- --- --+------+ 
1 : 
5.9: 
t------t ------t 
.301-.40 54: 4: 
: 6.9: 
t------t------t 
.401-.50 137: 28: 
.501-.60 
.601-.70 
>.701 
Column 
Total 
16.9: 
t------+------+ 
90: 19: 
17.4: 
t ------ t------+ 
7: 11 : 
61 .1: 
t------t------t 3: 
. 
I t------ t------t 
354 
84.3 
65 
15.5 
Number of Missing Observations: 
21 
5.0 
11 
2.6 
17 
4.0 
17 
4.0 
58 
13.6 
166 
39.5 
109 
26 . 0 
18 
4.3 
3 
.7 
420 
100.0 
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Table A.16 Cross tabulation of household income quintiles and education 
levels of household heads (HED) 
Count 01 (GHS) 
OUINTILE-> Row Row Pet 
HED 
NO EO 
PRIMARY 
SECONDARY 
VOCATIONA 
UNIVERSIT 
UNKNOWN 
L 
Y 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
9 
Column 
Total 
0 
22 
39.3 
90 
31. 6 
23 
11 .9 
16 
13.0 
17 
8.8 
10 
26.3 
178 
20.0 
1 0 
8 
14.3 
72 
25.3 
44 
22.7 
16 
13 .0 
31 
16.0 
7 
18 .4 
178 
20.0 
2 0 
10 
17 .9 
58 
20.4 
53 
27.3 
27 
22.0 
21 
10.8 
9 
23.7 
178 
20.0 
3 0 
8 
14 .3 
30 
10. 5 
44 
22.7 
31 
25.2 
59 
30.4 
6 
15.8 
178 
20.0 
4 0 
8 
14.3 
35 
12.3 
30 
15.5 
33 
26.8 
66 
34.0 
6 
15.8 
178 
20.0 
5 Total 
56 
6.3 
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31. 7 
194 
21.8 
123 
13.8 
194 
21.8 
38 
4.3 
890 P=.OOOO 
100.0 
Table A.17 Cross tabulation of household income qu;ntiles and 
occupational groups of household heads 
Count 01 (GHS) 
OUINTILE-> Row Row Pet 
HOCC 
o 
CIVIL SE 
1 
ADMIN & P 
2 
TRADER 
3 
SEMI-SKI 
4 
SERVICE 
5 
NOT WORK 
RVANT 
ROF 
LLED 
ING 
Column 
Total 
0 
14 
7.2 
40 
20.2 
7 
20.0 
65 
27.4 
52 
37.1 
178 
20.0 
1 0 
27 
13.8 
6 
7.1 
41 
20.7 
10 
28.6 
69 
29.1 
25 
17.9 
178 
20.0 
2 0 
42 
21.5 
16 
18.8 
45 
22.7 
7 
20.0 
43 
18.1 
25 
17.9 
178 
20.0 
3 
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a 
54 
27.7 
27 
31.8 
33 
16 .7 
5 
14.3 
39 
16 .5 
20 
14 .3 
178 
20.0 
4 a 
58 
29.7 
36 
42.4 
39 
19.7 
6 
17.1 
21 
8.9 
18 
12.9 
178 
20.0 
5 Total 
195 
21.9 
85 
9.8 
198 
22.2 
35 
3.9 
237 
26.6 
140 
15.7 
890 P=.OOOO 
100.0 
ANNEX 2 
Occupational classification 
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Occupational group 
Administrative and professional 
00 Surveyor, engineer 
02 Biologist, agriculturist 
03 Doctor, dentist 
04 Nurse, midwife 
05 Other related medical science 
06 Administrator in school or university 
08 Lawyer 
11 Manager 
Trader 
20 
31 
33 
Accountant 
Middlemen 
Shopkeeper 
Semi-skill 
71 Tailor, dress maker 
74 Jeweller, watch mender 
75 Plumber 
76 Electronic worker 
77 Carpenter 
78 Painter 
79 Brick layer 
82 Bakery 
85 Craftsmen 
Service 
09 Author, writer 
40 Farmer, agricultural management 
64 Truck driver 
68 Post-man 
70 Weaver 
89 Labourer 
90 Guard 
91 Cook 
92 Waiter 
93 Care taker 
94 Barber 
X5 Partner 
Not working 
07 Priest 
Xl Unemployed 
X3 Unemployed 
Y1 Student 
Y2 Children in arms 
Y3 Housewife 
Y4 Retired officer 
Civil servant 
X4 Civil servant 
X9 Military services 
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ANNEX 3 
Maps 
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BURMA 
GUL F OF 
51 AM 
~ The map of Thailand 
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ANNEX 4 
Questionnaires 
280 
Ouestionnaire 1 General household survey 
BeetioD 1 Houlehold rOlter. '.c~loD 2 Health benefit coverage 
Pleaee liet the name of every one who hal been living here at least 3 months in the past 12 months 
Helllber MUle Surname Age Sex Harital Itatus Relationship with For those The highest education Ie •• (name I .. covered by any typel of 
number household head age between attained health benefite? 
male 1 lingle ••• 1 head ••••••• 
6-30 years. 
1 Write down degree or Write down all benefitl' 
female 2 married • . 2 lpouse ••••• 2 Still in certificate and 1. civil lervant 2. etate enterprile 
widovl lon/daughter ) Ichool? nlUlle of Ichool or 3. veteran or volunteer 
widower 3 parent •• •• •• college. •• low income card S. Social lecur divorced 4 relative ••• 5 no •.•• 0 If never attended, no 0 6. private employee 
leparate 5 otherl ••••• 6 yes • •• 1 write "never" yel 1 7. private inlurance 8. otherl 
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SectioD 3 Illness and injury within the past two weeks. SectioD. Chronic illness. 
Member During last week and Severity Did •. (name) •• Did •. (name) .• consult Does •• (name) •• suffer Specify Specify Severity Has •. (name). 
number the week before last of exelllPt frolll or seek any form of frolll any chronic the nlUlle how long of exelllPted frolll 
week, was .. (name) •• illness school or treatJnent? illness? of chronic has it illness Ichool or 
ill or injured? normal work? Read aloud card 2. diseases. been nOI'lllal work 
discovered. Read during these 
Write down number Read Write down Write all details and no ••••••.••••• 0 card 12 lIonths? 
of illnesl or card 1 number of fill in consultation if yes, write 1 Write n\mber 
injury. days. form for each visit. number of diseases of day •• 
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SectioD 5 Disability. SectioD 6 Promotive and preventive services (ask for the past 12 months) 
Member Bas •• (naJlle) •• Specify all Specify how Severity Has •• (nllll\e) .• During the period, has •• (naJlle) •• used Specify where most often used. 
number suffered frOll\ types of long has this of exempted from any promotive and preventive services? 
any type of disability disability disability school or work --------------------------------------- --------------------------------
disability? been because of the ANC Family Vaccine others ANC Family Vaccine 
discovered. Read disability? Labour planning Labour plan-
card 1 Write down no. PNC PNC ning 
no •••••• 0 Write down of day affected others 
yes ••••• 1 no. of years. during last year. no ••• 0; if yes, specify no. of visit 
283 
section 6 (continued) 
Annual expenditure (in baht) 
ANC Family Vaccine Others 
Labour plan-
PRC ning 
Specify health benefit coverage 
used. 
ANC Family Vaccine 
Labour plan-
PRC ning 
Others 
How much was reimbursed? 
(baht). 
ANC Family Vaccine 
Labour plan-
PRe ning 
Others 
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Section 7 Hospitalisation within the last 12 months 
During the year, 
has .• (name) • • 
been hospitalised? 
never •••••• 0 
if yes, specify 
no. of admissions. 
Specify no. of 
days stayed in 
hospital during 
the whole year. 
Please fill in 
hospitalisation 
fOr1l\ for each 
admission. 
SectioD 8 Income of each family member 
Member What does Work status. Basis of Last lIIonth Are there other types of payments? Any income from 
number .• (name) •• incOllle. total other work? 
work? private elllployee I hourly I income. ---------------------------------------------
govemployee • •• 2 daily. 2 Bonus OVer- Others Food Cloth Hous- Travel baht!year 
Describe employer ••••••• 3 weekly 3 tille -ing ing 
the job. self-elllployed •• 4 lIIonthly 4 
household work • 5 others 5 (baht) baht! baht! baht! no ••••••••• 0 Please specify 
state enterprise 6 year month lIIonth yes ........ I type of job. 
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Section 9 Household income. 
Interviewer asks questions in part A first, then asks the amount of 
earning in part B. 
Part A yes .. l 
no ..• 2 
In the previous 12 months, did any member in this 
household receive any payment either in cash or 
in other form: 
1. pension 0 1 
2. any insurance claims 0 1 
3. bank interest 0 1 
4. dividends 0 1 
5. loan repayment 0 1 
6. scholarship and grant 0 1 
7. gi ft 0 1 
8. heritage 0 1 
9. lottery winning 0 1 
10. land rent or house rent 0 1 
11. land sale 0 1 
12. vehicle sale 0 1 
13. house sale 0 1 
14. transfer of money by 0 1 
relatives from elsewhere 
Section 10 Housing and ownership of durable. 
(Direct observation by the interviewer is needed) 
Part B 
The annual amount 
of earning by 
every member was: 
(baht) 
· ......... 
.......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
· ......... 
1. How many bedroom do you have? .......••. 
2. Is the house of permanent type (last longer than 5 years)? 
(1) more than 5 years (2) less than 5 years (3) others, specify •. 
3. Are you an owner-occupier of the house? 
(1) yes (2) a tenant (3) others, specify .• 
4. Do you have these household durab1es? 
stove, open flam gas 
microwave/oven 
fridge 
electric fan 
radio 
television 
video tape player/recorder 
washing machine 
bicycle. 
motor bicycle 
motor car 
tricycle 
other (specify) •......•.... 
no 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
286 
yes 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Section 11 Satisfaction. 
Part A How do you rate satisfaction level of the following health 
institutions? 
Strongly Not Very 
dissatisfied satisfied 
1. Buddhachinaraj hospital 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
2. Military hospital 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
3. Private hospital 1 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
4. Private hospital 2 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
5. Private hospital 3 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
6. Private hospital 4 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
7. Municipal clinic 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
8. Private clinic 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 3 4 
b. Costs of care 1 2 3 4 
c. Doctor/patient relationships 1 2 3 4 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 3 4 
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9. Drug store 
a. Quality of clinical care 1 2 
b. Costs of care 1 2 
c. Other personnel attention 1 2 
10. Others, specify ....•......... 
a. Quality of clinical care , 2 
b. Costs of care , 2 
c. Doctor/patient relationships , 2 
d. Other personnel attention 1 2 
Part B What is your opinion towards doctors' income in 
institutions? 
Too 
1" little little 
a. Doctors in public institutions 1 2 
b. Doctors in private hospitals 1 2 
c. Doctors in private clinics 1 2 
Part C What is your opinion towards your payments? 
Too 
little little 
12. Social Security contribution 1 2 
13. Private insurance premium 1 2 
14. Tax payment 1 2 
Part 0 What is your opinion towards the existing health 
15. Public health institution. 
a. good, no change is needed 
b. needs some minor changes, ego ...•••.•.••..•....• 
C. needs major changes, ego ...•...•••..••.......... 
d. needs fundamental changes, ego .•.•.•••.•...•..•. 
16. Private health sector. 
a. good, no change is needed 
b. needs some minor changes, ego .•••••••••••.•.•••• 
C. needs major changes, ego •.•.••.••••••••••••••••. 
d. needs fundamental changes, eg. • ••••..•.•••.•.••. 
17. Other comments 
. 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
these 
Too 
Much much 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
Too 
Much much 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
institutions? 
· ................................................................. . 
· ........................................... , ..................... . 
· ................................................................. . 
Section 12 Deaths in household. 
1. Your household has been living in this municipal area for •••• years. 
2. In the past 5 years, are there any deaths in your family? 
(0) no (1) yes, specify 
Years (1986-1991) Age at death Sex Cause Place Treatment 
· .............................................................. . 
· .............................................................. . 
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Tracer card There are three tracer cards read by the interviewer to the 
respondents: 
Tracer card one Severity of illness: It is measured by degree of 
reduced capacity of daily activity according to age group and 
occupations. 
1. For adults in working age 
Grade 1 could not work at all 
Grade 2 could do only light work 
Grade 3 could work but not so laborious as normal people 
Grade 4 active normal performance for all types of work 
2. For housewife 
Grade 1 
Grade 2 
could not do the housework at all 
could do only some work. limited to some types and 
quantities of housework 
Grade 3 
Grade 4 
could work but not so laborious as normal housewife 
could work normally for all type of housework 
3. For student aged 7-16 years. 
Grade 1 could not study 
Grade 2 could study at a limited level 
Grade 3 could study normally but with limited physical exertion 
Grade 4 normal ability to study with physical fitness for all 
activities 
4. For children 6 years and under. 
Grade 1 
Grade 2 
Grade 3 
Grade 4 
could not play with other children 
could play but no physical exertion 
could play but limited to some activities ego running 
could play normally 
Tracer card two Chronic illness is defined as chronic symptom of any 
illness which lasts more than three months or any diseases below: 
asthma 
haemorrhoids 
skin disease 
tuberculosis 
allergic diseases 
chronic arthritis 
chronic bronchitis 
tumour (benign) 
convulsion 
chronic sinusitis 
chronic cholecystitis 
diabetes mellitus 
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rheumatic disease 
peptic ulcer 
thyroid disease/goitre 
hypertension 
nephritis. renal stone 
hernia 
heart disease 
psychosis/neurosis 
disease of prostrate gland 
varicose vein 
hepatitis 
carcinoma 
Tracer card three Disability is referred to any of these conditions: 
deafness (one or both ears) 
blindness (one or both eyes) 
cleft palate 
abnormalities in speech 
amputation of fingers or toes, hand or feet 
amputation of leg or arm 
paralysis of limb(s) 
congenital defects, ego cerebral palsy etc. 
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